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ABSTRACT 
EPICUREAN JUSTICE AND LAW 
Jan Maximilian Robitzsch 
Susan Sauvé Meyer 
This dissertation concerns a cluster of related issues surrounding the Epicurean 
conception of justice. First, I show that the Epicureans defend a sophisticated kind of 
social contract theory and maintain a kind of legal positivism, views that are widely held 
today and so are of continuing interest for contemporary readers. In doing so, I argue 
that thinking about justice and law forms an integral part of Epicurean philosophy (pace 
the standard view). Second, I take up some neglected issues regarding justice and so 
provide detailed accounts of the metaphysics of moral properties in Epicureanism as 
well as of Epicurean moral epistemology. 
 After the introduction in chapter 1, I set out the main features of the Epicurean 
view of justice and law in chapters 2-4. In chapter 2, I explain the basics of the 
Epicurean conception of justice as an agreement and relate it to Epicurean ethics as 
whole. In chapter 3, I examine Epicurean culture stories and I point out in what way the 
Epicurean view is a kind of social contract theory. In chapter 4, I argue that the most 
important aspect of the Epicurean conception of justice from a metaethical perspective is 
that justice, a moral fact, depends on benefit, a natural fact about the world. On the basis 
of this analysis, I subsequently argue that the Epicurean conception of the law is best 
understood as a kind of inclusive positivism. 
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After having laid out the Epicurean view in this way, I enlarge the conversation in 
chapters 5-7. In chapter 5, I discuss the motivations Epicurean agents have to be just 
and comment on the relationship between contractual justice, that is, justice that comes 
about by agreements, and aretetic justice, that is, justice understood as a virtue or 
character disposition. In chapter 6, I turn to the metaphysics of justice, arguing that the 
just, for the Epicureans, is an accidental property. In chapter 7, finally, I show that 
Epicurean agents come to have an understanding of justice via sense experience in the 
same way that they have an understanding of everyday objects.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation concerns a cluster of related issues surrounding the conception 
of justice and law that Epicurus of Samos (c. 340 to 270 BCE) and his followers during 
the Hellenistic period advanced.1 While the Epicurean conception of justice and law has 
received some attention since the 1970s,2 some contemporary introductions to ancient 
political thought or ancient legal thought still do not discuss Epicurean ideas at all.3 
Others, in the wake of Herman Usener’s remark in the Epicurea that “surely nobody will 
hold that those [Principal Doctrines] on political matters […] are among the stronger 
teachings of Epicurus”4 – dismiss them as simplistic.5 This is unfortunate, since the 
Epicureans have an interesting contribution to make to the history of legal and political 
philosophy. On my reading, they defend a sophisticated social contract theory and argue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On Epicurus as well as the Epicurean school, see especially Erler 1994 (including an extensive 
bibliography). Also important are DeWitt 1936, Schmid 1984 [1962], Steckel 1968, Longo 
Auricchio 1978, Frischer 1982, Clay 1983, Asmis 2001, and Clay 2010 [2009]. On Roman 
Epicureanism, see Castner 1988, Sedley 2010 [2009], and Erler 2010 [2009]. On Diogenes of 
Oenoanda, see Gordon 1996. Good recent introductions into Epicurean philosophy are 
Giovacchini 2008, O’Keefe 2010, and Verde 2013. 
2 The most important scholarly contributions on the Epicurean justice and law are Falchi 1902, 
Philippson 1910a, Philippson 1910b, Chroust 1953, Müller 1969a, Müller 1969b, Chroust 1971, 
Müller 1972, Goldschmidt 1976, Nichols 1976, Goldschmidt 1977, Goldschmidt 1981, Müller 
1983, Long 1985, Vander Waerdt 1987, Müller 1988, Vander Waerdt 1988, Sprute 1989: 39ff., 
Annas 1993a: 293ff., Alberti 1995, Armstrong 1997, Minutoli 1997, Morel 2000, O’Keefe 2001a, 
Waggle 2003, Ranger 2007, Coleman 2012, and Thrasher 2013. 
3 See, for instance, Böckenförde 2006.  
4 illa de rebus publicis […] nemo profecto inter poteriora discipliae Epicurae habebit. Usener 
1887: XLIV. 
5 In Adomeit 2001, for instance, the chapter dealing with the Epicureans is entitled “Epikur oder 
das Müdewerden des griechischen Geistes” and at one point in the chapter, the author remarks 
in regard to an aspect of the Epicurean conception of law: “das ist nun wirklich die denkbar 
flachste Rechtsphilosophie!” (95). 
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for an interesting kind of legal positivism, theories that are still widely held today among 
political and legal philosophers.   
Since mentioning the Epicureans and politics in the same sentence might cause 
some surprise, let me hasten to add that my emphasis here lies on philosophy, since in 
terms of practical politics, the Epicureans indeed advocate for a form of political 
quietism.6 One of Epicurus’ most famous sayings is the imperative “live unnoticed [lathē 
biōsas]” and, elsewhere, Epicurus counsels the Sage not to be politically active.7 
Furthermore, the withdrawal from a life among the many into a community of like-minded 
friends is the practical ideal for all Epicurean agents, not the active life of the polis or res 
publica.8  
Given these suggestions, one can easily see how the Epicureans were 
understood as apolitical or antipolitical thinkers, especially since they lived at a time in 
Greek history that, after the rise of Alexander, was characterized by a loss in political 
freedom of formerly independent Greek city-states and by a shift from public to private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Even in terms of practical politics, as Geert Roskam convincingly argues in detail in his 2007 
book, the Epicureans are not banned from participating in the public sphere. There are many 
situations, in which political activity may serve Epicurean interests better than an abstention from 
politics. It is instructive to compare the Epicurean with the Stoic position here, which is nicely 
captured in fr. 9 Usener (= Seneca, On Leasure 3.2): “Epicurus says: ‘The Sage will not engage 
in politics, unless something disturbs him.’ Zeno says: ‘The Sage will engage in politics, unless 
something impedes him’ [Epicurus ait: ‘Non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens, nisi si quid 
intervenerit.’ Zenon ait: ‘Accedet ad rem publicam, nisi si quid impedierit’].” 
7 Frr. 8 and 551 Usener. 
8 See, for instance, KD 14. In a recent paper, Jeffrey Green argues for the view that the 
Epicureans should be understood as extrapolitical thinkers, rather than merely apolitical or anti-
political ones. He characterizes such a view as follows: “[A]n extrapolitical perspective does not 
necessarily reject politics once and for all but continually looks to achieve a temporary or episodic 
transcendence of political commitments and concerns, often with the expectation of a future 
reentry into political life” (Green 2015: 493). While it is true that the Epicureans do not reject 
politics unconditionally, it seems to me to be a mischaracterization to claim that they continually 
hope to return to a political life. This seriously misconstrues what the best life for the Epicureans 
is. 
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concerns.9 However, as I argue in more detail in this dissertation pace scholars who 
maintain that thinking about the political realm only plays a negligible role in 
Epicureanism, the Epicureans also develop a sophisticated theory of justice and the law 
that forms an integral part of their philosophy. The main function of the Epicurean theory 
of justice and law is to help Epicurean agents achieve the ethical end in life, pleasure 
(hēdonē), understood as the freedom from mental distress (ataraxia) and from bodily 
pain (aponia). Justice and the laws regulate the interactions between human beings, 
which promote security, which in turn promotes freedom from mental distress and from 
bodily pain. In short, then, one might even go so far as to say that Epicurean philosophy 
would not be complete without its conception of justice and law. 
The fact that justice and law play a key role in Epicureanism does not make the 
Epicurean conception of justice and law interesting, though. What earns the Epicurean 
conception this attribute is that the Epicureans argue for a kind of social contract theory 
and maintain a kind of legal positivism (that is, the view that the existence of law is 
based on social facts).10 This makes their view especially appealing to modern readers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 On the Hellenistic political thought and its historical background, see, for instance, Aalders 
1975, Bichler 1988, or Habicht 1988. For a discussion of the relationship between philosophers 
and the active life in the 4th and 3rd century, see Scholz 1998.   
10 Like any theory, the Epicurean theory was not created in a vacuum. Accordingly, the 
Epicureans probably drew heavily on older Presocratic and Sophistic theories in order to develop 
their ideas. The extent of influence is difficult to assess, since many of these theories have come 
down to us only in a fragmentary state and their interpretation is contested among scholars. A 
case in point is Democritus’ ethical and political theory. Given what we know about Epicurus’ 
dependency on Democritus in other areas of his philosophy, one would also expect dependency 
in practical philosophy. Unfortunately, though, we are particularly poorly informed about 
Democritus’ thought in regard to ethics and politics and so it is difficult to say what influence 
Democritus had on Epicurean doctrines. (For Democritean ethics, see Vlastos 1945, Vlastos 
1946, Kahn 1985, Procopé 1989, and Procopé 1990. For the influence of Democritus and other 
Sophists on the Epicurean view, see Müller 1972, Sedley 1976, Huby 1977, Müller 1980, Müller 
1984, and Warren 2002.) By contrast, the main target of the Epicurean conception of justice and 
the law seems to be the Platonic conception. This is especially clear in book II of the Republic 
where Glaucon develops a challenge to Socrates by setting out an account of justice that bears 
4	  
	  
After all, many contemporary political philosophers are sympathetic to social contract 
theory, and legal positivism is the dominant view in legal philosophy. 
In chapters 2-4, I set out the main features of the Epicurean view of justice and 
the law. In chapter 2, I first situate the Epicurean conception of justice and law in 
Epicurean ethics as a whole in the way that I already briefly outlined above. Second, I 
describe the relationship between benefit and justice more closely since the Epicureans 
not only claim that justice consists in agreements, but also that agents agree on what is 
beneficial. And third, I discuss which parties are able to form agreements on the 
Epicurean conception.  
In chapter 3, I turn to Epicurean justice and law from a diachronic perspective. I 
examine the Epicurean accounts of cultural development and point out in what way the 
Epicurean view is a kind of social contract theory. In accordance with early modern 
theories of the social contract, the Epicureans roughly distinguish between three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
much similarity to the Epicurean one. According to this account, for instance, justice arises as a 
result of agreements agents form with each other because they fear suffering harm. Furthermore, 
agents practice justice only because they fear sanction mechanisms that are in place to prevent 
wrong-doing. Since the Republic as a whole can be read as Plato’s answer to Glaucon’s 
challenge, it is most tempting to read Epicurus as someone who is renewing Glaucon’s argument, 
just as Glaucon had renewed Thrasymachus’. The precise relationship between the Aristotelian 
and the Epicurean conceptions of justice and the law is again more difficult to gage. Ever since 
Bignone’s magisterial two-volume 1936 study, the relationship between the two thinkers has been 
subject to much speculation (now see especially Jannone 1969). I will largely set aside possible 
Aristotelian influence in this investigation. Finally, the Skeptics and the Stoics play some role for 
the development of Epicurean doctrines on justice and the law, but this role is probably minor. In 
both cases, the influence seems to be detectable primarily in later Epicurean authors, after core 
Epicurean ideas have probably already been developed. (On innovation vs. tradition in Epicurean 
school, see the papers in Fish and Sanders 2011.) For instance, in Polystratus and Philodemus, 
one can find arguments against the relativity of the fine and shameful and other entities in the 
moral domain and so a view that a Skeptic might hold. However, since Skepticism only 
reemerges as a serious philosophical view after the Academy takes its Skeptical turn in 266 BCE 
and both Polystratus and Philodemus write after this date, it seems likely that these texts are to 
be explained as responses to the change in intellectual climate. The case of the Stoics is similar. 
For a more detailed case study, I refer the reader to chapter 3 where I discuss the competing 
readings of the cradle argument offered by the two schools and the possible debate about the 
doctrine of oikeiōsis.  
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separate phases of development: (1) the original state, in which human beings live 
dispersed, (2) a first phusis-phase of cultural development, in which human beings come 
together to form communities, and (3) a second nomos-phase of cultural development, 
in which human beings form legal and political states. These parts correspond to 
different degrees of establishment and human understandings of justice and the law. No 
justice and laws exist in the original state, while the first phase of development features 
justice without laws and the second phase both justice and laws. 
In chapter 4, I draw on the results of the previous two chapters to work out the 
metaethical implications of the Epicurean conception of justice. I then classify the 
Epicurean theory of law in terms of the vocabulary of modern analytic philosophy of law. 
I begin by situating the Epicurean theory of justice in the ancient nomos-phusis-debate, 
claiming that the Epicurean view occupies a middle position between the view that 
justice is completely manmade or artificial and the view that it is completely natural. I 
argue that the most important aspect of the Epicurean theory of justice from a 
metaethical perspective is that justice, an ethical fact, depends on benefit, a natural fact, 
about the world. Consequently, I classify the Epicurean theory of justice as naturalistic. 
On the basis of this metaethical analysis, I subsequently argue in the second half of the 
chapter that the Epicurean conception of the law is best understood as a kind of 
inclusive positivism and I show in detail how this reading improves on previous attempts 
to describe the Epicurean position. 
After having laid out the Epicurean view in this way, I enlarge the conversation in 
chapters 5-7 and paint a more complete picture of Epicurean conception of justice and 
law by discussing it from moral-psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological 
perspectives. In chapter 5, I discuss the motivations Epicurean agents have to be just 
6	  
	  
and comment on the relationship between contractual justice, that is, justice that comes 
about by agreements, and aretetic justice, that is, justice understood as a virtue or 
character disposition. I argue that generally contractual and aretetic justice operate in 
different spheres and have different addressees, but that the two spheres overlap insofar 
as on the most general level the content of the agreements that lead to justice (morality) 
both determine what is lawful and what is just (understood as a virtue). Furthermore, I 
show in this chapter that for non-Sages who do not grasp the usefulness of the law and 
for non-Sages who do, contractual justice is important to uphold order. However, non-
Sages are motivated to be contractually just by following the laws, while Sages are just 
because they possess a virtuous character.  
In chapter 6, I turn to the metaphysics of justice, arguing that the just, on the 
Epicurean view, is an accidental property.  In doing so, I comment in detail on the claim 
of Principal Doctrine (Kuria Doxa = KD) 33 that there is no justice in itself (kath’ heauto). 
Pace commentators who claim that it is a straightforward denial of a Platonic claim, I 
maintain that the criticism of Plato’s view is indirect. To do so, I draw on the history and 
usage of the term ‘kath’ heauto’ in the Garden, Peripatos, and Academy. I then discuss 
in detail how the Epicurean understanding of justice compares and contrasts with the 
Platonic one. If properly understood, KD 33, on my reading, constitutes a whole-sale 
rejection of the Platonic theory of justice: Pace Plato, (1) justice is not an abstract entity, 
(2) it is not a universal in the way that the Form of justice could be said to be a universal, 
and (3) it in no way is the most real, most basic, and most fundamental entity in the 
ontological schema.  
In chapter 7, finally, I argue that Epicurean agents come to have an 
understanding of justice in the same way that they have an understanding of everyday 
7	  
	  
objects. I establish this claim by appealing to the metaphysical status of the just as an 
accidental property that is ontologically in the same category as other non-moral 
accidental properties and to the Epicurean commitment to an atomistic theory of 
perception, according to which all accidental properties, which includes the just, can 
become objects of perception. Furthermore, I show in this chapter that Epicurean agents 
not only come to have an understanding of the just via sense experience, but that this 
understanding is itself non-inferential, that is, that it does not involve syllogistic reasoning 
in any way. To support this reading, I turn to Epicurean prolēpseis or preconceptions, 
which, on my reading, constitute a functional, non-inferential understanding of an object. 
I end with some implications of the Epicurean theory of prolēpsis for practical politics.   
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2. THE BASIC EPICUREAN VIEW: JUSTICE AS AN AGREEMENT 
This chapter sets out what I take to be the basic Epicurean view: that justice 
consists of an agreement (sunthēkē) over not harming each other and not being 
harmed.11  
The doctrine of contractual justice is most clearly asserted in the Principal 
Doctrines (Kuriai Doxai = KD):12 
KD 32. Nothing is just or unjust in relation to however many of those animals not 
able to form agreements over not harming and not being harmed; so too with 
however many of the peoples unable or unwilling to form agreements over not 
harming and not being harmed.13 
KD 33. There is never any justice in itself, but an agreement over not harming 
and not being harmed in the dealings with each other in any place whatever at 
any time whatever.14 
KD 35. There is no one who secretly violating any of the things agreed upon with 
each other in regard to not harming and not being harmed is confident that he will 
escape notice, even if for now, he escapes notice numberless times. For until his 
death, it is unclear whether he will escape notice.15 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Sunthēkē and its cognates can also be translated by ‘compact,’ ‘contract,’ or ‘covenant.’ I have 
chosen the translation ‘agreement’ because it is broader than compact, contract, or covenant, 
and, as this chapter will show, much better captures the idea that the kinds of agreements that 
Epicurean authors have in mind are often very generic and informal, which is not implied by the 
alternative translations just mentioned. 
12 See also Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V.1020. 
13 Ὅσα τῶν ζῴων µὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ µὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλα µηδὲ 
βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα µὴ 
ἐδύνατο ἢ µὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ µὴ βλάπτειν µηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. KD 
32 = LS 22A; Trans. by Long and Sedley, modified; emphasis added. 
14 Οὐκ ἦν τι καθ᾽ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς µετ᾽ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ᾽ ὁπηλίκους δή 
ποτε ἀει τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ µὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι. KD 33. Trans. mine; emphasis 
added. 
15 Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρᾳ τι ποιοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ µὴ βλάπτειν µηδὲ 
βλάπτεσθαι, πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἄν µυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνῃ. Μέχρι γὰρ 
καταστρπφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει. KD 35. Trans. mine; emphasis added. 
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Furthermore, KD 31 claims: 
The naturally just is a sumbolon of benefit in regard to not harming each other 
and not being harmed.16 
 
There is some disagreement on how to translate the word ‘sumbolon’ in the last 
text quoted.17 If it is understood to mean agreement, then KD 31 makes the same point 
as KD 32, 33, and 35. All four maxims then claim that justice is ‘contractual,’ albeit in 
somewhat different language. However, some commentators take ‘sumbolon’ in KD 31 
to mean token or expression.18 These commentators claim that Epicurus makes a more 
general point, namely, that what is naturally just is an expression of benefit. Regardless 
of what one takes sumbolon to mean, though, I will show in this chapter that Epicurus 
and the Epicureans both claim that there is a close relationship between justice and 
benefit and that there is a close relationship between justice and agreements.19 Since 
there is independent evidence for both these claims that do not rely on KD 31, not much 
hinges on the precise meaning of the word ‘sumbolon.’ 
In this chapter, I will first defend the thesis that the formula “not harming and not 
being harmed” is an explication of security (asphaleia), an important good in Epicurean 
theory (2.1.). Security in turn is beneficial (sumpheron) on the Epicurean view insofar as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύµβολον τοῦ συµφέροντος εἰς τὸ µὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους µηδὲ 
βλάπτεσθαι. Trans. mine. 
17 On the meanings of the word sumbolon, see Müri 1976 and Struck 2004.  
18 See, for instance, Schofield 2010 [2000]: 440, fn. 11 and Brown 2010 [2009]: 192, fn. 44. While 
indeed the meaning of ‘sumbolon’ is first and above all ‘agreement,’ Aristotle (On Interpretation 
16a4 and 24b2) already uses ‘sumbolon’ in a philosophical context to mean ‘token’ or 
‘expression’ and not merely ‘agreement.’ Epicurean usage of ‘sumbolon’ as ‘token’ or ‘expression’ 
could thus be said to merely follow the precedent set by earlier thinkers such as Aristotle. 
19 Besides KD 31, KD 36-38 also discuss the close relationship between justice and benefit. 
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the things pertaining to security promote the achievement of the highest goal, pleasure 
(hēdonē), understood as the freedom from bodily pain (aponia) and mental distress 
(ataraxia). Second, I will turn to how to understand the process of forming agreements 
from the Epicurean point of view (2.2.). I will argue that it is best understood as coming 
to a reciprocal understanding about which things – among a set of things that are 
beneficial – are most appropriate for agents in regard to the mutual dealings with each 
other given their circumstances. I will distinguish two forms of agreements, which 
foreshadows a key feature of Epicurean social contract theory and legal positivism that I 
discuss in more detail in subsequent chapters: (1) agreements that lead to justice and so 
more generally moral norms and (2) agreements that lead to the laws.20 Third, I will 
discuss the requirements an agent must fulfill in order to form agreements (2.3.). I will 
argue that (1) while the Epicureans do not mention agreements with certain groups that 
are traditionally excluded, there is at least some evidence for agreements or at least 
agreement-like understandings with these groups and that (2) although Epicurean theory 
focuses on agreements and these agreements focus on the interests of the contracting 
parties, these interests are compatible with the just treatment of those who do not 
themselves form the agreements. 
2.1. The Content of Agreements and Their Role in Epicurean Theory 
In this section, I will explore the content of Epicurean agreements and the role 
agreements play in Epicurean theory as a whole. KD 32, 33, and 35, which were quoted 
above, specify that agreements are over “not harming and not being harmed.” I will 
argue that this means that Epicurean agreements are contracts over matters of security. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 One might think that these two types of agreements are equivalent to what are later called 
‘pactum unionis’ and ‘pactum subjectionis’ (see, for instance, Cohen 2014: 96), but see also the 
comments in Müller 1985: 13.  
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However, this basic picture is complicated by KD 31, which also mentions benefit (to 
sumpheron) in regard to justice.21 In what follows, I will explain that for an agreement to 
be beneficial means for it to be conducive to obtaining the state of pleasure (understood 
as the freedom from bodily harm and mental distress) for the agreeing parties. While 
being secure is certainly beneficial in obtaining pleasure, it is unclear whether there are 
other things that can be agreed on in the same way as agents agree not to harm each 
other. Since there is some conflicting textual evidence on the matter, I will thus maintain 
at the end of the section that different Epicureans probably had varying conceptions 
about what counts as beneficial and so about what agreements amount to. 
The Principal Doctrines quoted examined above all state that agreements that 
lead to justice consist in refraining from doing harm. On a first reading, perhaps the most 
intuitive understanding, harm can refer to the direct physical harm any individual may 
suffer. Refraining from harm then means that agents, for instance, pledge in agreements 
not to rob each other and not to kill each other.22 However, Tim O’Keefe suggests that 
refraining from harm may also include the indirect harm one could do to others.23 For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Again, see also KD 36-38 that link justice in relation to benefit. 
22 In this vein, it has been argued that Epicurean contractualism is the answer to a collective 
action problem: Agents are better off not being harmed, but because harming others is in some 
scenarios supposedly useful to agents, agents do not abstain from harming because the cost is 
higher than the confidence that they will actually receive the greater good of not being harmed. 
This results in a stalemate that is only resolved by the agreements. See Denyer 1983: 144ff. as 
well as Campbell 2002a and Campbell 2003: 256ff. While such a reading may be compelling at 
first, it struggles to explain that, on the Epicurean view, agents are not naturally disposed to harm 
others and that ideal agents, Sages, never commit an injustice (which includes harming) for profit. 
See fr. 582 Usener as well as the discussion in chapter 5.   
23 2001a: 139ff. O’Keefe distinguishes between a narrow reading and an expansive reading of the 
claim that justice is an agreement not to harm each other. According the narrow reading, justice 
as an agreement not to harm each other excludes indirect harm, and according to the expansive 
reading, justice as an agreement not to harm each other includes indirect harm. Below, I 
distinguish between these two readings as well as a third reading according to which justice is an 
agreement over what is beneficial, which also includes direct obligations towards others.  
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instance, it may include that agents do not poison the local well or stream, which other 
members of the community use to fulfill one of their natural and necessary desires, such 
as the desire for drink. In this vein, Hermarchus explicitly mentions provisions that were 
put in place to refrain from killing certain animals like sheep and cattle, because they are 
useful to human beings to procure their daily livelihood.24 Accordingly, when agents 
pledge not to harm each other in a mutual agreement, they – at times – seem to oblige 
themselves to cause neither direct nor indirect harm to those with whom they form an 
agreement.25  
It is difficult to say, tough, whether the textual evidence really allows us to 
conclude that the phrase ‘not harming and not being harmed’ also includes indirect 
harm, as O’Keefe claims. After all, the distinction between direct and indirect harms has 
no equivalent in Greek and there is some danger of importing an anachronistic 
distinction. Furthermore, the textual evidence for cases of indirect harm is very slim. 
But the question of indirect harm aside, the phrase “not to be harmed” also 
leaves open whether ‘not to be harmed’ means ‘not being harmed by other people’ or 
more broadly ‘not being harmed by other people as well as by animals and any other 
potential sources of harm.’ That is, are agreements made only among contracting parties 
or are they made among contracting parties and against third parties? The textual 
evidence seems to suggest that harm from third parties is also to be included in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Hermarchus, fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On Abstinence I.11.2ff. The idea here is that 
not being able to use these animals would constitute a harm to the agent. 
25 A potential problem for O’Keefe’s reading is that the passage in Hermarchus, which he uses to 
back up his reading, deals with a law and not a moral norm, that is, with agreements of law, which 
are later, instead of agreement of justice, which are prior. See Alberti 1995: 167 as well as the 
discussion of her position below. However, it seems to me to be a fair assumption that there are 
also moral norms whose content resembles the content of the laws and so that the Hermarchus 
passage supports the point O’Keefe wishes to make.  
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agreements. Hermarchus, for instance, argues that our primitive ancestors came 
together and formed agreements in order to fend off wild animals.26 And while Lucretius 
does not explicitly claim that agreements are directed against third parties, he mentions 
that the only threat that human beings face prior to forming agreements are wild 
animals.27 Consequently, like Hermarchus, Lucretius seems to endorse the idea that the 
harm human beings preempt in agreements is any kind of physical harm, not just the 
harm that could be committed by the parties forming the agreement. It follows, then, that 
although potential harm from third parties is not mentioned in the Principal Doctrines or 
elsewhere in Epicurus’ own writings, it is best not to unduly restrict the verb ‘to be 
harmed’ (Greek: ‘blaptesthai’; Latin: ‘laederi’) to the harm caused by other human beings 
in light of the evidence in Hermarchus and Lucretius; ‘to be harmed’ could also refer to 
union and protection against whatever external threats may arise – human or otherwise. 
In short, then, Epicurean agents will form agreements about things that cause direct 
harm and things that would cause harm indirectly both by the contracting parties 
themselves and by third parties.  
So far the discussion has centered on physical harm. Yet there is no reason to 
restrict harm to physical harm when it comes to the Epicurean view. For the Epicureans, 
the actual physical harm that agents experience is only the first step; a key component 
of Epicureanism is to alleviate the mental distress that agents experience in regard to 
potentially being physically harmed. In this context, recall that freedom from mental 
distress plays a key role in Epicureanism. According to the Epicureans, the highest goal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Hermarchus, fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On Abstinence I.10.1  
27 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V. 988ff. 
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in life is the pursuit of pleasure (hēdonē).28 However, by pleasure, the Epicureans do not 
primarily mean the sensual pleasures of food, wine, and sex (although the pursuit of 
some such pleasures is not precluded by their theory), but rather a state that is 
characterized negatively by the absence of bodily pain and mental distress, aponia and 
ataraxia.29 Consequently, the removal of fear is a pillar of Epicurean philosophy, which – 
in certain ways – can be understood as a predecessor to modern psychotherapy.30 
Be this as it may, the discussion of the scope of refraining from harm shows that 
being safe – in some way – is key in Epicurean agreements, since it helps agents to 
achieve a state of aponia and ataraxia. The same idea is also captured by the technical 
term ‘security’ (asphaleia), which figures prominently in Epicurean writings.31 Security 
has a dual purpose in Epicureanism: If agents are secure, they are first protected from 
potential sources of pain and, second, their fear and mental disturbances connected with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See, for instance, Letter to Menoeceus X.128. 
29 Ibid., 131f. Note in the metaphor in this context. ‘Ataraktos’ (and modern Greek ‘ataraxos’) 
means ‘calm’ or ‘still’ and is applied to the state of the sea. When one is free from mental distress, 
one’s mental landscape thus resembles a calm sea, not raging, choppy waters. The Epicurean 
understanding of pleasure is quite unorthodox and even in antiquity caused much confusion – as 
the long complaint about Epicurus’ unorthodox usage of the notion of pleasure in Cicero 
indicates. See On Ends II.6ff. Perhaps some of the confusion can be cleared up if one has in 
mind Epicurean hedonism most often advises that we lead a pleasant, not a pleasurable life, 
although again pleasurable things are not excluded from the Epicurean point of view if they do not 
infringe on the goal of leading a pleasant life. On the Epicurean conception of pleasure, see, for 
instance, Brochard 2009 [1904], Bailey 1964 [1928]: 482ff., Steckel 1960, Diano 1974: 67ff., 
Gosling and Taylor 1982: 345ff., Hossenfelder 1986, Mitsis 1988: 11ff., Purinton 1993, Cooper 
1999, Erler and Schofield 2010 [1999], Nikolsky 2001, Held 2007, Arenson 2009, Wolfsdorf 2009, 
Woolf 2010 [2009], and Wolfsdorf 2013: 144ff.  
30 The focus on this psychotherapy has some strange consequences for Epicurean philosophy, 
especially for the issue of what will harm a Sage. A Sage will have internalized the precepts of the 
Four-Fold Remedy that pain is easy to endure and that death is nothing to her, which seems to 
make it difficult to find a scenario, in which a Sage will genuinely experience harm. If death is 
nothing to the Sage, does killing him really constitute a harm? For discussion of this problem, see 
Rosenbaum 1987.  
31 For asphaleia, see especially KD 7, 13, and 14. This does not mean that agents have to agree 
with Epicurean theory in order to form agreements but that Epicureanism broadly construes 
security and harm, making the theory appealing to all sorts of agents.  
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suffering pain are alleviated. Security thus complements the program of scientific 
investigation that serves the purpose of mitigating the threat that natural phenomena 
pose (including the divine) – as KD 13, for instance, clearly sets out.32 
It would be wrong to think, though, that the Epicureans argue that agreements 
are the only – or in fact the best – way to achieve security for the Epicureans. 
Agreements are one of several means to achieve the state of ataraxia and aponia, and 
so they need to be understood in the context of these other means to achieve this end. 
For the Epicureans, the highest form of security is the withdrawal from the dealings with 
others. By this, they mean the life in a community of friends,33 which is a life of not being 
affected by the many.34  Epicurean theory can thus be characterized as devaluing the 
active life, which earned it its reputation for being apolitical or antipolitcal.35 Accordingly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 “There is no profit in procuring security in relation to human beings if things above and beneath 
the earth and indeed all in the boundless [universe] remain matters of suspicion [Οὐθὲν ὄφελος 
ᾖν τὴν κατ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν 
ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ]” (Trans. by Bailey, modified). On security, see also 
Barrigazzi 1983. Even if it were unauthentic, the Letter to Pythocles in this context is a great 
example of how Epicurean research into natural phenomena contributes to freedom from mental 
distress by educating agents about the true nature of things.  
33 The withdrawal from the many in the Epicurean school could have played a similar doctrinal 
function as the theoretical life does in Aristotle. In Aristotle, an agent should try to partake in the 
life of contemplation as much as possible, but the human condition will prevent her from devoting 
herself exclusively to the life of contemplation. Desires for basic human needs such as food or 
drink will compel her to interact with others – which means to lead a practical life. Likewise, in 
Epicurus an agent should be self-sufficient, which in its highest form means the withdrawal from 
society, but this withdrawal may not be possible because human nature according to Epicureans 
makes us depend on others for our well being. In this context, it is also interesting to point out the 
theological dimension of this idea. The withdrawal from the many (like Aristotle’s advocacy of the 
life of contemplation) may be Epicurus’ version of the common ancient idea of the imitation of the 
divine (hōmōiosis theōi; see Bignone 1936: I.134f., Schmid 1951: 127ff., Müller 1991: 124, Erler 
2002, and Liu 2005).  
34 The distinction between the Epicurean community and the rest of humanity is very important in 
Epicureanism. For ‘hoi polloi’ in Epicurean writings, see, for instance, KD 14, and Letter to 
Menoeceus 123 (3 times), 124, 125, and 134. 
35 See, for instance, von Arnim 1898: 73, von Arnim 1910: 148f., and Zeller 2013 [1923]: III.1, 486 
(470); see also fr. 552 Usener as well as Vatican Saying (Gnomologium Vaticanum = GV) 58. 
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the Epicureans claim that even if societal agreements are in place and an agent has the 
power and personal means to protect herself against others, the life among the many 
always remains risky. As a result, such a life is worse than the life in the community of 
friends:  
The simplest security is that which comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from 
the many, although a certain degree of security from other men does come by 
means of the power to repel [attacks] and by means of prosperity.36 
 
In the same vein, Epicurus famously advises his disciples to “live unnoticed”37 
and explicitly claims that the Sage “will not be politically active.”38 This attitude already 
brought the Epicureans much ridicule in antiquity, culminating in Cicero’s remark at On 
the Orator III.63f. that if all eminent men who had reached the state of ataraxia withdrew 
from public life, they would not be able to remain in this blissful state for a long time.39  
However, as more recent scholars argue, this view is too simple.40 Epicureans 
acknowledge that it is not always possible to withdraw from the many and thus to be 
secure in this way. First, not everyone is a Sage and it would be wrong to reduce the 
Epicurean theory to be directed only at Sages.41 Not everyone has the disposition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενοµένης µέχρι τινὸς δυνάµει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ, 
εἰλικρινεστάτη γίγνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια. KD 14. Trans. 
by Gerson/Inwood, modified. See also KD 6 and 7. In KD 7, asphaleia is even referred to as “the 
natural good [τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν].”   
37 λάθε βιώσας. Fr. 551 Usener. 
38 οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεται. Fr. 8 Usener. 
39 See also Plutarch, Against Colotes 1126e ff. 
40 See, for instance, Müller 1972: 78ff., Long 1985, and especially Roskam 2007. There is even 
some evidence that Epicurus himself had some interest in political matters. See Roskam 2007: 
50. 
41 In contradistinction to the Stoics who argue either that the figure of the Sage is only a 
regulatory ideal or that there are only very few people who have achieved the status of being a 
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necessary to live the life of a Sage. According to the Epicureans, not everyone has the 
bodily constitution (sōmatos hexis) or ethnic background (ethnos) to become a Sage,42 
which is a prerequisite for such a life. Likewise, Epicurus explicitly mentions people 
whose disposition is to lead a political life.43 These people are not to be stopped from 
following their nature, but rather encouraged to pursue the life that best fits them. For 
such people, it seems that security from others will be a major concern.44 Second, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sage, the Epicureans argue that there is a large number of sages in the world. See Delattre 
2003. Accordingly, we read in Philodemus that “one must not suppose that all [Sages] are friends 
of all – at least according to what ‘friends’ are usually called. For it is not possible that the infinite 
number of them come to know each other [οὐ µὴν ἀπάντα[ς] ἀ[πάν]των οἰητέον εἶναι [φίλ]ους. ᾐ 
κατὰ τὸ σύν[η]θές γε φίλοι καλοῦνται· τοὺς γὰ[ρ] ἀπείρους [ο]ὔ δυνατὸν ἀλλήλοις εἴς γνῶσιν 
φικνεῖσθαι].” On the Gods III, col. c.1.3ff. Diels. Given that not everyone is capable of being a 
Sage (see below), I take ‘apeiron’ here to mean ‘many’ (so many that not everyone can befriend 
everyone), but not literally an infinite number.   
42 See fr. 226 Usener. 
43 See fr. 555 Usener; see also Grilli 1996 and the typology of Epicurean forms of life in Liebich 
1960: 104ff. 
44 However, note again that, on the Epicurean view, life in society is only the second best option 
after the complete withdrawal from the many. Moreover, while fame and power can perhaps lead 
to security in the moment, they cannot ultimately guarantee a life free from bodily pain and mental 
distress (Philippson 1910a: 308f. as well Roskam 2007: 37ff. and 56ff.). Indeed, KD 7 only says 
that some people considered fame and reputation as means of attaining security from others and 
that if they were secure, they had achieved “the natural good” (= security). In other words, KD 7 is 
a hypothetical statement that leaves open whether fame and power can be used successfully to 
achieve security. The saying might therefore be understood as a meditation on the possibility of 
obtaining freedom from mental distress and bodily pain via the accumulation of power and fame 
and in fact stress that the belief of this possibility is mistaken (see also KD 6). Such a reading is 
corroborated by the culture story in Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things (V.1105ff.). There, the first 
kings mistakenly believe that erecting monarchies will keep them secure from their fellow human 
beings, which shows that power alone does not suffice to be free from mental distress and bodily 
pain. More importantly, though, the pursuit of fame and power as a means of obtaining security is 
in tension with the Epicurean commitment that human beings should above all cultivate their 
natural and necessary desires, pursue natural and unnecessary desires only when they bring no 
harm, and avoid unnatural and unnecessary desires altogether. See the detailed discussion in 
chapter 5. The desire for fame and the desire for power are prime examples of unnatural and 
unnecessary desires. Consequently, a prudent Epicurean will not desire fame and power as a 
means of attaining freedom from mental distress. The same idea is also asserted in GV 81, 
where wealth and fame are described as incontrollable; as such, they cannot give the soul 
ataraxia, and so a fortiori not asphaleia, either: “The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor 
joy be created by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect by the many or 
by anything else that is associated with the causes of unlimited desires [Οὐ λύει τήν τῆς ψυχῆς 
ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον ἀπογεννᾷ χαρὰν οὔτε πλοῦτος ὑπάρχων ὁ µέγιστος οὔθ᾽ ἡ παρὰ 
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circumstances might make it impossible for an agent to live a life withdrawn from the 
many. In such a case, an Epicurean seems to have no choice but to live with other 
human beings; political knowledge thus becomes beneficial to her to obtain security via 
reciprocal agreement.45 In other words, while there is a considerable amount of evidence 
that all things being equal, Epicureans advise that agents should not be implicated in 
political matters,46 political theorizing fulfills an important function in Epicurean theory. It 
helps agents attain security, which in turn helps achieve the Epicurean goal of living a 
life of aponia and ataraxia.47  
So far, I have argued that contractual justice is important because agreements 
are a component of the ways that agents achieve security, which in turn promotes 
aponia and ataraxia. This completes the first step of my argument and I now turn to the 
complication I already signaled above: KD 31 connects the just with the beneficial. 
Accordingly, one could say on a first reading that agreements in Epicureanism are 
beneficial to agents insofar as they help them in obtaining ataraxia.48 But are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
τοῖς πολλοῖς τιµὴ καὶ περίβλεψις οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αὶτίας].” Trans. by Bailey, 
modified. On the relationship between security and ataraxia, see Cicero, On Ends I.34f. and 52f. 
45 In the same vein, KD 39 advises Epicurean agents on how to deal with things depending on 
whether they can be influenced by them or whether they are beyond their sphere of influence. 
See Müller 1972: 117f. Finally, note that even if the withdrawal from the many is possible, this 
does not mean that Epicurean agents capable of withdrawing will live the life of hermits, 
completely isolated from others. As Asmis emphasizes, the imperative ‘lathē biōsas’ does not 
mean to live in a physically concealed way, that is, in hiding, but rather to blend in with the society 
and so to adopt a certain inner attitude (2001: 214). 
46 See especially the examples in Fowler 1989: 122ff. 
47 To show that political theorizing played some role in Epicureanism, finally, add a numerical 
argument: Eight of the forty Principal Doctrines deal explicitly with justice and the law. If thinking 
about justice and law, that is, the political realm, were completely unimportant to the Epicureans, 
it would be very surprising that one in five or 20% of the most important maxims were devoted to 
it. 
48 Since benefit could refer to the benefit of any given individual or to the benefit of the community 
as a whole, a common objection against Epicurean theory is that one can easily imagine 
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agreements really about what is beneficial without qualification? The set of things that 
are beneficial is larger than the set of things that are covered by an agreement in which 
agents pledge to refrain from harming as what contributes to an agent’s security; in other 
words, while there is one kind of benefit in regard to the dealings with other beings and 
that may be summed up by the term ‘security,’ there may be more farther reaching 
‘benefits’ that are not cases of justice. For instance, one may think of an agent wanting 
to receive help from others when in need of such help. This is an instance of something 
beneficial in regard to the dealings with other beings. However, it is unclear whether 
Epicurean agreements, in the way I have discussed them so far, entail positive 
obligations (that is, the duty to do something) beyond the negative obligations that 
agents pledge to follow (that is, the duties to abstain from harm). 
Since the Principal Doctrines are silent on positive obligations, let us turn to 
some later Epicurean texts. In Hermarchus, one reads that the first law-givers “tried to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
scenarios, in which it may be beneficial for an agent to form a certain agreement that will 
guarantee her personal aponia and ataraxia while being at odds with the aponia and atarxia of 
others. For example, the usurpation of political power may be ‘beneficial’ to the tyrant, but only at 
the expense of her subjects. Put differently: If the perspective on benefit Epicurean agents should 
have is that of an individual, then it needs to be explained how such a perspective leads to any 
consensus about what is beneficial to the community as a whole. If, by contrast, the perspective 
on benefit Epicurean agents should have is that of the community, then it needs to be explained 
how something that is prima facie clearly not beneficial to an individual – like enduring something 
painful on behalf of the community – is beneficial to her after all. In short, the Epicureans need to 
explain how the individual and community perspective on benefit can cohere, especially when 
they also invoke the notion of a common good in their account (see chapter 3). Answering this 
objection is no easy task; indeed, it is one of the contested areas in the scholarship on Epicurean 
friendship. See especially Mitsis 1988, O’Connor 1989, Annas 1993a, O’Keefe 2001b, Brown 
2002, and Evans 2004. A detailed discussion of this problem would exceed the scope of the 
current investigation and so I can only sketch a possible solution. The Epicurean claim that what 
is beneficial for society or for the group aligns with what is beneficial for the individuals becomes 
somewhat more plausible if one realizes that Epicurean theory, unlike modern hedonist theories, 
assumes that the scenario of several agents simultaneously achieving the state of aponia and 
ataraxia is possible and realistic. Furthermore, the resources needed to reach this state are, in 
fact, for the Epicureans so abundant that there will not be conflicts among agents. Therefore, one 
may say that no real conflict between the goal of an individual and the goal of the community as a 
whole (if these goals are properly understood) exists in Epicurean theory, and something that is 
beneficial is beneficial for both an individual and for the community as a whole. 
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restrain firmly those who readily destroyed each other and who weakened the [mutual] 
aid [boētheian] because of forgetfulness of past events.”49 One may be tempted to think 
that this means that agreements also confer positive obligations on agents – if not in all 
regards, then, at least insofar as they promote security. However, it is not quite clear 
what precisely ‘aid’ entails: The passage may merely imply that the negative obligations 
in Epicurean agreements were understood as also providing certain outcomes that aid 
agents, that is, that agreements created a community, in which all aided each other in 
the sense of restraining those who tried to harm them.50 However, on a stronger reading, 
the passage is evidence that even in early Epicureanism, there are more positive 
obligations towards others that arose out of Epicurean contracts – obligations that are 
not explicitly discussed in the Principal Doctrines. 
Ultimately, I think the evidence in Hermarchus is too slim to argue for the 
conclusion that even in early Epicureanism, agreements also entail positive obligations 
on the part of the contracting parties to help others. However, a formulation like the one 
in Hermarchus could explain why Lucretius writes that it is just (aequum) for agreeing 
parties to pity the weak: 
It was then, too, that neighbors began eagerly to form agreements [amicitiem] 
one with another, not to hurt or to be harmed, and claimed protection for their 
children and womenfolk, indicating by means of inarticulate cries and gestures 
that it is fair or just [aequum] that the weak are pitied by everyone.51 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 ἐπειράθησαν βεβαιοτέρως ἀνεῖρξαι τοὺς προχείρως φθείροντας ἀλλήλους καὶ τὴν βοήθειαν 
ἀσθενεστέραν κατασκευάζοντας διὰ τὴν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος λήθην. Hermarchus, fr. 34 Longo 
Auricchio = On Abstinence I.11.1. Trans. mine. 
50 According to such a reading, then, Hermarchus’ account is compatible with Lucretius’ in regard 
to its treatment of the free rider problem. See On the Nature of Things V.1025ff. as well as the 
more detailed discussion in chapter 3. 
51 tunc et amicitiem coeperunt iungere aventes / finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari, / et 
pueros commendarunt muliebreque saeclum, / vocibus et gestu cum balbe significarent / 
imbecillorum esse aequum misererier omnis. V.1019ff.; Trans. by Smith, modified. 
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Again, ‘pitying the weak’ could merely be Lucretius’ way of expressing that 
agreements not only concern contracting parties themselves, but may also include 
others. On this reading, Epicurean agreements are not merely non-aggression pacts 
between the contracting parties themselves, but they also include provisions regulating 
indirect harms, as was discussed above. It seems difficult to reconcile a merely negative 
obligation with ‘pitying,’ though, which seems to include a positive obligation to help 
others. We will have an opportunity to revisit this problem in more detail in chapter 3, 
where I discuss this passage with regard to the terminology used, which is reminiscent 
of the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis. In any case, how the originally negative obligation to 
refrain from harm, which is found in the Principal Doctrines, is related to positive 
obligations to help others (without a modification of Epicurean theory) is not explained in 
Lucretius. 
2.2. Benefit, Justice, and Law 
In the previous section, I discussed the relationship between harm, security, and 
benefit in Epicureanism and I argued that the mutual agreements over not harming and 
not being harmed are beneficial to obtaining aponia and ataraxia. However, I did not 
comment on how these agreements relate to justice. After all, KD 32 and 33 (and 
possibly also 31) claim that justice is an agreement over not harming and not being 
harmed. What does this mean? 
Let us begin with the relationship between the just and the beneficial. The 
Epicureans seem to think that there are certain things or actions that are beneficial and 
that this benefit is an objective fact about the world. Unfortunately, the textual evidence 
for such a claim is rather slim. However, benefit itself is never discussed in terms of an 
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agreement. In other words, agents unite to agree on what is beneficial. And indeed, the 
view that benefit is an agreement would have rather strange consequences. Imagine, for 
instance, that human beings agreed that it would be beneficial to their health to eat three 
chocolate bars everyday or that they would agree that brushing one’s teeth is a waste of 
time and that dental health can be obtained without it. Surely, such acts would not make 
eating chocolate or brushing one’s teeth beneficial towards achieving the end of health. 
They would merely ignore what we know about dieting and what is conducive to 
obtaining health, which is an objective fact of the matter. Of course, our state of 
knowledge may progress and we may find out that a certain thing or action is not 
beneficial to obtaining health after all. In this vein, we may find out that certain actions do 
not have the benefit that they were believed to have. For instance, therapeutic 
phlebotomy has largely been abandoned in modern medicine, because it is now 
believed to cause more harm than benefit in patients. Again, though, this was not a 
matter of agreement among human beings, but rather a finding, a scientific fact about 
what is beneficial in which circumstances and what is not. 
Now, I already suggested above that ‘not harming and not being harmed’ is a 
kind of benefit for the Epicureans. In particular, I argued that ‘not harming and not being 
harmed’ was a shorthand for security, which in turn was a shorthand for benefit insofar 
as it relates to the interpersonal dealings of human beings with each other. If one 
connects this previous discussion with the idea that I just presented, namely, that benefit 
is an objective fact about the world, it follows that on the Epicurean view, what harm is 
and is not is an objective fact about the world. In a certain sense, then, the Epicurean 
conception of justice is very firmly rooted in objective facts about the world. 
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However, this is only one part of the Epicurean conception. The Epicureans also 
claim that justice is an agreement. I take this to mean that there is a constructivist 
element to Epicurean justice. Justice, on this view, is not what is beneficial without 
qualification, but only what is beneficial and has been agreed upon and so has received 
the ‘rank’ of being just.52 In other words, the set of things and actions that are beneficial 
is larger than the set of things and actions that are just; there are things that are 
beneficial independent of and prior to the agreements, but there is no justice outside the 
agreements on the Epicurean view. Take the following example: Under the condition that 
it is beneficial not to steal because refraining from such behavior promotes the agents’ 
ataraxia and aponia,53 only agreements that promote that agents refrain from stealing 
will be agreed on and be just. This means that different societies may reach different 
conclusions in regard to stealing and hence what is beneficial in that society. For 
instance, it could be seen as beneficial that chopping off a thief’s hand is an appropriate 
punishment in some societies, while a fine or a prison sentence may be considered 
appropriate in others. Yet regardless of the differences between societies, only things 
that promote security and hence ataraxia and aponia will ever be candidates to be 
recognized as just. For instance, it will never be just to steal, on the Epicurean view, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See “chōra” in KD 37. 
53 One can imagine several ways in which caring for the weak furthers aponia and ataraxia and 
the following ways are by no means exhaustive: If an agent’s dependents are taken care of, this 
will help an agent to stop worrying about them and thus contribute to his ataraxia. Furthermore, if 
the weak are taken care of (and hence also achieve a state of ataraxia), agents do not have to 
fear physical harm (and hence to be insecure) and be mentally disturbed that the weak will 
organize and plot against them.  
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precisely because it is hard to imagine a scenario, in which stealing will promote ataraxia 
and aponia.54 
So far, I have focused on justice and spoken about ‘agreements’ without 
distinguishing that there are two kinds thereof in Epicurean theory.55 The agreements I 
discussed up to this point, for the most part, are best understood as an act of reaching a 
mutual understanding about what is beneficial in certain circumstances (although again 
what is beneficial is not ‘constructed’ through the agreement, but an objective fact about 
the world). These agreements can be said to establish moral norms, that is, the rules 
that regulate our interactions with others in a community. They are the ‘social glue’ that 
allows society to form successfully, that is, they enable human beings to abandon their 
originary isolated existence.56 
However, there is also a second kind of agreement and hence of contractual 
justice for the Epicureans that is logically and temporally posterior to the first kind. This 
type is not explicitly found in Epicurus’ own works, but the main reason for this may 
simply be that the key sections of Epicurus’ On Nature, which could have discussed this 
second type of agreement, are lost. These agreements of the second type lead to the 
creation of laws, on the basis of certain moral norms (that – at least in the ideal case – in 
turn came to be via the Epicurean agreements of the first kind). In other words, then, the 
Epicureans argue that the agreements play a double role: One kind of agreement helps 
to create moral norms such as justice, while other kinds of agreements help establish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 First, if no one steals, agents will not be harmed by losing their possessions. Second, agents 
will also not have to fear the loss of their possessions.  
55 However, I have signaled this distinction above and made reference to it in footnotes. 
56 Again, see the more detailed discussion in the subsequent chapter. 
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the laws. For the Epicureans, both agreements promote ataraxia and aponia by 
guaranteeing security and hence appealing to what is by nature beneficial, in a way that 
is to be spelled out in more detail below. 
These two types of agreement are different in two ways. First, the mode of 
agreement is different in each case, and second, there are sanction mechanisms in 
place to punish the infringements of laws, while there are no or – at least no reliable – 
sanction mechanisms in place for infringements of moral norms. On the Epicurean view, 
the laws thus remedy the biggest defect of the moral norms: That agreements 
establishing moral norms are kept most but not all of the time.57  
According to Lucretius, laws are not made via reciprocal agreements, that is, in 
the same way that the agreements that lead to justice were formed, but they are made 
by a few preeminent men who set down the laws. This happens after failed attempts to 
establish kingships and the bloodshed that ensued from it.58 One might thus be tempted 
to think that it is quite odd to speak of ‘agreements’ when it comes to the laws. After all, 
the majority of the population is shut out from the law-giving process and an ‘agreement’ 
that is made solely among the law-givers only seems like a cold comfort. Furthermore, 
Lucretius does not even use the word ‘foedus’ at this pint in the text and there is no other 
Epicurean text that explicitly refers to the laws as agreements. 
Nevertheless, I think that the laws also ressemble kinds of agreements in 
Epicurean theory. That a few eminent individuals give the laws does not entail that these 
individuals have license to set down laws as they wish. The act of law-giving act also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.1024ff. 
58 Ibid., V.1105ff. 
26	  
	  
crutially involves the many. Indeed, very first kings who pursue what is beneficial to them 
rather than what is beneficial for society as a whole lose sight of the common good.59 
They are egoistic. The result of this is an unstable political order. Therefore, whatever 
laws are now made and whatever political measures are now taken must – as a 
consequence of the failed kingships – cohere with the ‘will of the people’, that is, with 
what is beneficial for all. And this is also the reason why Lucretius emphasizes that 
although not everyone makes the laws, everyone in society decides to obey the laws of 
their own will (sponte sua), giving the laws legitimacy.60 This is important because it 
means that although the process of making laws is not collaborative like the process of 
determining moral norms is, it entails an element of collaboration in according a role to 
the many. As a result, the process of law-making can also be said to constitute a kind of 
agreement between the law-givers and those who agree to the law. In other words, the 
process of law-giving from the Epicurean view involves an element of choice on the part 
of all citizens: Law-giving is not construed as a simple top-down process but as a kind of 
agreement between the law-givers and the subjects, with the emphasis on the part of 
subjects lying on the instrumental reasons they have to obey the laws rather than on the 
idea of consent, which is characteristic of early modern theories of the social contract. 
This brings us to the second difference between the agreements of justice and 
the agreements of law: sanction mechanisms that punish the infringements.61 As I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 They build citadels to protect themselves, not the general public. Ibid., V.1109. 
60 Ibid., V.1147. Hermarchus also reports that the first law-givers did not have to use force to 
establish the laws but that the people who subjected themselves to them acquiesced 
(sunchorēsantōn) by themselves. Fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On Abstinence I.8.1. See 
also the comments in Armstrong 1997 and O’Keefe 2001 (which I discuss in more detail in 
chapter 5).   
61 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V. 1151ff. 
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already signaled above, the main drawback of the agreements of justice is that there are 
no sanction mechanisms in place if agreements are not met. This drawback is remedied 
by the agreements of law, which minimize the problem of free riding because agents 
now start to fear the violation of the (just) law. However, this also means that there is 
now a central coercive power that is primarily obeyed out of fear, like in Hobbes. By 
contrast, fear plays no significant role in the formation of the agreements that lead to 
moral norms; in fact, as I argue in more detail in chapter 3, fear is, for the Epicureans, 
above all a deplorable by-product of the life in (non-ideal) communities. And so, although 
the Epicureans defend a kind of social contract theory, it is clear from these comments 
that the Epicureans cannot unabashedly endorse agreements that lead to laws as 
unequivocally good. 
2.3. Who is Able to Form Agreements? 
 After discussing Epicurean agreements in regard to harm, security, and benefit, 
and showing how the Epicureans distinguishes between two different kinds of 
agreement, let us now turn to the question of who forms agreements in Epicureanism. 
This question is important because, in the Epicurean theory of justice, the ability of 
forming agreements is understood as the prerequisite for articulating one’s own point of 
view: Without the ability to form agreements, an agent will simply have to accept the 
determinations that other agents make in regard to what is just.62 By examining the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 One may think that this focus on the ability to form agreements in connection with justice is odd 
in Epicureanism. However, in focusing on agreements the Epicureans are in good company; their 
theory is similar to Rawls’ in this respect (see Sorabji 1993: 165 for further references). Rawls’ 
approach has also been criticized for not being able to account for those beyond the frontiers of 
justice, for instance, members of other species. According to Rawls, human beings are to decide 
what principles of society are just according to a thought experiment. Ideal reasoners are behind 
a “veil of ignorance,” that is, they abstract from the particularities and socially contingent factors of 
their respective existences, and then decide on principles of justice that they could rationally and 
reasonably agree to. These principles are first that all people have the same claim to basic rights 
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relevant texts, I will argue in what follows that the Epicurean theory can accommodate 
the interests of traditionally marginalized groups such as foreigners, women, children, 
and animals, even though members of these groups are never explicitly acknowledged 
to be able to form agreements.63 First, there is some evidence that members of these 
groups can at least form certain kinds of understandings, but these are not agreements 
in the sense that I have laid out above. I argue that these understandings have some 
value, though. Second, even if Epicurean contracting parties are motivated to secure 
their own interest in agreements, (A) these interests may include the interests of above 
groups and (B) Epicurean agents at least ideally have no reason to harm others who are 
not a threat, even if they do not form an agreement with them.   
 Let us begin our discussion with KD 32:  
Nothing is just or unjust in relation to however many of those animals not able 
[mē edunato] to form agreements over not harming and not being harmed; so too 
with however many of the peoples [ethnōn] unable or unwilling [mē edunato ē mē 
ebouleto] to form agreements over not harming and not being harmed.64 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and second that economic inequalities are only acceptable if they are construed in such a way 
that the worst-off members are benefitted in the most effective way. However, whether this 
accounts for non-human beings as well is a difficult point. After all, while ideal reasoners abstract 
from the particularities of their existence, they still know some basic facts behind the veil of 
ignorance, not only about the domains of politics, history, psychology, and economy, but also 
about themselves; they know, for instance, that they are human beings. Given that the ideal 
reasoners are by stipulation self-interested, the challenge for Rawlsian contract theory, just as for 
the Epicurean theory, is to show that this focus on the self-interest of the ideal reasoners is 
sufficient to care for animal welfare.  
63 Epicurus’ school was open to women and is universally acknowledged to have been more 
favorable towards women than other schools. See, for instance, Erler 1994: 287f. and Gordon 
2012: 72ff. Whether this includes the ability to form agreements is another matter. On the role of 
women and other members of the Greek and Roman household as well as their legal relationship 
to men, see, for instance, Pomeroy 1975, Reinsberg 1989, and Dixon 1992.  
64 Ὅσα τῶν ζῴων µὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ µὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλα µηδὲ 
βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα µὴ 
ἐδύνατο ἢ µὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ µὴ βλάπτειν µηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. LS 
22A; Trans. by Long and Sedley, modified. On the dialectic context of the maxim, see especially 
Bignone 1936: II.272ff. as well as Moraux 1957: 100ff. 
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In this maxim, Epicurus distinguishes between agreements with animals and 
agreements with other peoples. What is striking about the passage is that he does not 
directly rule out either. “However many of” could stand in for some, all, or perhaps even 
an empty set. In regard to animals, the key question to investigate is thus whether for the 
Epicureans, they are capable of forming agreements.65 In regard to other peoples, it is 
noteworthy that ‘ethnos’ is a broad term and may thus include not only non-Greeks but 
also Greeks who are disposed in such a way that they cannot form agreements. The key 
question in regard to these peoples is therefore whether the Epicureans think that some 
people are in general incapable or unable to form agreements. 
I will begin my discussion with the possibility of interspecies agreements (2.3.1.). 
I will then turn to the possibility of interethnic agreements (2.3.2.). Finally, I will end this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 There is disagreement on how to understand and hence translate ‘pros’ in KD 32. See the 
discussion in Perelli 1967: 180, fn. 1 and Goldschmidt 1977: 44ff. On a first reading, it can mean 
that there is no justice in regard to animals that cannot form agreements, as in the translation 
quoted above. On a second reading, it can also mean that there is no justice among these 
animals, namely, those cannot form agreements. On this reading, the text merely says that there 
is no justice within a given species, but it leaves open whether human beings are obliged to be 
just in regard to this species. For instance, on the condition that wolves cannot form agreements 
with each other, one might say the following: while there is no justice among wolves and indeed 
human beings cannot form agreement with wolves, human beings might still be required to be 
just in regard to wolves. This second reading (that there is no justice among wolves), however, 
seems less convincing than the first (that there is no justice in regard to wolves). The context of 
the maxim, that is, observations on justice, makes it unlikely that Epicurus is merely making the 
ethnological observation that there are some species (and peoples) that lack justice when it 
comes to other members of their species. The more interesting observation is about how we 
should act in regard to other species (and in the second part of the maxim: in regard to 
foreigners). Furthermore, if there is no justice among members of a certain species, it also seems 
odd to suppose that there is at the same time justice between the members of this species and 
the members of another species. Again, on the assumption that wolves cannot form agreements 
with each other, it would be odd to assume that there is no justice among wolves, but that there is 
justice among a wolf and a human being in the sense that wolves can form agreements with 
humans. Definitely more argument for such a view would be needed. In other words, the reading 
that there is no justice in regard to those animals that cannot form agreements seems to be the 
preferable reading of KD 32.  
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section with some observations on intersexual and intergenerational agreements 
(2.3.3.).    
2.3.1. Interspecies Agreements 
If the Epicureans allowed interspecies agreements, this would have some 
interesting consequences from a modern perspective. It would imply that the 
Epicureans truly extend justice to animals and that on their view, human beings would 
have ‘contractual obligations’ towards them, which could be seen as an important step 
on the way of arguing for the interests of animals and so perhaps even their ‘rights.’66 I 
will argue in what follows that the textual evidence suggests that animals cannot form 
agreements on the Epicurean view, although some passages in Lucretius suggest that 
there are ‘understandings’ between human beings and animals, which at least in some 
way resemble the agreements that lead to the existence of justice. However, I will argue 
that the passage in Lucretius reflects a change in the Epicurean position over time rather 
than in Epicurus’ teachings.  
In KD 32, Epicurus leaves open whether there may be a group of animals that is 
able to form agreements. To decide this issue, one therefore needs to first examine 
whether animals on the Epicurean view have the cognitive capacities to form 
agreements. After all, only if they are capable of forming agreements, that is, if they have 
the requisite capacities to form agreements, is it possible that they are also able to form 
agreements, that is, they are in circumstances that enable them to form agreements. Let 
us turn to the Epicurean description of animal psychology. In looking at what the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 For a contemporary attempt to use the idea of contracts to argue for animal rights, see 
Narveson 1977 (see also the reply in Reagan 1977). For the ancient debate, see especially the 
discussion in Sorabji 1993: 153ff. On the usage of the term ‘rights’ in an ancient context, see 
Miller 1995: 87ff. 
31	  
	  
Epicureans think about cognitive capacities of animals and humans, we will see that the 
Epicureans have quite a nuanced appreciation of animals,67 especially compared to 
other schools of the time.68 Furthermore, there is some debate among Epicurean 
authors on what exactly animals can do. Nevertheless, I will argue in what follows that 
Epicurean animal psychology makes it likely that animals were not able to form 
agreements, even if there is some evidence in Lucretius that human beings and animals 
can form understandings that share some of the features of contractual justice. 
 Let us begin with Epicurus himself. In On Nature XXV,69 a notoriously cryptic text 
that is not only lacunose but also contains much unexplained technical vocabulary, we 
read:  
We sometimes reproach it [that is, an animal capable of having ‘developments’] 
all the more, but in an admonitory mode – and not in the way in which we 
exonerate those animals which are wild by combining their developments and 
their make-up alike into a single thing, and indeed do not use either the 
admonitory and reformatory mode or the simply retaliatory mode.70  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See Annas 1992: 134ff. and Annas 1993b: 67ff. 
68 See Sorabji 1993: 116ff. and Dierauer 1977. 
69 The passage is still listed under “Deperditorum librorum reliquae” in Arrighetti, but Laursen 
identified the text as belonging to On Nature XXV. While I quote Long and Sedley’s translation in 
what follows, the critical edition of the text that has been provided by Laursen is invaluable, since 
it also includes a detailed commentary on the text. For a more recent reading of this difficult text, 
see Masi 2006. 
70 ἔτι µᾶλλον ἐνίοτ[ε κ]ακίζοµεν, ἐν νουθετητ[ικ]ῶι µέντοι µᾶλλον τρόπω[ι], καὶ οὐκ ὥσπερ [τ]ὰ 
ἄγρια τῶν ζώιων [καθ]αίροµεν µὲν ὁµοίως αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγε[νν]ηµένα [κ]αὶ τὴ[ν] σύστασιν εἰς ἕν τι 
συµπ[λέ]κοντες, οὐ µὴν ο[ὔ]τε τῶι νουθε[τ]ητ[ι]κῶι τρόπωι καὶ ἐπανορθωτικῶι οὔτε τῶι ἁπλῶς 
ἀ[ντι]ποι[η]τικῶι χρώµεθα. LS 20j = fr. 34.25 Arrighetti; Trans. by Long and Sedley, modified; on 
this passage, see especially Huby 1967, Laursen 1988, and Verlinsky 1996. Laursen translates: 
‘We occasionally criticize even more – that is, not in the primary blaming way and not as wild 
animals do, we rinse, in that we plait together the products themselves and the composition.” 
Arrighetti, in turn, translates: “Per di più talora gli muoviamo delle accuse: sotto forma di 
rimproveri, e inverno, secondo una certa misura; e non come per le bestie selvagge, quando 
facciamo una cosa sola dei moti psichici e della constitutione atomica scusiamo ugalemente sia 
l’una che gli altri. Non usiamo certo né del sistema di rimproverare né di correggere e nemmeno 
di esser troppo severi…” Note that the gamma in ‘agria’ is no longer legible in the original papyri 
and one of the two 19th century facsimile has aeria tōn zōiōn (air animals). Furthermore, Long and 
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While many details of this passage are unclear,71 Epicurus here seems to claim 
that wild animals are in some way significantly different from non-wild animals. It could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sedley translate ‘sumpleō’ as “conflate,” but this suggests a deliberate confusion on the part of 
those who ‘weave together’ constitution and developments, which need not be the case. Citing 
Aristotle’s On the Soul 428a25 and Parts of Animals 643b16, the LSJ lists the specific meaning of 
sumplokē as the “combination of mental acts so as to form one entity,” which is intended here; 
Epicurus also uses the term in this way at Letter to Herodotus 72 and 73. Better is Laursen’s 
translation “plait together,” which may signal a deliberate or non-deliberate act.  
71 A key notion needed to make sense of the passage is the idea of a ‘development’ 
(apogegennēmenon). According to one reading of the passage, the difference between wild and 
non-wild animals lies in the relationship between what Epicurus calls the ‘developments’ and the 
make-up or constitution (sustasis). What Epicurus means by ‘apogegennēmena’ is not very clear, 
yet these seem to decide whether an animal is worthy of praise or blame. Unfortunately, the 
technical term ‘apogegennēmenon’ is not defined anywhere and the best explanation is perhaps 
found in the following passage: “So when something develops which takes on some distinctness 
from the atoms in a differential way – not in the way which is like viewing from a different distance 
– it acquires responsibility which proceeds from itself [οὕτως ἐπειδὰν ἀπογεννηθῇ τι λανβάνον 
[τι]νὰ [ἑ]τερότη[τα τῶν] ἀτό[µ]ων κατά τινα πρόπον διαληπτικόν, οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου 
δ[ι]αστήµατος, ἰσχάνε[ι] τὴν ἐξ ἑαυ[τοῦ] αἰτίαν].” LS 20B = fr. 34.22 Arrighetti; Trans. by Long and 
Sedley, modified; see also the discussion in Masi 2005. Without context, it is difficult to make 
sense of what this exactly means. However, it could mean that an entity may consist of the atoms 
that make it up – also referred to as the constitution (sustasis) – and something that is acquired in 
the course of time that is distinct from the atomic make up, the apogegennēmena. 
Apogegennēmenon is the perfect participle of apogenaō, which means ‘to beget’ or ‘to produce.’ 
The apogegennēmena are hence the “developments” that come to be over time and that are 
distinct from the atomic constitution of an entity. Unfortunately, how and by what process the 
apogegennēmena are different from the atomic constitution is quite mysterious. The analogy to 
seeing an object from two different distances that is offered later in the text is puzzling rather than 
illuminating (see also Laursen 1988: 12f.). In any event, the point that is above all important here 
is that Epicurus (somehow) argues that there are developments distinctive from the atomic 
constitution and that this prevents that any entity, insofar as it has developments, can be reduced 
to its atomic constitution. What is important in this context is the function of the developments: 
The text claims that the developments (as opposed to the atomic constitution itself) are key when 
it comes to evaluating ‘responsibility:’ “But many naturally capable of achieving these and those 
results fail to achieve them, because of themselves, not because of one and the same 
responsibility [aitian] of the atoms and of themselves. And with these we especially do battle, and 
rebuke them, <hat>ing [them] for a disposition which follows their disordered congenital nature as 
in the case of all animals. For the nature of their atoms has contributed nothing to some of their 
behavior, and degrees of behavior and character, but it is their developments which themselves 
possess all or most of the responsibility for certain things. It is as a result of that nature that some 
of their atoms move with disordered motions, but it is not on the atoms that… [Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ 
τῶνδε καὶ τῶνδ[ε φ]ύσιν ἔχοντα ἀπεγραστικὰ [γί]νεσθαι δι᾽ ἑαυτὰ οὐ γίγνεται ἀπ[ε]ργαστικὰ, οὐ 
διὰ τἠν αὐτὴν αἰτία[ν] τῶν τε ἀτόµων καὶ ἑαυτῶν· οἷς δὴ καὶ µάλιστα µαχόµεθα καὶ ἐπιτιµῶµεν, 
µ[ι]σοῦντες κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆ[ς] ταραχώδη φύσιν ἔχοντα καθ[ά]περ ἐπὶ τῶν πάντων ζώιων. Οὐθὲν 
γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργηκεν εἰς ἔνια ἔργα τε καὶ µεγέθη ἔργων καὶ διαθέσεων ἡ τῶν ἀτόµων φύσις, 
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννηµένα τὴν πᾶσα[ν ἢ] τὴν πλε[ίσ]την κέ[κτ]ητ[αι] αἰτίαν τῶνδέ [τι]νων. ἐκ δ᾽ 
ἐκ[ε]ίνης [ἔν]ιαι τῶν [ἀ]τόµων κινήσεις ταραχώδε[ις] κ[ινο]ῦνται, οὐχὶ δὲ τὰς ἀτ[όµου]ς…].” LS 20B 
= fr. 34.21 Arrighetti; Trans. by Long and Sedley, modified. There are some textual problems 
here. First, polla at the beginning of the passage just quoted may refer to zooa, as Long and 
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follow from this that the Epicureans distinguish between wild animals and tame or 
domestic ones and that this difference overlaps with the distinction between those 
animals that are able to form agreements and those who are not. However, deducing 
any firm conclusion from this passage seems problematic, given the state of the text and 
a lack of context. Let us therefore turn to a different and perhaps more conclusive piece 
of evidence to address the cognitive capabilities of animals in Epicureanism. 
 In On Irrational Contempt for Common Conceptions, Polystratus, the third head 
of the Garden, who is perhaps one of the last Epicureans to have studied with the school 
founder himself (which would make doctrinal continuity between his views and Epicurus’ 
own views more likely) explicitly discusses the cognitive capacities of animals. 
Unfortunately, much of Polystratus’ argument is lost due to the poor condition of the 
papyrus scroll it was preserved on, and the passages that are relevant in this context are 
too dispersed to quote in full. Nevertheless, in his treatise, Polystratus is concerned with 
demonstrating that human beings and animals crucially differ in regard to reason 
(logismos). Animals, Polystratus claims, “do not share in reason or not in one like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sedley suggest, but this has been challenged by Laursen who argues that this does not fit the 
lacuna preceding the text and that it should rather be the developments themselves that are the 
subject of the sentence (1988: 10; see also Annas 1992: 131, fn. 25). Second, the root of the 
present participle in the second sentence is not preserved in the manuscript. ‘Hating’ is Long and 
Sedley’s interpolation. Be this as it may, the key Greek term in the above passage is ‘aitia’, which 
is most commonly translated as ‘cause’ (which bears the problem that the modern understanding 
of causality is different than that of the ancients). The idea is that only action that is produced by 
the developments can be praiseworthy or blameworthy action. This means that animals cannot 
be held accountable for their atomic make-up, either. For instance, we cannot blame a cat for 
scratching the new couch if this scratching is necessitated by her atomic make-up. What is 
interesting, then, is that the text acknowledges that developments may also take place in animals 
and that these developments are the cause of blame. Unfortunately, Epicurus does not offer us 
any more detail here as to which behavior in animals is part of their atomic constitution and which 
is not, which would be the first step in developing a classification of animals. 
34	  
	  
ours.”72 Polystratus does not outright deny reason to animals, but he insists that there 
are certain cognitive operations that animals cannot perform and that these distinguish 
animals from human beings. More explicitly, Polystratus names the following, related 
differences:73 he points out that animals are not able to remember past events74 and he 
even denies that animals are able learn; animals on his view only live in the present.75 
Furthermore, he explicitly claims that animals do not have the ability to grasp the 
beautiful and shameful and other such things or to understand signs (sēmeia), omens 
(oiōnoi), and tidings (klēdones).76 On this view, animals take in sensory information, but 
that they are not able to process this information as human beings are. To make this 
point, Polystratus uses several verbs that stress understanding and comprehension,77 
claiming that this ‘understanding’ is unique to human beings; it distinguishes human 
beings from animals.  
The ability to form agreements is not explicitly discussed in the text. However, it 
seems that it could be added to the list. After all, the description of the cognitive 
capacities of animals in Polystratus is enough to indict animals. Without memory, the 
ability to learn, and a grasp of things that are beneficial,78 animals are unlikely to be able 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 τὸ µὴ κοινωνεῖν λογισµοῦ ἢ µ[ὴ οἵ]ου ἡµεῖς. On Irrational Contempt, col. VII.5ff. Indelli; 
emphasis added. 
73 See also Haussleiter 1935: 286f. 
74 [οὔτε τὰ παρελθ]όντα µνη[µ]ονε[ύειν]. Col. IV.1f. Admittedly, the text is here very uncertain.   
75 Col. IV.2f. 
76 Col. VII.1ff. 
77 See sunoraō at col. I.2 and VII.4f. and eulabeomai at col. III.4f. 
78 This does not mean that an animal (or in fact anyone) has to have fully formed views about 
justice in the sense of a fully articulated theory in order to form agreements. It only means that 
whoever forms agreements needs to have some beliefs about what is beneficial, so that the 
coordination with others (the agreeing) about what is just is possible.  
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to form agreements. Given how animals were described, any other conclusion would be 
very odd. 
 This overall impression is confirmed in Hermarchus, Epicurus’ immediate 
successor as head of the Garden. His view of animals on the whole is less nuanced than 
that of Polystratus:  
Now if people had been able [edunato] to make a kind of agreement with the 
remaining animals [ta loipa tōn zōōn], as with human beings, over not killing and 
not being killed indiscriminately by us, it would have been fine to push justice up 
to this point; for it would tend to security. But since it was impossible [tōn 
amēchanōn ēn] to associate with law creatures that lack reason, it was not 
possible [ouk hoion te] to use such an instrument as the means of providing for 
utility in our security from other living beings any more than from lifeless things. 
That is why the only way to achieve such security as possible is to take the 
licence which we now have to kill them.79 
 
According to Hermarchus, agreements with animals would be desirable because 
they extend security for human beings to the animal kingdom: Natural threats would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Εἰ µὲν οὖν ἠδύναντο ποιήσασθαί τινα συνθήκην ὥσπερ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰ 
λοιπὰ τῶν ζῴων ὑπὲρ τοῦ µὴ κτείνειν µηδὲ πρὸς ἡµῶν ἀκρίτως αὐτὰ κτείνεσθαι, καλῶς εἶχε µέχρι 
τούτου τὸ δίκαιον ἐξάγειν· ἐπιτεταµένον γὰρ ἐγίγνετο πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν 
ἀµηχάνων ἦν κοινωνῆσαι νόµου τὰ µὴ δεχόµενα τῶν ζῴων λόγον, διὰ µὲν τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου 
τὸ συµφέρον οὐχ οἷόν τε κατασκευάσασθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐµψύχων ἀσφάλειαν 
µᾶλλόν περ ἢ τῶν ἀψύχων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὴν ἐξουσίαν λαµβάνειν, ἣν νῦν ἔχοµεν, εἰς τὸ κτείνειν αὐτά, 
µόνως ἔστι τὴν ἐνδεχοµένην ἔχειν ἀσφάλειαν. Hermarchus, fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On 
Abstinence I.12.5ff.; Translation by Clark, modified. Alberti uses this passage to argue for four 
claims: (1) that there are laws without agreements, (2) that there are regulatory laws and laws of 
justice, (3) that regulatory laws are useful, but not just, (4) that laws that concern animals are 
regulatory laws (1995: 167f. and fn. 12). In response to this, one first may say that ‘echousia’ 
need not be an entitlement conferred by the law, as Alberti claims; it can also be one that agents 
naturally have. See, for instance, Democritus’ claim that “the laws would not prevent each to live 
according to her own echousia [οὐκ ἂν ἐκώλυον οἱ νόµοι ζῆν ἕκαστον κατ' ἰδίην ἐξουςίην].” 68 DK 
B 245. If this is so, then the text does not provide an example of a law without agreements (pace 
(1)). Second, as Alberti herself explicitly acknowledges, laws concerning the behavior towards 
animals could be agreements between two human agents about how to treat animals. It is 
therefore unclear why a law concerning animals cannot be just, especially if it concerns refraining 
from harm (pace (4)). The passage discusses a scenario, in which animals are contracting with 
humans, and this hypothetical scenario is dismissed as unrealistic because animals cannot form 
agreements according to Hermarchus. However, it still follows that if it were possible for animals 
to form agreements, these agreements would also have the character of being just. Finally, then, 
since Alberti does not provide other evidence for regulatory laws, the distinction she draws with 
the help of Hermarchus’ text seems dubious (pace (2) and (3)). 
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greatly diminish.80 Yet Hermarchus also claims that such agreements are impossible 
because non-human beings do not possess reason (ta mē dechomena tōn zōōn logon), 
varying Polystratus’ claim that animals do not have reason like ours. Without reason, 
animals will easily violate the terms of the agreements and the end for which the 
agreements (security) were originally formed will not be obtained. Forming agreements 
in such a situation indeed seems futile. Thus, Hermarchus seems right to insist that 
animals do not have reason and hence cannot partake in justice – at least not in the way 
being discussed here, namely, in forming agreements with human beings. However, 
Hermarchus also speaks about “the rest of the animals” (ta loipa tōn zōōn), which – on 
an alternative reading – could again imply that only certain animals are unable to form 
agreements, while others indeed are able to do so, even if such a reading is unlikely 
given the evidence about the cognitive capacities of animals according to Epicurean 
psychology. 
The case against agreements with animals in Epicureanism thus seems quite 
compelling. However, Lucretius also discusses their cognitive capabilities and their 
relationship to human beings in detail. First, note that throughout The Nature of Things, 
Lucretius diverges from other Epicureans in what he thinks animals are capable of;81 of 
all Epicurean authors whose work on the subject is extant, Lucretius grants animals the 
most extensive cognitive capacities. Most significantly, Lucretius claims that animals 
have animus, which is the Epicurean technical term for a rational soul.82 And as we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Note that the argument is wholly anthropocentric: Animals are not to be protected and included 
in the sphere of justice because of themselves, but because this would mean that human beings 
would be exposed to less threats. 
81 See Sorabji 1993: 28f. 
82 On the Nature of Things II.270. On the distinction between animus and anima, see Lathière 
1972. I set aside the question of whether animals experience emotions. On this point, see the 
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already saw above, it is above all having certain cognitive capacities that will ultimately 
decide whether animals are capable of forming agreements. It seems, then, that already 
at the outset, Lucretius is not the best source for the orthodox Epicurean position.  
Be this as it may, we find the following passage in Lucretius’ account of cultural 
development in book V of On the Nature of Things: 
For every species that you see breathing the breath of life has been protected 
and preserved from the beginning of its existence either by cunning or by 
courage or by speed. There are also many that survive because their utility has 
commended them to our care and committed them to our guardianship. In the 
first place, the fierce breed of savage lions owes its preservation to its courage, 
the fox to its cunning, and the deer to its speed in flight. On the other hand, the 
light-slumbering and loyal-hearted dog and every kind of beast of burden, as well 
as the fleecy flocks and horned herds, are all committed, Memmius, to the 
guardianship of human beings. They were glad to escape from the wild beasts 
and seek peace and the plentiful provisions, procured by no exertion of theirs, 
which we give them as a reward for their utility. But those animals that nature 
endowed with none of these qualities, so that they were unable either to be self-
supporting or to render us any useful service, in return for which we might allow 
their kind to have sustenance and security under our protection, were of course 
an easy prey and prize for others, shackled as they all were by the bonds of their 
own destiny, until nature brought their species to extinction.83 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discussion in Konstan 2008: 18ff. Similarly, I set aside the further suggestion that the Epicureans 
were ‘memorists’, that is, they thought that reason is neither necessary for human beings nor 
animals, but that memory is the decisive intellectual capacity, as Frede 1990 claims. For some 
discussion, see Sorabji 1993: 76f. Eric Brown suggests to me in conversation that the discussion 
of the cognitive capacities of animals can also be traced back to Plato’s comments about whether 
there is belief (doxa) in the irrational parts of the soul, that is, the appetitive and spirited parts 
(see, for instance, Republic 441a f. and571c f.). If there is indeed belief in the irrational part, it 
seems that such a view could lend support to the view that interspecies agreements are possible: 
Animals that do not have a rational soul could thus still form beliefs, which seems to be the 
prerequisite for forming agreements; if, by contrast, there are no beliefs in the irrational part of the 
soul, interspecies agreements are less likely. In any event, note, though, that Lucretius’ view is 
peculiar in so far as he already allows animals to have a rational part of the soul. 
83  Multaque tum interiisse animantum saecla necessest / nec potuisse propagando procudere 
prolem. / nam quae cumque vides vesci vitalibus auris, / aut dolus aut virtus aut denique mobilitas 
est / ex ineunte aevo genus id tuta<ta> reservans. multaque sunt, nobis ex utilitate sua quae / 
commendata manent, tutelae tradita nostrae. / principio genus acre leonum saevaque saecla 
/tutatast virtus, volpes dolus et fuga cervos. / at levisomna canum fido cum pectore corda, / et 
genus omne quod est veterino semine  partum / lanigeraeque simul pecudes et bucera saecla / 
omnia sunt hominum tutelae tradita, Memmi; / nam cupide fugere feras pacemque secuta /sunt et 
larga suo sine pabula parta labore, / quae damus utilitatis eorum praemia causa. / at quis nil 
horum tribuit natura, nec ipsa / sponte sua possent ut vivere nec dare nobis / utilitatem aliquam, 
quare pateremur eorum / praesidio nostro pasci genus esseque tutum, / scilicet haec aliis 
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The text distinguishes the two kinds of animals, which gives additional grounds 
for singling out wild animals in On Nature XXV, as I briefly suggested above. On the one 
hand, the text claims, there are wild animals such as lions, foxes, and deer that cannot 
be domesticated. On the other hand, it continues, there are those animals that can be 
domesticated: working animals that one would typically encounter on a farm and that are 
common in any agrarian society such as those of antiquity. While wild animals according 
to Lucretius possess certain natural capacities that enable them to procure protection 
and survival on their own, the domestic animals do not. However, animals such as dogs, 
cattle, and sheep provide valuable services to human beings. Despite their inability to 
protect themselves and procure security and survival on their own, they can compensate 
for this lack by the benefit (utilitas) they provide for human beings. Human beings in turn 
provide protection and survival for them. Accordingly, it is beneficial for a farmer to take 
care of his watchdog or sheepdog or the survival of his flock that yields milk and wool (in 
the case of sheep) or milk (in the case of cows).  
To sum up, then, there are three clues that make agreements between human 
beings and animals seem possible on Lucretius’ view. First there is the frequent use of 
the word ‘utilitas,’ which is a nominalized translation of the Greek adjective ‘sumpheron’ 
and thus recalls the Epicurean description of justice as the expression of benefit in KD 
31. Second, there is the idea that there is an exchange of goods and services between 
domestic animals and human beings in effect (“damus utilitatis eorum praemia causa”), 
which recalls the idea of a barter and hence a type of agreement. And then finally, some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
praedae lucroque iacebant / indupedita suis fatalibus omnia vinclis, / donec ad interitum genus id 
natura redegit. On the Nature of Things V.855ff.; Trans. by Smith. 
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content of the barter between humans and animals involves security and protection, 
which also play a key role in Epicurean agreements. 
While the evidence in Lucretius stands against the evidence in Polystratus and 
Hermarchus, I have already pointed out above that Lucretius is an unlikely candidate for 
being a representative of Epicurean orthodoxy. He not only allows that animals have 
more extensive cognitive capacities, as I showed above, but he also seems to claim in 
On the Nature of Things that the content of agreements is more expansive than it is for 
Epicurus: It is not merely confined to the obligation to refrain from harm, but also 
encompasses the positive obligation to help others. These differences may help explain 
the difference between the Lucretian account and that of other Epicureans.84 
Furthermore, note that the passage quoted above does not explicitly talk about 
agreements; the word ‘foedus’ does not appear in the text. Lucretius explicitly calls the 
relationship between animals and human beings one of guardianship (tutela).85 
Guardianship, as it is described here, however, implies an asymmetrical relationship: 
The patron ensures that the patronized is secure and the patronized provides some 
other benefit to the patron, but this benefit need not be security.86 In the case of cows 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See Sorabji 1993: 28f. pace Annas 1992: 134ff. and Campbell 2003: 126f. See also Campbell 
2008: 9ff. 
85 V.861 and 867.  
86 Guardianship (tutela) is a technical term of Roman law. See, for instance, the comments in the 
Roman jurist Gaius (2nd century CE): “Where the head of a family has children in his power he is 
allowed to appoint guardians for them by will. That is, for males while under puberty but for 
females however old they are, even when they are married. For it was the wish of the old lawyers 
that women, even those of full age, should be in guardianship [Permissum est itaque parentibus 
liberis, quos in potestate sua habent, testamen<to tu>tores dare: masculini quidem sexus 
inpuberibus, <feminini vero inpuberibus puberibus>que, <vel> cum nuptae sint. veteres enim 
voluerunt feminas, etiamsi perfectae aetatis sint, propter animi levitatem in tutela esse]. Institutes 
I.144; Trans. by Gordon and Robinson. See also the texts on guardianship in Lefkowitz and Fant 
2005: 99ff. While there is no direct equivalent to guardianship in Greece, one may assume, 
however, that women are understood to be in a similar dependency relationship. See discussions 
in Pomeroy 1975 and Reinsberg 1989. 
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and other “beasts of burden,” this is especially clear, since cows are not used in any way 
to fend off enemies. In the case of dogs, a dog can be said to keep human beings 
secure, but it seems that even here human beings would not be said to enter the 
agreement to be safe from dogs, but rather so that dogs can help them to be safe from 
third parties. Consequently, David Konstan is right that tending to animals is not the 
same as forming an agreement with them.87 However, interactions with animals do seem 
to have certain features that are similar to the interactions that are characteristic of 
Epicurean agreements88 so that at least in Lucretius agreement-like understandings with 
animals are possible, even if these are not agreements in the sense of those that lead to 
the existence of justice. 
The same conclusion can also be drawn from another observation. Lucretius 
often describes more primitive stages of cultural evolution in such a way that prefigure 
elements that are characteristic of later stages of development. For instance, describing 
the understandings among our primitive ancestors even at a time when human beings 
had not yet come together and formed agreements, Lucretius writes: “And Venus joined 
the bodies of the lovers in the woods; for either mutual desire united them or the violent 
force of the man and his excessive lust or presents, acorns and gathered strawberries or 
pears.”89 The context of this passage is to explain how lovers unite to procreate. Besides 
rape, Lucretius mentions mutual attraction and desire of the partners as well as what 
could be called prostitution: the exchange of sexual favors for delicacies. In both these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 2008: 91, fn. 15; pace Goldschmidt 1977: 53 and Campbell 2003: 227ff. 
88 That is, as I explained above, they are a form of exchange that involves benefit in some way 
and, at least in some cases, security also seems to play a role. 
89 et Venus in silvis iungebat corpora amantum;/ conciliabat enim vel mutua quamque cupido/ vel 
violenta viri vis atque inpensa libido/ vel pretium, glandes atque arbita vel pira lecta. V.962ff. 
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cases, mutual consent to have sexual intercourse seems to play a role. Consequently, 
one may even say that a mutual benefit is recognized by both parties. However, again, 
while Lucretius does not call the exchange of strawberries for sexual favors or the 
decision of men and women to have sex ‘agreements,’ these interactions may be said to 
exhibit some features of agreements insofar as they involve benefit. 
It is thus tempting to also speak of ‘agreements’ in the case of animals and 
assume a multi-tired view of what counts as an agreement.90 Besides the agreements 
that lead to justice, on the one hand, and those that lead to the existence of the laws, on 
the other hand, there would also be agreements with animals and the agreements of the 
original state that were just discussed, among others. Unfortunately, the textual evidence 
for such a reading of the Epicurean theory of agreements is rather slim. And even if this 
were the Epicurean view, it would still imply that there are no agreements with animals in 
the full sense and so also no justice in regard to them. After all, the agreements with 
animals would be of a completely different type than the ones that human beings form 
with each other. 
Nevertheless, from what was said, it is clear that animal interests are at least in 
part taken into account. First, the understandings with animals described in Lucretius, 
even if they are not agreements that lead to the existence of justice, seem to 
acknowledge that animals have interests that are served in the understanding. And 
second, even if there are no agreements with animals, there is no reason why Epicurean 
agents would deliberately harm others, including animals.91 Accordingly, an Epicurean 
agent could also easily opt for a vegetarian diet (which was more common in antiquity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 As Eric Brown suggests to me. See also Campbell 2008: 9ff. 
91 See the more detailed discussion in chapter 4. 
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than a meat-based diet), given that plant food can be obtained more easily and in a 
more worry-free way than meat (which may require a perilous hunt). In fact, Gordon 
Campbell has recently pointed to a neglected passage that makes a stronger than ever 
case for the view that the Epicureans advocated vegetarianism.92 If Campbell is right, it 
seems likely that Epicurean agents would readily leave alone animals (that is, refrain 
from harming them), if these animals do not present a threat to them.93  
2.3.2. Interethnic Agreements 
In the second part of KD 32, the possibility of interethnic agreements is 
discussed. Again, as in the case of animals, Epicurus leaves open whether there are 
peoples unable to form agreements. As I already pointed out above, ‘ethnē’ here can 
refer to Greeks and non-Greeks alike, which means that there can also be Greeks who 
are unable to form agreements on the Epicurean view. In contrast to the case of 
animals, Epicurus adds that there may also be people who are not willing to form 
agreements, a possibility that is missing in the case of animals. In the first part of KD 32, 
Epicurus does not distinguish between animals able and willing to form agreements on 
the one hand and animals unable and unwilling on the other hand. Epicurus only 
mentioned animals that are unable to form agreements. As a consequence, one may 
distinguish three criteria that an agent needs to fulfill in order to form agreements. First, 
as we saw in the discussion of animals, an agent needs to be capable of forming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Cambell 2008: 13ff. 
93 An objection to such a vegetarian reading might be that slaughtering animals and eating meat 
was often part of religious rituals in antiquity. As a result, Epicurean agents could have also had 
non-dietary reasons for harming animals. Yet because the Epicureans also argue that the gods 
have no direct influence on human affairs, it seems difficult to assess what value they bestowed 
on religious rituals. Certainly, they hold that participating in them contributes to their aponia and 
ataraxia by helping them to meet the expectations bestowed on them by the community around 
these rituals. But is there really any value for religious rituals that involve the sacrifice of meat in 
an ideal Epicurean community? 
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agreements, that is, possess the prerequisite capacities. Second, agents need to be 
able to form agreements, that is, circumstances must be such that it is possible for 
agents to form agreements. And third, finally, agents also have to want to form 
agreements. 
In regard to other peoples, it is clear that at least some peoples are able and 
willing to form agreements, for otherwise there would be no agreements at all. The 
interesting issue is thus whether the Epicureans think that some people are incapable of 
forming agreements as a people. Here, the textual evidence is slim. Epicurus merely 
notes that not everyone has the capacity of being a Sage, which seems to indicate that 
he endorses natural differences between human beings.94 As a result, the Epicureans 
could also easily claim that some people are unable to form agreements, although non-
Sages supposedly are able to form agreements. It is thus unclear to what extent the 
Epicureans think that other peoples are able, capable, and willing to enter into 
agreements. Perhaps this is also a question that Epicureans did not much reflect on, 
being rather interested in the nuts and bolts of forming agreements, and the advice that 
security has to be obtained in other means if agreements are not possible.   
2.3.3. Intersexual and Intergenerational Agreements 
The possibility of forming agreements with women and children is not discussed 
directly in any Epicurean text. However, much can be deduced from a passage in which 
Lucretius explains how it is decided that provisions for women and children should be 
made. I take this discussion to complete the previous one and to show that even if 
members of certain groups do not form agreements their interests may still be protected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Fr. 226 Usener. 
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by agreements. The passage in question was already quoted above, but, for the sake of 
completeness, I quote it again here: 
It was then, too, that neighbors eagerly began to form amicitiae one with another, 
not to hurt or to be harmed, and claimed protection for their children and 
womenfolk, indicating by means of inarticulate cries and gestures that it is fair or 
just [aequum] that the weak are pitied by everyone. Although it was not possible 
for concord to be achieved universally, the great majority kept their agreements 
[foedera] loyally. Otherwise, the human race would have been extinguished at 
that early stage and could not have propagated and preserved itself to the 
present day.95 
 
The context of the passage is the description of the beginning of society: Human 
beings come together and thus agree on the first moral norms that are to be in place 
among them. Lucretius calls these initial agreements “amicitiae” and the characterization 
that they involve not hurting and being harmed (nec laedere nec violari) is sufficient to 
make clear that Lucretius must have the same kinds of agreements in mind that are 
described in the Principal Doctrines. Now, what is interesting about the passage is that it 
claims that here the agreement includes pity for the weaker members of society. This 
implies, first, that the weaker members of societies, by which Lucretius means women 
and children, did not form the initial agreements by themselves, but were excluded from 
this process.96 Second, it is also clear that on Lucretius’ view, women and children also 
profit from agreements insofar as they are included in agreements. For even if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 tunc et amicitiem coeperunt iungere aventes / finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari, / et 
pueros commendarunt muliebreque saeclum, / vocibus et gestu cum balbe significarent / 
imbecillorum esse aequum misererier omnis. / nec tamen omnimodis poterat concordia gigni, / 
sed bona magnaque pars servabat foedera caste; / aut genus humanum iam tum foret omne 
peremptum /nec potuisset adhuc perducere saecla propago. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things 
V.1019ff.; Trans. by Smith, modified. See also the more detailed discussion in chapter 3. 
96 Women and children are explicitly mentioned in the text, but ‘the weak’ could also entail the 
elderly or mentally or physically disadvantaged. These are more difficult to account for than 
women and children since women and children, in most cases can be said to have a patron (their 
father, their husband/relative, etc.), whereas one can very easily imagine cases where this is not 
true of someone who is elderly or disadvantaged. I bracket this problem here. 
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agreement did not involve a pledge to help the weak directly and merely consisted in not 
harming them, the weak would profit from the agreement, even if they themselves would 
not be among the contracting parties. Of course, this entails a rather optimistic view of 
Epicurean contracting agents. But be this as it may, it seems to follow from Epicurean 
moral psychology, which I discuss in more detail in chapter 5, that Epicurean agents do 
not have an incentive to harm others.  
That there is no indication that women form agreements in Epicurean theory 
might be considered surprising. After all, in contrast to other schools, the Garden was 
known to be open to female members and thus adopted relatively progressive views on 
women. In response to this, one can perhaps point out that women could stand in 
agreement-like relationships to men who are able to form agreements. In fact, 
“guardianship” is a technical term of Roman law used to describe the relationship 
between women and men – and to children when they are under age. However, we 
already examined the shortcomings of such a reading above. Nevertheless, since the 
main purpose of agreements is to obtain security and Epicurean agents are not by 
nature out to harm others, it seems that even if women and children do not form 
agreements, they would – at least – qua dependents have some share in the security 
obtained by the agreements of justice.  
2.4. Summary 
In this chapter, I discussed Epicurean agreements and laid out what I take to be 
the basic Epicurean view. In doing so, I raised three issues. First, I discussed that 
agreements are about not harming each other and not being harmed. I argued that this 
is an explication of security, which in Epicurean theory serves the purpose of promoting 
a state of freedom from bodily pain and mental distress. 
46	  
	  
Second, I described the relationship between benefit and justice more closely. I 
claimed that there are beneficial things prior to agreements, but that there is no justice 
without agreements. Furthermore, I distinguished two processes of agreements in the 
Epicureans (the agreements that lead to justice and agreements that lead to the laws) 
and so laid the foundation for understanding their theory as a kind of social contract 
theory.  
Third, I discussed which parties are able to form agreements on the Epicurean 
point of view. I dealt with agreements in regard to three groups: animals, other peoples, 
and women and children. I argued that the Epicureans can distinguish between whether 
agents are capable, able, and willing to form agreements and I showed that even if 
agreements in the full sense are not possible with the three groups just distinguished, (1) 
there may well be agreement-like understandings with them, (2) even if certain agents 
are not able to form agreements, their interests may still be taken into account in the 
agreements that are formed about them, and (3) in general, Epicurean agents are not 
disposed in such a way as to harm those with whom they have not formed agreements 
with, as long as these other agents do not pose a threat to the Epicureans.  
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3. THE ETIOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF JUSTICE AND LAW: 
EPICUREAN SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
	  
After setting out the basic elements of the Epicurean theory of justice in the 
previous chapter, I now turn to the etiological account of Epicurean contractual justice. In 
so doing, I show how the elements of Epicurean agreements that I identified in chapter 2 
work together from a diachronic perspective and how the Epicurean theory is best 
understood as a type of social contract theory. 
Epicurus’ own etiological account of contractual justice, which was probably 
found in book 12 of On Nature, has not come down to us.97 Fortunately, though, 
Lucretius’ account, which is probably closely modeled on Epicurus’ own version, can be 
found at On the Nature of Things V.925-1457. This text will be the principal source in this 
chapter, and for the most part, the following can be understood as a commentary on 
Lucretius’ culture story, which comprises an etiological account of justice. In the previous 
chapter, I already pointed out some idiosyncrasies in Lucretius in comparison to what 
one would expect given central tenets of Epicureanism; we will see this trend confirmed 
in this chapter.98 However, while On the Nature of Things V is the principal source, there 
is also an Epicurean culture story that is ascribed to the second head of the Garden, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Long and Sedley 1987: II: 151. The Epicurean culture story is only one of many; 
Kulturentstehungslehre was a flourishing genre in antiquity. See above all Lovejoy and Boas 
1965 [1935] as well as the studies by Cole 1990 [1967], Spoerri 1959, and Gatz 1967. A helpful 
overview of the different themes in prehistory and accounts of the Golden Age are found in 
Campbell 2002b: 20ff. and Campbell 2003: 336ff. (= appendix B). 
98 In this context, recall that Lucretius stresses that Epicureanism is a bitter pill to swallow for his 
fellow Romans (see I.936ff. and IV.11ff.). For an attempt to reconstruct the contents of Epicurus’ 
On Nature based on Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things, see Sedley 1998: 94ff. 
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Hermarchus.99 This text will serve as a corollary to the description in Lucretius and help 
distill an Epicurean account of how justice and law come to be.  
In what follows, I will first comment on the structure of the Lucretian account and 
briefly describe how it can be understood as a kind of social contract theory (3.1). These 
observations will then structure the following three sections, each of which will be 
devoted to a distinct part or phase of cultural development according to the Epicureans, 
corresponding to different phases of the development of justice and law (3.2., 3.3., and 
3.4). 
3.1. The Structure of Lucretius’ Culture Story and Social Contract Theory 
As many scholars have pointed out, Lucretius’ Kulturentstehungslehre does not 
proceed chronologically. Lucretius describes the development of prehistoric society and 
then contrasts it with modern society, leaving out certain intermediate steps of this 
development and jumping back and forth between the prehistoric time and the modern 
age.100 This may be due to the circumstances of the work’s composition: One of the few 
things we do know about Lucretius is that he died before being able to finish the poem 
as a whole. Since book five is one of the last books, the oddities in the text could thus be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Porphyry, On Abstinence I.7-12 = fr. 34 Longo Auricchio. Porphyry describes Hermarchus’ text, 
which is probably an excerpt from his great work Against Empedocles, as a “great genealogy 
[genealogian makran]” (On Abstinence I.7.1; see also Long Auricchio 1988: 126f. and Gallo 
1985). Unfortunately, it has only been partially preserved. Due to this partial preservation, the text 
can only provide a limited impression of what the full account may have looked like. On 
Hermarchus, see above all the editions of Krohn and Longo Auricchio as well as the comments in 
Erler 1994: 227ff., Obbink 1988, and Vander Waerdt 1988. For similarities between Lucretius and 
Hermarchus’ account, see Müller 1972: 74ff. and Müller 1987. 
100 Besides the much-discussed remarks on fire (see the overview in Westphalen 1957: 67f. and 
criticism in Manuwald 1980: 34f.), a good example for this is the discussion of the domestication 
of animals (V.855ff.). It precedes Lucretius’ prehistory proper and is discussed in the context of 
the survival of different species instead of being discussed later in the text in the context of 
human beings first settling down.  
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explained by Lucretius’ premature death.101 Be this as it may, some scholars argue that 
certain parts of the text should be transposed to restore the real order of Lucretius’ 
thought or even that the poem contains two separate cultural histories: one that is more 
developed and one that is a less polished draft included by a conscientious editor.102  
But while some later passages might not fit perfectly into a neat schema, the 
majority of scholars now rightly agree that the section of the poem that deals with the 
creation of society can be roughly divided into three parts. These parts correspond to 
three stages of cultural development on the Epicurean view.103 In the first part of his 
cultural history, Lucretius describes human beings and their primitive nature in their 
original condition or state (V.925-1010). In the second and third part, he describes how 
civilization comes into being, distinguishing between two distinct phases of development 
(V.1011-1104 and V.1105-1457). 
As Bernd Manuwald convincingly argues, this division is based on an important 
methodological distinction in Epicurean philosophy, which is most succinctly expressed 
in the Letter to Herodotus. The passage in question is in part corrupt, but the main point 
that is emphasized in the text is nonetheless sufficiently clear. According to Epicurus, 
any process of cultural development really consists of two distinct processes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 On this reading, perhaps On the Nature of Things could also be the product of an unknown 
ancient editor. The Church Father Jerome even suggests Cicero. See Eusebius, Hieronymus’ 
Chronicle 171.3 Olympiad.  
102 This thesis is found in Merlan 1950 who is followed by Furley 1978: 22ff. For criticism, see 
Westphalen 1957: 122ff., Perelli 1967: 271f., and Manuwald 1980: 9ff. 
103 The clearest discussion of the structure of Lucretius’ Kulturentstehungslehre is found in 
Manuwald 1980: 8ff. He follows Barwick 1943, the first 20th century commentator to argue for a 
coherent structure of the account. A good overview of the debate, including a criticism of 
Manuwald, is found in Sallmann 1986. 
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Furthermore, one must suppose that [human] nature was taught a large number 
of different lessons just by the facts themselves, and compelled [by them]; and 
that reasoning later made more precise what was handed over to it [by nature] 
and made additional discoveries – more quickly among some peoples, and more 
slowly among others and in some periods of time <making greater advances> 
and in others smaller ones.104 
 
In other words, during the first process of development, the development is due 
to nature (phusis) and proceeds from the things themselves (hupo autōn tōn 
pragmatōn). The idea here is that things themselves make certain developments 
possible while they preclude others. An example of this is the human larynx.105 It allows 
human beings to produce sounds. In the course of time, human beings start forming 
more systematic sounds because of certain impressions (phantasmata) or feelings 
(pathē) they have. Human beings thus slowly learn to use this organ by a process that is 
gradual, but not systematic. However, the continual use of the natural capacities kicks 
off the development of what will later become language. In order for this to happen, 
though, a process of reasoning (logismos) is needed.106 And this second process of 
development is distinct from the first.107 During this process, reasoning perfects what 
was started by nature – more quickly in some cases, more slowly in others. Reasoning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Ἀλλὰ µὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλά καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγµάτων 
διδαχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι· τὸν δὲ λογισµὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα ὕστερον 
ἐξακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν ἐν µὲν τισὶ θᾶττον, ἐν δὲ τισὶ βραδύτερον καὶ ἐν µὲν τισὶ 
περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις † ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπεῖρου † **, ἐν δὲ τισὶ καὶ ἐλάττους. Letter to 
Herodotus X.75; Trans. by Inwood and Gerson. 
105 Ibid. X.75f. 
106 Referring to Diogenes, Lives X.32 and 39, Detel writes that “[f]ür die logischen Beziehungen 
zwischen empirischen und theoretischen Sätzen verwendet Epikur selber den Terminus 
‘λόγισµος” (1975: 29, fn. 23). This seems to be confirmed by ibid. X.76, 117, 120, and 132 and 
KD 19. See also Asmis 1984: 204ff. 
107 In accordance with Manuwald (1980: 20f.), I understand the two processes of cultural 
development to be successive chronological periods overall, although surely, there might be 
some overlap. For an alternative view, see Furley 1978: 11.  
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intervenes after nature has already made a beginning. In this case, human reasoning 
adds linguistic conventions by systematizing the random sounds that were produced in 
the first cultural phase. Furthermore, it helps posit (tethēnai) and fix meanings to get rid 
of ambiguities and facilitate communication. 
The distinction between a phusis-development process and a logismos-
development process in any cultural development yields three distinct phases of cultural 
development:  
(1) an original state or condition of humanity, during which no cultural 
development has yet taken place,  
(2) a first cultural phase, during which the development of natural human 
capacities takes place (phusis-development), and  
(3) a second cultural phase, during which reasoning perfects the process of 
development that nature started (logismos-development).  
This distinction is especially relevant for the questions about justice and law 
because the three phases of cultural development correspond to different degrees of 
knowledge and implementation of justice and laws. As we will see, justice and law do not 
exist in the original state and human beings have no understanding of justice and laws. 
In the first cultural phase, human beings gain an understanding of what is just, based – 
in some way – on what is beneficial, and they implement this understanding by means of 
reciprocal agreements. However, at this point in the societal development, there are no 
laws. Finally, in the second cultural phase, after some failed attempts, what is beneficial 
is codified into laws. As a result, a community not only has reciprocal agreements that 
correspond to moral norms but also a more institutionalized understanding and practice 
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in the form of laws.108 In short, then, one can rightly speak of a “double birth” of justice 
and law in Epicurean theory.109 
The analysis just presented gives the Epicurean account what may seem like a 
temporal dimension, which – from a modern perspective – might lead to its immediate 
dismissal as a just-so story. In response to such a criticism, one can point out that a 
more charitable reading of the Lucretian text, namely, to read it as a counter-narrative to 
the explanations offered by other schools of the Hellenistic period. This counter-narrative 
‘proves’ that even if Epicurean principles about the natural world are adopted and Stoic 
and Platonic ideas about providence and demiurgy are abandoned, all phenomena in 
the world, including those in the social and political realm, can still be explained. In short, 
a plausible Epicurean explanation of all phenomena is possible.110  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Hermarchus’ account, as it is preserved in Porphyry, by contrast, seems to be restricted to the 
second phase of cultural development. It only deals with the laws. However, it follows the same 
general schema that Lucretius follows, as the discussion of epilogismos that is taken to be 
characteristic of law-giving at I.8.2 and I.10.4. shows. (I discuss the latter passage in detail 
below.) The comments in Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr. 12 Smith) are compatible with such a 
reading as well; it is difficult to say what stage of development the passage describes. Much 
seems to depend on whether ‘epinoia’ is used for any idea in the mind or rather for specific ideas 
that require epilogismos. See also the discussion in chapter 7 below. On epilogismos, see 
Arrighetti 1952, De Lacy 1958, and Schofield 1996.      
109 Sasso 1979: 7ff. The development just outlined again emphasizes two key features of the 
Epicurean theory of justice and law that I already briefly discussed in the previous chapter and 
that I will take up again in more detail in chapter 4 but that I wish to flag at this point: (1) that 
justice and law depend on nature in some sense and are thus based on facts about the world and 
(2) that justice and law are importantly distinct phenomena. Furthermore, for a discussion of the 
parallelism between the evolution of language and the evolution of justice, see Müller 1969: 306ff. 
as well as Müller 1972: 93ff., Goldschmidt 1977: 165ff., and Ranger 2007: 81f. I agree with Müller 
that one ought to be careful in drawing connections between the discussions of justice and 
language in Epicurus (see also Pigeaud 1983: 141 and Alberti 1995: 170f. and fn. 18); not all 
readers have been careful enough (for instance, Long and Sedley 1987: I: 134 and II: 137, Cole 
1990: 73, Arrighetti 1973: 553, and Vander Waerdt 1988: 92, fn. 21). Likewise, however, it seems 
to me that Müller may be overemphasizing the difference between the account of language and 
the account of justice and thereby loses sight of the commonalities the two accounts.  
110 In chapter 4, I will also call such an explanation ‘naturalistic.’ In this context, note also that, as 
some scholars point out, the exact epistemic status of the culture story in On the Nature of Things 
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Be this as it may, as the above comments about the three phases of 
development and role of agreements already suggest, the Epicurean theory of justice 
and law is a kind of social contract theory. In the remainder of this section, let me briefly 
comment on some similarities between Epicurean theory and early modern theories of 
the social contract and thus show that Epicurean conception of justice and the law is part 
of a more comprehensive political theory. In this context, it is helpful to draw on the three 
“essential features” of social contract theory Charles Kahn identifies:111  
(1) There is a description of the original condition of mankind, according to which 
human beings do not yet live in society.  
(2) There is some deficiency to the original condition that makes it necessary for 
human beings to unite and hence to form society. 
(3) Human beings form society by means of agreements and so remedy the 
deficiency of the original condition.  
 All of these three features can also be found in the Epicurean account. In what 
follows, I will comment on each of the three distinct phases of cultural development and 
thereby show in what way the Epicurean theory of justice and law exhibits these three 
essential features of social contract theory. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
V is difficult to ascertain. See Goldschmidt 1977: 77f. and Kahn 1981: 93. One could think of the 
account either as describing a historical state of affairs or as being merely an explanatory aid. 
111 1981: 93. On ancient social contract theory, see also Kaerst 1909, Guthrie 2003 [1971]: 135ff., 
Müller 1985, and Sprute 1989. 
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3.2. The Original State 
Before turning to the description of the process of societal development proper, 
Lucretius discusses human beings as they were before they entered society. I will call 
this state of humanity as a whole the ‘original state.’ By this, I mean the original condition 
of humankind, not a political or legal state that precedes the present day political or legal 
state. In Lucretius’ description, human beings are physically enduring in the original 
state. They have strong bones and sinews and are resilient to heat and cold as well as 
to different kinds of diseases.112 They live the life of hunters and gatherers.113 And they 
do not have fixed homes, but sleep under the open sky and wear no clothes.114 In short, 
human beings are very hardy creatures that live a rather primitive life. Humankind as a 
whole does not yet possess the arts that are an important part of human culture. 
Lucretius explicitly names plowing, which is the requisite to farming and characteristic of 
a sedentary life-style, along with iron-molding and casting, which are important for tool-
making.115 Furthermore, human beings lack the ethical and political knowledge that is 
the prerequisite for society to come into being. As Lucretius writes, “Nor could they 
[primitive human beings] look to the common good [commune bonum], nor did they 
know to make mutual use of any moral norms [moribus] or laws [legibus].”116  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V. 925ff. 
113 Ibid., V.937ff. and 966ff. 
114 Ibid., V.953ff. 
115 Ibid., V.933ff. 
116 nec commune bonum poterant spectare neque ulllis / moribus inter se scibant nec legibus uti. 
Ibid., V.958f. Trans. mine. 
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Let us look more closely at these lines. First, at 958f., Lucretius makes an 
epistemological claim (“could not look (nec … poterant spectare)”) about the extent of 
moral knowledge in the original state. The emphasis in this claim lies on the common 
good (commune bonum). What exactly the ‘common good’ is for Lucretius is unclear. 
Lucretius does not repeat the expression elsewhere in the poem and it seems that 
‘commune’ (common) could be understood in two ways. First, ‘common good’ could 
merely refer to the good that is common to all. It would then be equivalent to the ‘natural 
good’ that Epicurus mentions in several texts.117 This ‘natural good’ is the Epicurean 
highest good or end that all agents pursue: pleasure (hedonē), understood as freedom 
from bodily pain (aponia) and mental distress (ataraxia), which according to the 
Epicureans in the cradle argument, all beings pursue from birth.118  Yet such a reading 
does not explain why human beings were not able to form agreements at this point in the 
culture story. First, if the common good is the natural good, that is, Epicurean pleasure, it 
seems that human beings in the original state should also pursue it. But Lucretius claims 
as well that human beings in the original state cannot look to this good, which would 
result in a contradiction. Second, moreover, this reading seems to imply that the first 
human beings fail to form communities because they have not grasped a fact about the 
world (namely, that what the natural good for human beings is). This seems hardly 
plausible.  
Let us therefore suggest an alternative reading. On this reading, the ‘common 
good’ refers to the good of the group as a whole as supposed to the good of each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 KD 7. See also Letter to Menoeceus 128f. 
118 See Cicero, On Ends I.30. For different readings of the cradle argument, see Brunschwig 1986 
(who argues that the first good is kinetic pleasure) and Held 2007: 58ff. (who argues that the first 
good is katastematic pleasure). 
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individual. The claim being made at this point in the text is thus that humans in the 
original state have not yet developed an understanding of the good that entails the life 
with others. In other words, ‘commune bonum’ at V.958 means that human beings in the 
original state have not yet grasped the ‘common’ aspect of the good. This is true 
regardless of which particular ‘philosophy’ an agent ascribes to, although for the 
Epicureans, it would mean that for any given agent, being in a state of pleasure is 
compatible with the pleasure of the larger group as a whole and that, in some scenarios, 
pleasure is even more easily obtained in a group than by oneself.   
The main reason why human beings lack an understanding of the common good 
according to the Epicureans at this point in societal development is that the first human 
beings are self-sufficient beings and, as such, are not dependent on others to procure 
this good. As Lucretius puts it: “Individuals [in the original state] seized whatever prize 
fortune had offered them, trained as they were to live and use their strength for 
themselves alone.”119 The family, the basic unity of society, does not yet exist. Men and 
women meet to procreate but this interaction is not enough to form more lasting ties; 
there is no appreciation of community among our first ancestors according to 
Lucretius.120 And consequently, the good does not yet need to include considerations 
about other human beings. Only when human nature changes in the course of societal 
development, do human beings lose their self-sufficiency, and only through this loss, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 quod cuique obtulerat praedae fortuna, ferebat / sponte sua sibi quisque valere et vivere 
doctus. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V.960f.; Trans. by Smith, modified. 
120 Ibid., V.962ff. One wonders how children are raised at this stage in the process of cultural 
development, but the text does not address this issue. 
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human beings start realizing the importance of cooperation with other human beings to 
fulfill their desires, which shape what they perceive as the common good.121 
This brings us to the moral norms (mores) and laws (leges) that are mentioned in 
the passage quoted above. First, note that Lucretius clearly distinguishes between what 
one could call moral norms and legal norms, which foreshadows the important difference 
between justice, which comes to be in the first phase of cultural development, and the 
laws, which only come to be in the second phase of cultural development. Furthermore, 
note that because human beings at this point of development are self-sufficient, they do 
not need to interact with others. As a result, moral norms and laws are of no use (nec … 
uti) to them. After all, moral norms and laws regulate behavior in human society and 
have no value for the Epicureans independently of the use they bring.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 From the above remarks, it is clear that the Epicureans deny that human society comes to be 
‘by nature,’ that is, that from the beginning of humankind it is in human nature to form 
communities. See also the discussion of justice as being ‘by nature’ in chapter 4. Such a view is 
also supported by the overwhelming majority of other sources. In this vein, we read in Themistius 
that Epicurus thinks that “human beings are not by nature sociable and cultivated [µὴ φύσει εἶναι 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον κοινωνικόν τε καὶ ἥµερον]” (fr. 551 Usener; Tran. mine) and Epictetus reports: 
“when [Epicurus] wishes to get rid of the natural communion of human beings with each other, he 
makes use of the same thing that is gotten rid of. For what does he say? ‘Do not be deceived, 
men, nor lead astray or cheated. There is no natural communion among rational beings with each 
other, believe me. Those who say other things deceive and delude you’ [ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν 
φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, αῦτῷ τῷ ἀναιρουµένῳ συγχρῆται. Τί γὰρ λέγει; µὴ 
ἐξαπατᾶσθε, ἄνθρωποι, µηδὲ παράγεσθε µηδὲ διαπίπτετε· οὐκ ἔστι φυσικὴ κοινωνία τοῖς λογικοῖς 
πρὸς ἀλλήλους, πιστεύσατέ µοι· οἱ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα λέγοντες ἐξαπατιῶσιν ὑµᾶς καὶ παραλογίζονται]” 
(fr. 523 Usener; Trans. mine). See also ibid.: “Epicurus says that there is no human society: 
everyone takes care of himself [dicit Epicurus… nullam esse humanam societatem: sibi quemque 
consulere].” Trans. mine. The only piece of evidence that society is natural for the Epicureans is a 
further passage in Epictetus: “Epicurus understands as well that we are by nature sociable 
[ἐπινοεῖ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, ὅτι φύσει ἐσµὲν κοινωνικοί]” (fr. 525 Usener; Trans. mine). Müller (1972: 
36ff.) convincingly argues this need does not mean that Epicurus actually endorses the position 
that society is natural, but that he should (from a Stoic perspective), were he more reasonable. 
Accordingly, Epictetus continues: “but once having placed our good in the body he cannot say 
anything different [ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ κελύφει θείς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡµῳν οὐκέτι δύναται ἄλλο οὐδὲν 
εἰπεῖν]” (fr. 525 Usener; Trans. mine). As I argue in more detail below, the Epicureans do not 
deny that society becomes necessary at some point in the societal development, namely, when 
human nature changes, but that it has always been a necessary part of human nature. On the 
question of whether society is natural or the product of convention, see also Philippson 1910: 
294f., Garbo 1936: 245, and Grilli 1953: 69ff. 
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Now, is this societal state, in which human beings do not yet live in communities, 
a good or bad one for the human beings who live in it?122 Lucretius’ view in this regard is 
notoriously difficult to pinpoint.123 Indeed, advantages of the original state are weighed 
against its disadvantages. The Latin poet notes, for instance, that more people died in 
the primitive state due to attacks of wild animals than at the time that he is writing.124 
However, while he acknowledges that this number has gone down in post-original state 
societies, he also points out that these societies pose new risks that were unknown to 
human beings in the original state: Going out to sea and waging wars only came into 
being when human beings left the original state.125 The original state in Lucretius is thus 
neither an idyllic state from which the downfall of human beings takes its course nor a 
lowly stepping-stone to higher levels of human development à la Enlightenment thinkers. 
Lucretius is the first extant ancient thinker to introduce such a differentiated appreciation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 In this context, see also the discussion on whether the original state is a state of war of all 
against all. Among those who affirm the claim are Falchi 1902: 158, Guyau 1917: 151, 160, 167, 
Perelli 1967: 166ff., and Müller 1972: 38ff. (also Müller 1987: 234f., fn. 8, Müller 1988, 117, Müller 
1991: 112), and  Scholz 1998, 259 and fn. 17 as well as possibly Long 1985: 308. Among those 
who deny it are Philippson 1910a: 295, Garbo 1936: 249ff., Mitsis 1988: 83 (see also the 
comments in Annas 1993: 299 and Campbell 2003: 217ff.).  
123 One of the major debates in the secondary literature on Lucretius’ Kulturentstehungslehre is 
whether Lucretius can be characterized as primitivist or progressivist. See, for instance, Robin 
1916, Guyau 1917: 153ff., Burry 1955 [1932], Taylor 1947, Merlan 1950, Keller 1951, Borle 1962, 
Ruch 1969, Manuwald 1980: 51ff., and Asmis 1996. This is equivalent to asking whether 
Lucretius believed that human beings in the original state were superior to their predecessors and 
history was a story of decline (primitivism) or he believed that human beings in the original state 
were mainly characterized by lack that needed to be overcome and history was a story of 
progress (progressivism). Put more provocatively, the alternative is thus whether Lucretius was a 
proto-Rousseau or a proto-Condorcet, authors that are often invoked by commentators 
discussing this question. Put this way, though, one can easily see, as most recent commentators 
do, that the dichotomy is misleading when it comes to Lucretius’ account (see, for instance, 
Furley 1978: 9, Müller 1988, and Campbell 2003: 180ff.). Besides the problem of using and thus 
imposing anachronistic vocabulary, Lucretius’ account simply does not fit into this neat schema. 
On the idea of primitivism in antiquity, see Lovejoy and Boas 1965 [1935]. On the idea of 
progress in antiquity, see Edelstein 1967, Blundell 1986: 165ff., and Dodds 1973.  
124 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V.988ff. 
125 Ibid., V.999ff. 
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of this pre-cultural state, which will also have consequences for the appreciation of 
justice and law, as we will see below: Justice and law will be ambiguous social 
institutions that on the one hand solve a deficit of the original state but on the other hand 
they bring about new problems and dangers that were absent in the original state. 
To sum up the findings of this subsection, society cannot develop in the original 
state because human beings do not have any understanding of the common good and 
because such an understanding is necessary to form societies. More importantly, 
though, human beings cannot have such an understanding at this point because there is 
no such understanding to be had: Human beings are completely self-sufficient and 
hence there are no empirically instantiated examples of human beings living together 
and cooperating with each other that could give rise to an understanding of the common 
good. On the Epicurean view, society is not ‘required’ at this point of cultural 
development. First, it is not required because living in society is not essential to human 
nature. And second, it is not required because society does not provide goods that our 
primitive ancestors could not provide on their own. Only when circumstances change 
and human nature changes, society comes to be, which happens during the first cultural 
phase, to which we now turn.  
3.3. The First Cultural Phase 
At V.1011ff., Lucretius turns to the coming to be of human communities. At this 
point, a new stage of development is described, one in which moral norms (mores) come 
to be. Mores are nothing else than the rules and principles that regulate human behavior 
in the interaction with other human beings, which is characteristic of life in communities. 
It is therefore not surprising that justice makes its first appearance at precisely this point 
in Lucretius’ culture story. As we saw in the previous section, circumstances in the 
60	  
	  
original state did not require the development of society. Let us therefore look closely at 
what changes from the first to the second phase of societal development so that society 
can come to be.  
Recall that the main hindrance to the formation of society in the original state is 
that human beings are self-sufficient. Consequently, human beings must not only lose 
their original self-sufficiency but also require other human beings to make up for their 
loss. Accordingly, Lucretius opens the section that deals with the development of human 
communities with precisely such a remark. As we saw above, human beings in the 
original state are described as tough and enduring and they live the life of hunters and 
gatherers. Now, by contrast, human beings settle down and consequently their nature 
changes: 
Next they provided themselves with huts and skins and fire, and woman, united 
to man, went to live in one <place with him. The advantages of cohabitation> 
were learned, and they saw the birth of their offspring. It was then that human 
beings first began to become gentle: The use of fire rendered their shivering 
bodies less able to endure the cold beneath the pavilion of the sky; Venus tamed 
their strength; and children with their charming ways easily broke down the stern 
disposition of their parents.126  
 
 The change from isolated hunters and gatherers to a sedentary family mode of 
life is surprising because Lucretius does not explain precisely what causes the change 
from one mode of life to the other. What suddenly made human beings build huts, wear 
clothing, and establish more lasting unions with the opposite sex that led to the formation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126  Inde casas postquam ac pellis ignemque pararunt / et mulier coniuncta viro concessit in unum 
/ [lacuna?] / cognita sunt, prolemque ex se videre creatam, / tum genus humanum primum 
mollescere coepit. / ignis enim curavit, ut alsia corpora frigus / non ita iam possent caeli sub 
tegmine ferre, / et Venus inminuit viris puerique parentum / blanditiis facile ingenium fregere 
superbum. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V.1011ff.; Trans. by Smith, modified, emphasis 
added. 
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of families? It seems that the transition is missing here; nothing in the description of the 
original state gives us readers the answer to this question. However, it seems fairly easy 
to fill in Lucretius’ account. Human beings, chancing upon fire and skins and inventing 
huts, quickly see the advantages such and similar innovations pose. Gradually, they 
begin to adopt these innovations and make them part of their daily lives. These 
innovations and changes may initially be independent of one another and not 
necessitated by each other: They may emerge one after the other and be small and 
insignificant at first. The pace of the development can thus appear to be rather slow. 
Eventually a tipping point is reached, though; taken together, certain innovations, which 
individually altered the state of human beings only insignificantly, lead to bigger changes 
and ultimately result in a significant transformation of human nature.127 Human beings 
are no longer what they were in the original state but become gentle and tamed, having 
become accustomed to innovations that make their lives easier.128 Constant dripping 
wears away a stone; this seems to be the meaning of tum… primum… coepit.129  
Note that “advantages of cohabitation” in the passage quoted above is Martin 
Smith’s addition (see also Cyril Bailey who adds “laws of marriage”): the corresponding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 In this context, see Sarkissian 2010 who argues for the doctrine of “situationalism,” according 
to which minor changes in circumstances may have big effects on moral behavior. 
128 ‘Mollescere’ at V.1015 does not mean ‘to become weak,’ but rather ‘to become soft/gentle’, as 
Manuwald convincingly argues: “mollescere ist nämlich als Gegensatz gemeint zu dem durus 
genus (vgl. vv. 925ff.), das ein Leben more ferarum (vgl. v. 932) führte. Lexikalisch bedeutet 
mollescere entweder im wörtlichen Sinne ‘an Härte, an Kraft verlieren’ oder übertragen in 
durchaus positivem Sinne ‘sanft, freundlich werden’ […]. Sieht man von der Spezialbedeutung 
‘seine Männlichkeit verlieren’ […] ab, ist mollescere in peiorativen Sinn (moralische Erschlaffung, 
Verweichlichung) erst spät belegt” (1980: 56, fn. 212). 
129 It is interesting to note that the family really has a key place in the development of community 
according to this view.  Children, then, truly function as the ‘social glue’ that enables the 
emergence of the families as the basic units of society. Compare this to the role of the household 
(oikos) in Aristotle’s Politics (I.1252b9ff.). 
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line in Lucretius’ text is missing. However, there are good reasons in favor of Smith’s 
and Bailey’s suggestions. Once relationships between the sexes are no longer casual, 
human beings need to acquire some understanding and, as a result, relationships 
become sustainable. As “cognita sunt” at V.1013 indicates, some intellectual act, some 
act of learning, takes place at this point of the development.130 It seems very likely that 
this act involves some aspect of human interaction. Given the context of the passage 
that describes the first long lasting relationships that are being formed, the lacuna 
probably contained the poem’s first instance of human beings developing moral norms in 
regard to these relationships.   
 Human nature, then, changes and human beings become gentle and ‘softer’ 
according to Lucretius’ account. As a consequence, human beings are also no longer 
self-sufficient as they were in the original state. The main reason that spoke against the 
establishment of a society therefore falls away. Not being self-sufficient, human beings 
in this first phase of society have the incentive to unite and form communities. This is the 
only way to compensate for the new needs that arise.131 
In any case, as soon as the necessity of living with others arises, the issue of 
what principles and rules regulate this new situation emerges. We already saw above 
that the more lasting relationships between the sexes call for new knowledge of some 
kind that pertains to the new way of dealing with each other. Accordingly, in the passage 
that immediately follows the one quoted above that dealt with the change in human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Pace Lachmann’s suggestion to emend “cognita sunt” to “conubium.”  
131 This account of the origin of the communities recalls the prominent idea, also found in other 
classical accounts, that human beings are deficient beings and the state is formed out of 
necessity to fulfill a need. See, for instance, Plato, Republic 369b f. and Protagoras 321c ff. 
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nature, Lucretius continues to describe the interaction between the first human beings in 
the now slowly forming society. And this interaction again includes the emergence of 
further moral norms, which brings us to one of the most important passages in Lucretius’ 
account of cultural development when it comes to justice: 
It was then, too, that neighbors eagerly began to form amicitiae one with another, 
not to hurt or to be harmed, and claimed protection for their children and 
womenfolk, indicating by means of inarticulate cries and gestures that it is fair or 
just [aequum] that the weak are pitied by everyone. Although it was not possible 
for concord to be achieved universally, the great majority kept their agreements 
[foedera] loyally. Otherwise, the human race would have been entirely 
extinguished at that early stage and could not have propagated and preserved 
itself to the present day.132 
 
Beside the moral norms that arise between men and women (the family), there 
are also moral norms that arise between neighbors.133 Lucretius calls these moral norms 
“amicitiae.” By this, Lucretius could first mean Epicurean ‘friendships.’134 According to 
such a reading, friendships (understood as “fellowships” rather than intimate bonds 
between people)135 would thus stand at the beginning of the communal life. This would 
be especially interesting because early modern conceptions of the social contract 
usually do not accord much significance to the notion of friendship. According to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 tunc et amicitiem coeperunt iungere aventes / finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari, / et 
pueros commendarunt muliebreque saeclum, / vocibus et gestu cum balbe significarent / 
imbecillorum esse aequum misererier omnis. / nec tamen omnimodis poterat concordia gigni, / 
sed bona magnaque pars servabat foedera caste; / aut genus humanum iam tum foret omne 
peremptum / nec potuisset adhuc perducere saecla propago. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things 
V.1019ff.; Trans. by Smith, modified. 
133 The “et…et…” at V.1019ff. may indicate that the formation of ties between neighbors happens 
at the same time as the family comes into being and men and women form more lasting ties or 
that one type of relationship comes to being before the other. On either reading, both kinds of 
relationships in a way stand at the beginning of the genesis of society (see also Westphalen 
1957: 34). . 
134 See, for instance, Long 1985: 310. 
135 See O’Connor 1989: 168. 
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reading, then, Epicureans would accord political importance to their ‘friendship.’ 
However, as some commentators point out, ‘amicitia’ need not be translated or in fact be 
understood as ‘friendship.’136 ‘Amicitia’ can also mean ‘alliance’ and as such be a 
synonym for ‘foedus’, which is used in the same passage quoted above and is a Latin 
equivalent of the Greek ‘sunthēkē.’137 As a result, the above passage may just describe 
how agreements come to be, but not take a stand on how the Epicurean theory of 
friendship is related to the Epicurean theory of justice. 
In any event, Lucretius’ claim that the first alliance between neighbors concerns 
not hurting and not being harmed (nec laedere nec violari) strongly echoes Epicurus’ 
claim that agreements that are the basis for justice are over “not harming and not being 
harmed” (mē blaptein mēde blaptesthai).138 Yet as I already pointed out in the previous 
chapter, the subsequent discussion shows that Lucretius not only takes justice to consist 
of an obligation not to harm and not to be harmed, but also in a positive obligation to act 
beneficently towards others. Some commentators also argue that Lucretius introduces a 
second motive, wholly distinct from benefit, for why agreements are formed, namely, pity 
or compassion for the weak.139 Such an assumption is unnecessary, though. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See, for instance, Mitsis 1988: 106, fn. 14, Müller 1991: 118f., and Konstan 2008: 89ff. (pace 
Rist 1980: 123). 
137 See Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V.1155 as well as Cicero, On Ends I.70 
138 KD 35. See also KD 31, 32, and 33. 
139 Westphalen 1957: 34 and 78; Boyancé 1963: 243 pace Müller 1972: 42 and fn. 71. See also 
Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 3 Smith, in which Diogenes appeals to his love of humanity 
(philanthrōpon) to aid (epikourein) foreigners (zenoi). One may also think of Rousseau and his 
account of pity. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau argues against Hobbes whom he takes to 
have a mistaken conception of human beings. Rousseau contends that Hobbes is mistaken in 
assuming that human beings are originally intent on harming each other; they are rather fair-
minded creatures: “Hobbes n’a pas vu que la même cause qui empêche les Sauvages d’user leur 
raison […], les empêche en même temps d’abuser de leurs facultés, comme il le pretend lui-
même; de sorte qu’on pourrait dire que les Sauvages ne sont pas méchants précisement, parce 
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example of Epicurean friendship, which includes other-regarding elements, but which is 
firmly rooted in self-regarding utility, is instructive here.140 The inclusion of compassion, 
and hence obligations towards others, on this model, can be understood as a variation 
on the Epicurean response to the issue of how concern for others can be accounted for 
on purely utilitarian grounds. And there is no reason to admit a second, independent 
motive, on which Epicurean agents act. 
This response becomes all the more attractive when one considers the passage 
in the light of a debate between Epicureans and Stoics on the doctrine of appropriation 
(oikeiōsis).141 While the details of this originally Stoic doctrine are much disputed,142 the 
basic idea behind it is that, according to the Stoics, human beings exhibit a natural 
tendency to show ‘concern,’ which means that they seek out what is ‘appropriate’ for 
themselves. This takes two forms. First, there is the tendency to care for one’s own self-
preservation (personal oikeiōsis) and, second, there is the tendency to care for the well-
being of others (social oikeiōsis). The exact relationship between the two forms of 
oikeiōsis is unclear in Stoic theory. Perhaps these forms of oikeiōsis are completely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
qu’ils ne savent pas ce que c’est qu’être bons” (2008 [1753]: 94f.). In fact, Rousseau charges 
Hobbes to have overlooked a principle common to all human beings, namely, compassion or pity: 
“Je parle de la Pitié, disposition convenable à des êtres aussi faibles, et sujets à autant de maux 
que nous le sommes; vertu d’autant plus universelle et d’autant plus utile à l’homme qu’elle 
précède en lui l’usage de toute réflexion, et si Naturelle que les Bêtes mêmes en donnent 
quelquefois des signes sensibles” (ibid., 95). 
140 I refer the reader to the discussions in Mitsis 1988, Annas 1993, O’Keefe 2001b, Brown 2002, 
and Evans 2004.  
141 In regard to oikeiōsis in Lucretius, see especially Pigeaud 1984: 137ff. and Algra 1997. In 
regard to oikeiōsis in Hermarchus, to which I turn in more detail below, see Vander Waerdt 1988. 
Finally, see also Giusta 1964: I: 265ff. who discusses the cradle argument under the heading of a 
“dottrina Epicurea dell’ οἰκείωσις.” 
142 On oikeiōsis, see, for instance, von Arnim 1926, Philippson 1932, Dirlmeier 1937, Pohlenz 
1940, Brink 1956, Pembroke 1996 [1971], Kerferd 1972, Striker 1983, Inwood 1984, Engberg-
Pedersen 1990, and Forschner 2008. 
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distinct; perhaps, though, at least in some Stoic authors, social oikeiōsis is understood 
as an extension of personal oikeiōsis. On this model, self-concern is gradually extended 
to a concern vis-à-vis close family members, neighbors, the community, etc., ultimately 
leading to social oikeiōsis or the concern for the human race as a whole. This amounts 
to the famous Stoic doctrine of cosmopolitanism.143  
Fortunately, the details of the Stoic account need not concern us in this context, 
and so we can turn directly to the Epicureans. The language the Epicureans employ 
suggests that they are replying to or borrowing from the Stoics. The verb that Lucretius 
uses in the passage (‘commendo’) is also one of the terms employed by Cicero to render 
the Greek verb ‘oikeioumai’ into Latin.144 And in a parallel passage in Hermarchus, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Besides On Ends III, which is quoted above, the key texts for Stoic oikeiōsis are Arius 
Didymus’ epitome of Peripatic ethics (see also the translation in Görgemann 1983) as well as 
Diogenes, Lives VII.85f. = LS 57A, Plutarch, On Stoic Self-contradictions, 1038B = LS 57E and in 
Hierocles’ Elements of Ethics as well as the famous ‘circles’ passage (Stobaeus IV.671.7ff. = LS 
57G) 
144 On Ends III.16: “Every animal, as soon as it is born (this is where one should start), is 
concerned with itself and takes care to preserve itself. It favors its constitution and whatever 
preserves its constitution, whereas it recoils from its destruction and whatever appears to 
promote its destruction. In support of this thesis, the Stoics point out that babies seek what is 
good for them and avoid the opposite before they ever feel pleasure or pain. This would not 
happen unless they valued their own constitution and feared destruction. But neither could it 
happen that they would seek anything at all unless they had self-awareness and thereby self-
love. So one must realize that it is self-love which provides the primary motivation [simul atque 
natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se 
conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sunt eius status diligenda, alienari 
autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitum videantur afferre. Id ita esse sic probant, quod ante 
quam voluptas aut dolor attingerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non 
fieret nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. Fieri autem non posse tut appeterent aliquid 
nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. Ex quo intelligi debet principium ductum esse a se 
diligendo.]” (Trans. by Woolf). Note that ‘social’ oikeiōsis is discussed later in the text, at III.62ff., 
and that here Cicero also uses ‘conciliare’ as a synonym of ‘commendare.’ Finally, it is interesting 
to note that Lucretius also uses ‘commendare’ at V.861, in the context of the ‘agreements’ with 
animals. The text would then suggest that guardianship relies on natural affinity between animals 
and human beings, a point that is also denied by the Stoics. 
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noun ‘oikeiōsis’ is even explicitly used as one of the reasons why human beings should 
abstain from killing animals:145   
The followers of Epicurus […] declared that the slaughter of a human being is a 
sacrilege, and imposed exceptional penalties.146 Perhaps there is also [taxa men 
kai] a natural appropriation [oikeiōsis] of human to human, because of their 
likeness of appearance and of soul, which inclines them away from readily 
destroying such an animal as if it were one or other of those it is acceptable to 
kill. But the main reason [tēn pleistēn aitian] for indignation at this act, and its 
being declared sacrilege, is that it was not beneficial [mē sumpherein] for the 
general organization of life.147  
 
In other words, given what we know about the dispute concerning the cradle 
argument in the Epicurean and Stoic schools and about the Stoic complaint against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 There is some debate on the question of whether the passage in Porphyry, which is the 
source for Hermarchus, is a direct quotation from the second head of the Garden or Porphyry’s 
summary. In favor of direct quotation are, for instance, Philippson 1923: 5, Boyd 1936: 188, and 
Vander Waerdt 1988: 94ff. Against direct quotation are, for instance, Krohn 1921: 5f. and Müller 
1972: 74. Accordingly, one may reach different conclusions regarding the use of a single word 
like “oikeiōsis.” 
146 That the text religiously sanctions killing (it is declared “anhosion”) is perhaps surprising and 
could be thought to be unusual for an Epicurean author. However, given comments in the 
Comparetti Ethics (PHerc. 1251 col. XII.4ff. Indelli and Tsouna), an Epicurean ethical treatise 
whose author is unknown and that is named after its first editor, this might not be unorthodox: 
“The many are rather led to right conduct by the laws which threaten with death, and with 
punishments coming from the gods, and with pains which are considered intolerable, and with the 
privation of some things which are supposedly hard to procure. This is partly on account of what 
was said at the beginning, partly because these things threaten men who are foolish and who 
cannot be persuaded by the true percepts; and the only thing that is achieved through them [that 
is, the laws] is deterrence for a short period of time [κ[αὶ µ]ᾶλ[λ]ον εἰς ὀρθ[ο]π[ρ]αξίαν ὑ[πὸ] τῶν 
νόµων ἄγονται θάνατον ἀνατ[εινοµέ]νων καὶ τιµωρία[ς ἐ]κ θε[ῶ]ν καὶ πόνους ὡς δυσ[εκπο]νήτους 
καὶ στρήσε[ις] ἐνίων ὡς δυσπορίστων, τὸ µὲν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰρηµένων, τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ 
πρὸς ἄφρονας ταῦτ᾽ ἀνατ[είνε]σθαι καὶ µὴ δ[υ]ναµένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλη[θι]νῶν πείθεσθαι 
παραγγε[λ]µάτων καὶ µόνον ἐπισχέσεις δι᾽ αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι πρὸς ὀλίγον χρόνον].” See also 
Schmid 1944: 40f. and Müller 1972: 76 and fn. 166.  
147 Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου […] φασὶν […] ἀνόσιον ἐπεφήµισαν τὴν ἀνθρώπου σφάγὴν καὶ 
ἀτιµίας οὐ τὰς τυχούσας τροσῆψαν. τάχα µὲν καὶ φυσικῆς τινος οἰκειώσεως ὑπαρχούσης τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις πρός ἀνθρώπους διὰ τὴν ὁµοιότητα τῆς µορφῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ µὴ προχείρως 
φθείρειν τὸ τοιοῦτον ζῶον ὤσπερ ἕτερόν τι τῶν συγκεχωρηµένων· οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ τήν γε πλείστην 
αἰτίαν τοῦ δυσχερανθῆναι τοῦτο καὶ ἀνόσιον ἐπιφηµισθῆναι τὸ µὴ συµφέρειν εἰς τὴν ὅλην τοῦ βίου 
σύστασιν ὑπολαβείν. Hermarchus, fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On Abstinence I.7.1f.; 
Trans. by Clark, modified. 
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Epicureanism that it abolishes justice with the denial of oikeiōsis,148 it seems right to 
suppose that the Epicureans, from an early point on, react to the Stoics by themselves 
co-opting the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis.149 This means that instead of positing a natural 
affinity towards the self and others as basic, the Epicureans insist that the same results 
can be obtained by positing an impulse towards what is beneficial is basic. This is 
especially clear in the Hermarchus passage where “the main reason” for abstaining from 
killing is benefit, but oikeiōsis is added as a secondary reason (“perhaps there is also”). 
Following Paul Vander Waerdt and others, it therefore seems likely to me that the 
passages in Hermarchus and Lucretius are evidence for an Epicurean acknowledgment 
of the importance of explaining other-concern, but on their own terms.150  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Cicero, On the Laws I.42f. and On Ends III.70f. 
149 See especially Vander Waerdt 1988. 
150 Another matter is how precisely this response to Stoic theory came about. Vander Waerdt 
argues in his paper that the excerpt in Porphyry shows that Hermarchus was an original thinker. 
This is pace the traditional view of the first head of the Garden after Epicurus. Yet such a 
suggestion is not without its own problems. See also Roskam 2007: 76ff. Let me give some 
historical context. Hermarchus and Epicurus were roughly the same age. After Epicurus’ death in 
271 BCE, Hermarchus succeeded him as head of the Garden. Generally, Hermarchus is thought 
to have died around 250 BCE. Given the status of Epicurus in the Garden, Hermarchus thus 
could have introduced such a significant innovation as the doctrine of oikeiōsis without Epicurus’ 
explicit consent only after 271 BCE and, in fact, such a rather late date would give the Stoics 
some time to develop their doctrine. In this case, though, one would still have to assume that the 
oikeiōsis doctrine was well-developed before the time of Chryssipus (279-206 BCE), who is 
generally considered to be the most important early Stoic author. In any case, On Abstinence I.7-
12 is usually taken to be an excerpt from Hermarchus’ Against Empedocles and one can infer 
from fr. 29 Longo Auricchio (see p. 126f. of her edition of Hermarchus’ fragments) that Against 
Empedocles was written during Epicurus’ lifetime or rather, more precisely, that it was written 
before 301 BCE (before Epicurus wrote On Nature XII). If this date is right, though, Epicurus must 
have known and endorsed Hermarchus’ ideas about oikeiōsis, for otherwise, Hermarchus’ 
treatise would have been quite heterodox. What is more, On Nature XII, incidentally, probably 
contained Epicurus’ own account of cultural development. This means that even before writing his 
own culture story in systematic form, Epicurus already had Hermarchus’ account to draw on. This 
is not to say that Hermarchus did not truly first come up with the idea of integrating a response to 
the oikeiōsis doctrine into Epicureanism, but it means that this must have happened with the 
explicit endorsement of Epicurus. Alternatively, one might, of course, doubt that On Abstinence 
I.7-12 is really an excerpt from Hermarchus’ Against Empedocles (see also the discussion in 
Longo Auricchio, p. 137ff.) and that it was written after Epicurus’ death. If so, however, we cannot 
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Be this as it may, at On the Nature of Things V.1023, Lucretius for the first time 
claims that human beings make use of a moral vocabulary or more specifically 
communicate that something is ‘aequum.’ In doing so, human beings communicate that 
a given course of behavior is morally preferable to another one: In this case, pitying the 
weak is preferable to not doing so or to other courses of behavior. However, it is unclear 
what Greek word ‘aequum’ translates. It could either translate ‘dikaion’ (just) or ‘isōs’ 
(equal or fair).151 In the latter case, justice might have its beginnings in the idea of 
weighing and determining equal shares. The development of the notion of justice would 
thus begin with the equal, that is, with situations in which human beings apportion 
shares. According to this reading, the act of apportioning would be conveyed by simple 
language, perhaps even exclusively by pointing. In support of this suggestion, Lucretius 
claims that human beings at this point in the process of cultural development only 
communicate “by means of inarticulate cries and gestures.”152 One could then argue that 
the understanding of justice that primitive human beings have (and that is captured in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be sure that Epicurus’ own account of cultural development did not also include an explanation of 
fellow-feeling in some way, perhaps modeled on what Epicurus says about friendship elsewhere, 
and that these ideas greatly informed Hermarchus’ account. Either way, then, it seems difficult to 
say anything about Hermarchus’ originality on the basis of On Abstinence I.7-12, especially since 
we do not know when it was written or in what respects it differs from Epicurus’ account in On 
Nature. And given the current textual evidence, it also seems difficult to venture a guess 
regarding the chronology of the debate on oikeiōsis that probably took place between the 
Epicureans and the Stoics. 
151 As David Sedley suggests to me in conversation. 
152 For Campbell (2003: 279), “balbe here indicates that the setting is that of the origins of 
language, with the formation of justice made possible by the development of the first efficient 
communication system which, although primitive and still relying heavily on gesture, is advanced 
enough to transmit ethical concepts.” Lucretius is thus very optimistic about what can be achieved 
without complete grasp of language. It especially seems quite daunting that arrangements in 
regard to the weaker members of society can be made without advanced, that is, fully developed, 
linguistic capabilities. Surely, human beings can apportion shares without language, but it seems 
impossible to convey the concept of ‘equal shares’ without such language.  
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their preconception) gradually evolves over time, and that it is not simple insofar as it 
presupposes the concept of the equal. 
 While such a reading has much appeal, it ultimately fails to convince in my 
opinion. First, in Epicurus or other Epicureans writing in Greek, we do not find the term 
‘isōs’ in connection with justice. Of course, it is possible that we merely lack the relevant 
texts. However, it seems unlikely that such a key distinction is only extant in Lucretius. 
Second, Lucretius uses ‘iustum’ once in its technical sense as ‘just’ at III.950.153 And so 
it is all the more surprising that book V, which contains a discussion of justice and the 
law does not again use ‘iustum,’ but ‘aequum’ instead. It thus seems more likely that 
Lucretius is using ‘just’ and ‘equal,’ ‘iustum’ and ‘aequum,’ as synonyms. This is also 
confirmed by looking at V.1149 where ‘aequum’ is used to describe the laws (“legibus 
aequis”). The context is the final stage of societal development: Here, it does not make 
sense to say that the laws are merely ‘equal’ in the sense of a precursor to the full-
fledged notion of justice (that is, the iustum or dikaion). At this point, the laws are ‘just’ in 
the full sense precisely because they are in accordance with the preconception of 
justice, that is, the practical understanding of justice available to agents at the time. In 
short, then, ‘aequum’ must translate ‘dikaion’ at V.1023; for the Epicureans, human 
beings first form agreements about what is just during the first phase of cultural 
development.154 
Be this as it may, the passage quoted makes clear that the agreements made 
during this phase of cultural development are not durable. Agreements are kept most of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 The other occurrence is at IV.1241. 
154 On the potentially problematic preexisting standard of aequitas at this point in the account, see 
Mitsis 1988: 106, fn. 15 as well as the reply in Campbell 2003: 254ff. 
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the time, but – as we will see in light of Lucretius’ later account of the development of 
civilization155 – there is no way to sanction infringements at this stage. Here, we see 
once again Lucretius’ nuanced appreciation of the cultural achievements of this stage: 
Although it is a deficit of this stage that agreement (concordia) is not universal, it must – 
as Lucretius points out – at least be widespread, for otherwise, humankind as a whole 
would have died out.156  
In his commentary on The Nature of Things V, Gordon Campbell points out that 
the observation about human beings dying out in Lucretius is surprising because the 
description of the original state was not at all violent.157 It therefore seems odd that 
suddenly violence is so wide spread (even if not ubiquitous). Campbell explains this by 
referring to game theory and changing evolutionary strategies among human beings:158 
What worked for primitive human beings no longer works for human beings in the first 
phase of cultural development. Human beings undergo a change in their nature and as a 
result, there is more violence among them. And this violence needs to be kept at bay, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 See V.1152ff. 
156 It is interesting in this context to compare Lucretius’ observations with the description of 
primitive societies according to Hart (2012 [1961]: 91ff.), since the two accounts are strikingly 
similar. Hart contends that for there to be a society without courts and legislature that only lives 
according to “primary rules of obligation,” certain conditions need to be fulfilled. First, the rules 
themselves must contain provisions according to which members of society do not harm each 
other. Second, if there is a tension in the society between those who obey the rules and those 
who free ride, the free riders may not be in the majority. And third, such a model is only applicable 
to small groups of people, not large-scale societies. The first two points are explicitly enforced by 
the Epicureans, as should be clear from the above discussion, the third point is not addressed by 
them. In contrast to Hart, the Epicureans do not distinguish between primary and secondary rules 
in their theory, which is perhaps not surprising. However, surprisingly, they do not comment in 
more detail on the transition from small-scale to more large-scale societies, either.  
157 2003: 254. 
158 Ibid., 258ff.; see also the alternative solutions discussed at 282f. 
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which is the purpose of the newly formed agreements.159 However, these are – as we 
saw – not always kept, and remedying or at least attenuating these injustices will thus be 
a major task for the second phase of cultural development.  
In response to Campbell, one may remark that his criticism presupposes that 
agreements are not only formed to keep human beings from harming each other. As I 
argued in the previous chapter, this would mean to unduly restrict the content of the 
agreements. After all, there is much evidence for violence committed by animals and 
that wild animals are a huge threat to human beings during the early phase of cultural 
development.160 A better reading of lines 1025ff. is thus that mankind would die out 
because some human beings do not always full-heartedly participate in communal 
measures designed to ward off any kind of attack, which indeed pose a great danger to 
human beings who now weakened in their natures are even more vulnerable to such 
threats.  
3.4. The Second Cultural Phase 
In the second phase of development, what is beneficial and hence just for human 
beings is set on a more solid footing. It gets codified into laws. This means that 
agreements become institutionalized and more importantly that enforcement 
mechanisms and punishments are created, which make agreements binding. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 This passage might also be seen as evidence for the fact that Lucretius’ tries to cover up the 
violence of the original state (see also Blickman 1989: 166 who makes the same claim in regard 
to a different passage). Lucretius needs to reintroduce violent elements in order to motivate the 
necessity of introducing laws and sanction mechanisms, which are not only a key feature of the 
Epicurean account, but also of the phenomenal reality. Alternatively, one could also understand 
Lucretius’ comment as a rhetorical overstatement. The comment that concordia was not 
pervasive during the first phase of cultural development would then merely stress that also this 
state was not complete and that this state of development was not a Golden Age, either. See also 
Manuwald 1980: 56f. 
160 See also V.988ff. 
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Consequently, the deficit of the last cultural phase, that agreements are often not kept, is 
remedied. The development is not linear, though, and in fact it begins with the failure of 
the first attempts to set up government in the form of kingships:161  
And more and more every day those who excelled in intellect and were strong in 
mind showed the others how to exchange their former way of life for new 
practices and, in particular, for the use of fire. Kings began to build cities and to 
choose sites for citadels to be strongholds and places of refuge for themselves; 
and they distributed gifts of flocks and fields to individuals according to their 
beauty, strength, and intellect.162 
 
A problem in regard to this passage is whether “those who excelled in intellect 
and were strong in mind “ at V.1107 are also the first kings at V.1109. I take it that this is 
very likely, since the change in subject between the lines would otherwise be quite 
odd.163 Understood in this way, then, the passage implies that the preeminent men/first 
kings use their superior capabilities to serve their own interest, not that of the public (see 
the pronouns ipsi … sibi). The preeminent men thus try to use their preeminence to 
circumvent the terms of the original contract. They try to create special privileges for 
themselves: They order cities and citadels to be built in order to have a safe residence. 
And this place of refuge is then used as a power basis in order to amass other 
privileges.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 I skip lines 1028-1104 in which Lucretius describes how human beings acquired language and 
learned to use fire. Target of both these discussions is probably Platonic account: first, the theory 
of language in the Cratylus and an account of the origin of fire as presented in the myth of 
Prometheus in the Protagoras (320c ff.). 
162 Inque dies magis hi victum vitamque priorem / commutare novis monstrabant rebus et igni, / 
ingenio qui praestabant et corde vigebant. / condere coeperunt urbis arcemque locare / 
praesidium reges ipsi sibi perfugiumque, / et pecudes et agros divisere atque dedere / pro facie 
cuiusque et viribus ingenioque. V.1105ff.; Trans. by Smith, modified. 
163 See also Hermarchus in Porphyry, On Abstinence I.10 (quoted below). 
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The attempt to usurp power does not succeed, though. According to Lucretius, 
the initial kingships fail because the interests of all are not sufficiently taken into 
account.164 In the process of accruing power, the kings use their wealth to persuade and 
deceive the many. As Lucretius writes, “no matter how much physical strength and 
beauty people possess, they follow in the train of the rich.”165 However, such a deception 
of the many is not successful for long.  Strife and power struggles very soon result. 
These lead to the dethronement of the first kings.166 This experience makes people 
aware of the necessity of introducing the rule of law: 
At length some of them taught the others to create magistracies and to establish 
ordinances, so that they would want to use laws. The human race, utterly weary 
as it was of leading a life of violence and worn out with feuds, was the more 
ready to submit voluntarily to the restraint of laws and stringent ordinances. The 
reason why people were sick and tired of a life of violence was that each 
individual was prompted by anger to exact revenge more cruelly than is now 
allowed by just laws.167 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 A parallel passage in Epicurus is KD 7: “Some wanted to become reputed and admired, 
thinking that they acquire security from other human beings in this way. Therefore, if the life of 
those [human beings] is secure, then they have received Nature’s good. However, if it is not 
secure, they do not possess that which they desired from the beginning according to what is 
naturally appropriate [Ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων 
ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νοµίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. ὥστε εἰ µὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, 
ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ µὴ ἀσφαλής, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὖ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς 
φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν].” Trans. mine. See also KD 6: “In order not to fear <other> human 
beings, there is the natural good of rule and kingship, with which one is possibly able to procure 
this <fearlessness> [Ἕνενκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας 
ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τ᾽ ἦ παρασκευάζεσθαι].” Trans. mine. 
165 divitioris enim sectam plerumque secuntur / quam lubet et fortes et pulchro corpore creti. 
V.1115f.; Trans. Smith. 
166 Ibid., V.1136ff. 
167 inde magistratum partim docuere creare / iuraque constituere, ut vellent legibus uti. / nam 
genus humanum, defessum vi colere aevom, /ex inimicitiis languebat; quo magis ipsum / sponte 
sua cecidit sub leges artaque iura. / acrius ex ira quod enim se quisque parabat / ulcisci quam 
nunc concessumst legibus aequis, / hanc ob rem est homines pertaesum vi colere aevom. Ibid., 
V.1143ff.; Trans. by Smith, modified. 
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In other words, for Lucretius, the rule of law emerges as the result of a process 
that heavily involves trial and error and the recognition of what is best faute de mieux.168 
The emergence of law is thus not a goal-directed process and even those who have 
intellect are prone to errors and thus to ‘forgetfulness’ when it comes to what is most 
beneficial to society as a whole. In fact, it is interesting that Lucretius does not argue that 
because the preeminent men fail, all should decide together what is best for society as a 
whole. On the contrary, it is again preeminent men who give the laws after the first 
kingships fail. Thanks to their intellectual prowess, these men are more mindful of what 
benefits all than the first kings were. In the passage above, the use of the verb ‘teach’ 
(doceo) emphasizes this point. In contrast to the previous phase of cultural development, 
when all human beings directly agreed on what is beneficial, this phase is no longer 
characterized by a joint effort of all. Instead, the hallmark of the logismos-phase is that 
distinct individuals are the driving force behind development, namely, those who have 
superior intellectual capacities. The majority of the population seems to be left out. 
Although all human beings have some capabilities to grasp the ‘basic moral vocabulary’ 
in the first cultural phase (after all, this capability is part of their nature and a prerequisite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Strictly speaking, the passage talks both about laws (leges) and ordinances (iura). According 
to standard usage of Latin legal vocabulary, ius is a broader term, encompassing all kinds of 
moral norms, written and unwritten, while lex is narrower and refers to written law. However, both 
terms can also be used as synonyms. If Lucretius used the terms as distinct in meaning, he 
would claim that the new sanction mechanisms helped both codify written laws as well as the 
(unwritten) moral norms in society, also helping the latter to more pervasiveness. This is difficult 
to grasp in my opinion. In the case of norms, societal reprimanding can be effective to enforce 
them. In this vein, it might be effective to reprimand agents in regard to certain behavior, for 
instance, to shout at them to enforce a social norm. But it seems surprising why such a way of 
reprimanding agents was not available in the previous stage of societal development. After all, 
the problem of the first cultural phase is that there are no sanction mechanisms in place to create 
pervasive adherence to the law and that such pervasiveness can only come about by the 
punishments that are set down in conjunction with the law. It seems more likely to me, then, that 
Lucretius is using lex and ius as a hendiadys to express the same idea: codified law. Epicurus, 
writing in Greek, had no way of distinguishing lex and ius. In Greek, the word nomos covers both 
the meaning of moral convention and law, both written and unwritten. 
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for society to function), not all have the ability to teach others and lead the way to 
introducing new ways of life.169 In order to do this, superior intellectual capabilities are 
required. These, Lucretius reasonably seems to assume, are not distributed in the same 
way as the basic ability to get along with each other and form basic alliances. Therefore, 
in the second phase of the development, some preeminent individuals are the principal 
agents of change.  
Yet, as I already remarked in the previous chapter, it would be wrong to think that 
the many play no role whatsoever in establishing the rule of law. The many concur with 
the laws that are given by their own will (sponte sua), having instrumental reasons to do 
so.170 While Lucretius does not use the word ‘agreement’ in this context, the process of 
law-giving nevertheless has the form of a kind of agreement, namely, between those 
who give the laws and those who decide that it is right to follow them. 
 Be this as it may, the intervention of reasoning (logismos) at this late point of the 
development of culture also brings about some problems for the account as a whole. As 
Cole points out,171 one specifically wonders how human beings were able to attain an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 After all, not everyone in Epicureanism has the capability of becoming a Sage. See fr. 226 
Usener. 
170 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things V.1147. In this context, see also the following passage in 
Hermarchus: “From the outset, no force was used to establish any of the laws, written or 
unwritten, which are still in use and are suited for handing on: the people who use them also 
agree on them [Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βιαίως κατέστη νόµιµον οὔτε µετὰ γραφῆς οὔτε ἄνευ γραφῆς 
τῶν διαµενόντων νῦν καὶ διαδίδοσθαι πεφυκότων, ἀλλὰ συγχωρησάντων αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν 
χρησαµένων].” Hermarchus, fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On Abstinence I.8.1.; Trans. by 
Clark. Pace Farrington 1953: 334 et passim.  It is true that the few (partim, Lucretius, On the 
Nature of Things V.1143) introduce the laws, but it does not follow that they “imposed” 
(Farrington) their laws on the many. The laws are successfully introduced in Lucretius because 
the many voluntarily accept them. As a consequence, Farrington’s evaluation of law and the 
preference for the first cultural phase over the second cultural phase is mistaken. 
171 1990 [1967]: 70ff. 
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understanding of justice during the first phase of cultural development if human beings at 
the time did not possess reasoning. Consider Hermarchus’ discussion of how laws 
against killing other animals are introduced: 
Some of the brightest people of that time, keeping in mind that they themselves 
abstained from killing because this is useful for security, reminded others what 
would result from their association with each other, so that abstaining from their 
kin they would safeguard the community which was working for the individual 
security of each. Separating themselves out, and doing nothing to injure those 
who had gathered in the same place, was useful not only for excluding animals of 
other kinds, but also for dealing with human beings who came to do harm. For a 
time, then, they held back from their kinsman inasmuch as he was entering the 
same community for providing necessities and was making some contribution to 
both the purposes mentioned [that is, repelling threats from animals as well as 
from other human beings]. But as time went on and reproduction greatly 
increased, and other kinds of animals (and their dragging away of victims) had 
been driven out, some people acquired a rational analysis [epilogismos] of what 
was beneficial for their sustenance of each other, not just a non-rational memory 
[alogon mnēmē].172 
 
 Again, note first that for Hermarchus, too, laws are introduced by preeminent 
individuals (‘some of brightest people of that time’), not by everyone, confirming that 
laws for the Epicureans are a matter of a few preeminent lawgivers, not of everyone 
alike. More importantly, though, note that having the capacity of ‘rational analysis’ 
(epilogismos) is in the above passage contrasted with having the capacity of ‘irrational 
memory’ (alogos mnēmē). On the assumption that the intensifier ‘epi’ does not make 
epilogimos radically different from logismos, it follows that human beings during the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Διαµνηµονεύοντες δέ τινες τῶν τότε χαριεστάτων ὡς αὐτοί τε ἀπέσχοντο τοῦ κτείνειν διὰ τὸ 
χρήσιµον πρὸς τἠν σωτηρίαν, τοῖς τε λοιποῖς ἐνεποίουν µνήµην τοῦ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐν ταῖς µετ᾽ 
ἀλλήλων συντροφαῖς, ὅπως ἀπεχόµενοι τοῦ συγγενοῦς διαφυλάττωσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, ἥ συνήργει 
πρὸς τὴν ἰδλιαν ἑκάστου σωτηρίαν. Οὐ µόνον δὲ χρήσιµον ἦν τὸ χωρίζεσθαι µηδὲ λυµαντικὸν 
ποιεῖν µηδὲν τῶν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον συνειλεγµένων πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀλλοφύλων ἐξόρισµα ζῴων, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ παραγιγνοµένους. Μέχρι µὲν οὖν τινος διὰ ταύτην 
ἀπείχοντο τοῦ συγγενοῦς, ὅσον ἐβάδιζεν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρείας τινὰς 
παρείχετο πρὸς ἑκαστερον τῶν εἰρηµένων· ἐλθόντος δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῆς δι᾽ 
ἀλλήλων γενέσεως µακρὰν προηκούσης, ἐξεωσµένων δὲ τῶν ἀλλοφύλων ζῴων καὶ τῆς 
παρασπάρσεως, ἐπιλογισµὸν ἔλαβον τινες τοῦ συµφέροντος ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλων τροφαῖς, οὐ 
µόνον ἄλογον µνήµην. Hermarchus fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On Abstinence I.10.2ff.; 
Trans. by Clark, modified. 
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stage of moral development (during which logismos is absent) merely acquire the 
preconception of justice by means of memory – in a way that does not significantly 
involve reason (alogos). I will take up this issue in more detail in chapter 7 when I deal 
with how individuals come to have an understanding of the just. 
In any case, it would be rash to conclude that the newly introduced laws are a 
hands-down triumph of justice. During the first cultural phase, human beings develop a 
notion of the aequum, but the problem is that justice cannot triumph because it is not 
pervasive enough; agreements are not always kept. During the second cultural phase, 
the sanction mechanisms that accompany the law help establish this pervasiveness. 
From now on, infringements against moral norms are prosecuted. This limits feuds and 
makes sure that there are clear ways of deescalating conflicts. But this positive aspect of 
the law is accompanied by the following downside according to Lucretius: 
Ever since that time [when laws were introduced] fear of punishment has 
poisoned the blessings of life. Violence and hurt173 enmesh all those who practice 
them: they generally recoil on the wrong doers, and it is not easy for those who 
by their actions violate mutual pacts of peace to pass a placid and peaceful life; 
for even if their crime goes undetected in heaven and on earth, they are bound to 
fear that it will not remain hidden for ever. And indeed many people, so it is said, 
by talking in their sleep or in the delirium of disease, have betrayed their own 
guilt and disclosed deeply hidden matters and their misdeeds.174 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 The word that is translated as hurt here is ‘inuiria’, which could also mean ‘injustice.’ In any 
event, the point of the passage, however, is not that justice and its opposite came to be when the 
laws were introduced. We already saw that justice came to be at an earlier stage in the process 
of societal development. 
174 inde metus maculat poenarum praemia vitae. / circumretit enim vis atque iniuria quemque / 
atque unde exortast, ad eum plerumque revertit, / nec facilest placidam ac pacatam degere vitam 
/ qui violat factis communia foedera pacis. / etsi fallit enim divom genus humanumque, / perpetuo 
tamen id fore clam diffidere debet; / quippe ubi se multi per somnia saepe loquentes / aut morbo 
delirantes protraxe ferantur / et celata <mala> in medium et peccata dedisse. V.1151ff.; Trans. by 
Smith. 
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 In other words, a new kind of fear makes its appearance at this point of the 
process of societal development.175 It is true that the laws can first be said to offer 
advantages. For instance, those who abide by the law are surely better off than in a 
society without laws, for it must be better for them to live in a society free from random 
violence. Likewise, those whose ‘blessings are poisoned by the laws’ precisely seem to 
be those who do not abide by the law; those who abide, by contrast, can be thought to 
have nothing to fear.176 Yet laws introduce fear into the world, and if the goal of 
Epicurean philosophy is to remove fear, the laws, on the Epicurean view, cannot, as 
David Konstan rightly observes, be an overall good thing, even if they yield some 
advantages.177 After all, one may also imagine that a good Epicurean may be wrongfully 
convicted and so unjustly subjected to the law and its provisions. Likewise, since the 
discussion of gods and religion in connection to fear immediately follows the discussion 
of the fear that results from punishments associated with the laws, it seems that the fear 
connected with the laws is importantly linked with the fear connected with the gods.178 In 
this vein, Philodemus observes that there were different ways stories of the gods were 
introduced into the world.179 First, there is the way in which individuals tell stories about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 See especially Konstan 2008: 79ff. and passim; see also Blickman 1989: 173ff. as well as 
Lenz 2011: 99. 
176 Manuwald 1980: 59, fn. 219 denies that there is anything negative about the law. On the role 
of fear in regard to obeying the law, see also chapter 5. 
177 2008: 112ff. See also Müller 1972: 72f. and Blickman 1989: 175.  
178 See V.1161ff.; Konstan 2008: 117 and Perlli 1967: 222. 
179 “… securing mere security [asphaleia] for themselves from the multitude or the latter from 
each other, but each leaving to everyone else what is evident [regarding the true nature of the 
gods]. But the others of course fabulous and terrible stories [about the gods], and did not seem to 
be introducing these things either in the same way as their predecessors or as the sources of 
security [sōtēria] to governments [ξεργαζόµενοι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν ἢ τὴν ἑαυτῶν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἢ 
τὴν ἐκείνων παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόµενον ἕκαστοι πᾶσιν ἐ[πιτρέποντ]ες· [ο]ἱ δὲ µύθους µὲν 
εἰσῆγον ἀµέλει καὶ τερατειάς, οὔτε δὲ τοῖς πρότερον ἐδόκουν ἐοικότα ταῦτ᾽ εἰσφέρειν οὔτε 
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the gods to procure security. Second, there is the way stories are told for the sake for 
the government. And third, there is the way that is not further specified, but that seems 
more pernicious than the first and second way. While this description is not explicitly 
linked to phases in human development and it is in fact unclear whether Philodemus is 
making a developmental claim at all in distinguishing these three ways stories about the 
gods are told, the first way is reminiscent of the first kings in Lucretius who usurp power 
to be safe and the second way of what the law-givers could have done in order to make 
sure that their laws are more widely obeyed. If this is true, then, indeed, the introduction 
of laws, via the fear it introduces into the world, paves the way for the introduction of the 
gods, and hence one of the most important fears in Epicureanism, which should make 
clear that the introduction of the law in Epicureanism cannot be all positive.180 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
σωτηρίας αἴτ[ια] πολιτείας]” Philodemus, On Piety 2151ff. Obbink; Trans. by Obbink, modified. A 
similar account is also found in Hermarchus: The first law-givers first try to frighten those who do 
not obey with severe (secular) punishments (fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = On Abstinence I.8.2). Later, 
they also add a religious dimension to keep the many from breaking the law (ibid. I.9.4). 
180 The connection between laws and divine punishments is also made in the so-called 
Comparetti Ethics [= PHerc 1251]. This text is very critical of the feasibility of restraining 
individuals by the laws in general, though. While the Epicureans seem to acknowledge that some 
individuals will be restrained from wrong-doing by the gods, they estimate that this number is very 
low. See col.. XII.4ff. Indelli and Tsouna as well as Diogenes of Oenoanda’s “Theological 
Physics-Sequence”: “For some say that this doctrine [that is, that the gods are not to be feared] 
does not benefit our life, for human beings even in the present situation act wrongly so far as they 
possibly can; that if, however, they are also released from their fears derived from the gods, they 
will act completely wrongly, and in consequence the whole [of life] will be confounded. However, 
[people of such behavior] are even now those who do not fear the gods ([let] this [be] agreed; for 
if they feared the gods, they would not do wrong). But, as for the others, I declare that those of 
them who grasp the arguments based on nature are not just on account of the gods, but on 
account of their having a correct view of the nature of desires and pains and death (for indeed 
invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account 
of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are just, in so far as they are just, on 
account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some 
of their number are conscientious on account of the gods, rather than on account of the laws, 
they are few; only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of 
multitudes, and even these are steadfast in acting justly [φασὶ γάρ τινες µὴ συνφέρειν τῷ βίῳ τὸ 
δόγµα τοῦτο. Τοὺς γὰρ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος µὲν ἀδικοπραγεῖν ἐφ᾽ ὅσον δή ποτε· ἂν 
µέντοι καὶ τῶν ἐκ θεῶν φόβων ἀπολυθῶσι, τελέως ἀδικοπραγήσειν, ἐγ δὲ τούτου συνχυθήσεσθαι 
τὸν ὅλον [βίον. tοιοῦτοι] µὲν καὶ ν[ῦν πε]φ[ύ]κασι[ν] οἱ µὴ [δ]ε[δ]οικότες τοὺς θεούς 
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3.5.  Summary 
 In this chapter, I discussed the Epicurean account of cultural development with a 
focus on justice and the law. I showed how the elements of the Epicurean theory of 
justice that I identified in chapter 2 work together diachronically. In doing so, I mainly 
focused on the culture story in On the Nature of Things V. I argued that the Epicurean 
theory should be understood as a proto-social contract theory and, in accordance with 
early modern theories of the social contract, the Epicurean account can roughly be 
divided into three parts: (1) the description of the original state, (2) a first phusis-phase of 
cultural development, in which human beings unite, and (3) a second nomos-phase of 
cultural development, in which human beings form legal and political states. These parts 
correspond to different degrees of establishment and human knowledge of justice and 
the law. While no justice and laws exist in the original state, the first phase of 
development features justice without laws. Finally, the second phase of development 
features both justice and laws. 
 In the remainder of the chapter, I then discussed each of the three phases. In 
regard to the original state, I showed that human beings are not originally social beings 
for the Epicureans and that the first human beings have no understanding of justice or 
the law. Consequently, justice and law also do not exist at this point in the cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
([συ]νκεχωρηµένον [εἴη τ]οῦτο· εἰ γὰρ ἐδεδοίκεσαν, οὐκ ἂν ἠδικουν)· [τ]ῶν δ᾽ἄλλων ἀποφαίνοµαι 
τοὺς µὲν φυσικῶν ἁπτοµένου<ς> λόγων µὴ διὰ τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι δικαίους, διὰ δὲ τὸ βλέπειν 
[ὀ]ρθῶς τάς τε ἐπιθυµίας τίν᾽ἔχουσιν φύσιν κα[ὶ] τὰς ἀλγηδόνας καὶ τὸν θάνατον (πάντῃ τε γὰρ 
πάντως ἢ διὰ φόβον ἢ διὰ ἡδονὰς ἀδικοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι), τοὺς δ᾽ αὖ χυδαίους διὰ τοὺς νόµους 
εἶναι δικαίους, εφ᾽ ὅσον γέ εἰσιν δίκαιοι, καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπικρεµαµένας αὐτοῖς ζηµίας. ἀλλὰ 
κἂν ὦσιν τινες ἐν αὐτοῖς διὰ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐγνώµονες, οὐ διὰ τοὺς νόµους, ὀλιγοι δὲ οὗτοι· καὶ δυ᾽ 
ἢ τρεῖς µόλις κατὰ µεγάλας πληθῶν ἀποτοµὰς εὑρισκόµενοι, βεβαίως οὐδὲ οὗτοι 
διακαιοπραγοῦσιν]” (NF 167 II.4ff. + NF 126 Smith; Trans. by Hammerstaedt and Smith, 
modified). See also discussion on obeying the law in chapter 5. 
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development. However, there is also no need for them at this point; human beings are 
completely self-sufficient creatures.  
In regard to the first phase of cultural development, I showed that society 
becomes necessary for the Epicureans after human nature changes: a sedentary 
lifestyle, family ties, and technological achievements affect human beings and change 
their nature. I suggested that this is a slow and gradual transition, but one that ultimately 
gives rise to communities. This takes the form of agreements over not harming and not 
being harmed, which, in Lucretius at least, in a second step get expanded to include the 
weak. I showed that at this stage of societal development, moral norms such as the just 
(aequum) first come into being. 
In regard to the second phase of cultural development, I focused on the way that 
laws are formed. Lucretius account clearly distinguishes between the genesis of justice 
(in the first phase of development), which is logically, metaphysically, and temporally 
prior, and the genesis of law, which is logically, metaphysically, and temporally posterior. 
According to Lucretius, laws first come into being as the result of the efforts of a few 
preeminent men. This also distinguishes genesis of law from genesis of justice: While it 
seems all contracting parties formed agreements with each other to create justice, law is 
the product of some bright minds (albeit the many also recognize what is lawful sponte 
sua). 
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4. CLASSIFYING THE EPICUREAN THEORY OF JUSTICE AND 
LAW 
 
In the two previous chapters, I set out the basic Epicurean view: In chapter 2, I 
described the basic elements of the Epicurean theory of justice and the law, and, in 
chapter 3, I discussed the Epicurean theory from a diachronic perspective as a kind of 
social contract theory. In this chapter, I will build on these results and discuss what 
metaethical implications this account of justice has. Furthermore, I will classify the 
Epicurean theory of justice and law from the perspective of contemporary legal 
philosophy. 
In the first section of this chapter, I will argue that the Epicurean theory of justice 
is a naturalistic theory (4.1.). In doing so, I will again turn to KD 31: 
The naturally just is a sumbolon of benefit in regard to not harming each other 
and not being harmed.181 
 
I already commented on the word ‘sumbolon’ in chapter 2 and so here I will focus 
on the idea that there is something “naturally just” (to tēs phuseōs dikaion) on the 
Epicurean view.182 I will explain what this means by situating the Epicurean theory of 
justice and law in the nomos-phusis-debate, a debate that reaches back to the 5th 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύµβολον τοῦ συµφέροντος εἰς τὸ µὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους µηδὲ 
βλάπτεσθαι. Trans. mine. 
182 Related to this discussion is the question of whether society is natural for the Epicureans. I 
discussed this question in detail in chapter 3, arguing that in Epicureanism, society is not natural 
for human beings in the original state, but that it is natural for human beings once they have left 
the original state. 
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century BCE.183 What the debate is exactly about is difficult to say. As a first 
approximation, however, it can be seen as the precursor of the nature-nurture-debate, 
which deals with the issue of which features in human beings are genetically and which 
are culturally determined. The verb ‘nomizō’ in Greek means to think, believe, or 
practice. Consequently, things thought, believed, or practiced by human beings are in 
this debate said to be ‘by convention’ (nomō(i)). Likewise, nomoi are ‘culturally 
determined’ human conventions, customs, or laws. ‘Phusis’, by contrast, is usually 
translated by ‘nature,’ in the sense of an essential and permanent entity, and so is the 
opposite of what is by convention.  
It would be a mistake, though, to leave it at such a characterization of the nomos-
phusis-debate since it oversimplifies what is really at stake. The reason is that the words 
‘nomos’ and ‘phusis’ were used in a variety of different ways in different contexts in the 
Classical and Hellenistic periods. For instance, they were used in regard to such 
different subject matters as language, perception, or cultural norms.184 In these contexts, 
the pair nomos/phusis can be fittingly translated by the pairs prescriptive/descriptive, 
appearance/reality, artificial/natural, or contingent-accidental/necessary, since the terms 
are respectively used to draw normative, epistemological, ontological, and modal 
distinctions.185  This makes it difficult to distill one single issue that the nomos-phusis-
debate is about and so to characterize the debate as a whole accurately. In the case of 
justice, however, the main issue seems to be whether justice is a natural entity in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 See above all Heinimann 1945, Pohlenz 1953, Guthrie 2003 [1971]: 55ff., Kerferd 1981: 
111ff., and McKirahan 2010: 405ff. 
184 See Plato’s Cratylus and Theaetus as well as Herodotus’ Histories III.38. 
185 McKirahan 2010: 407. The debate on justice includes normative, epistemological, and 
ontological aspects that are not always neatly distinguished. This is especially clear in 
Polystratus’ treatise On Irrational Contempt (ΧΧΙ.17ff. Indelli).  
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world or whether it is only an artificial, that is, man-made, one.186 I will argue in this 
chapter that Epicurean theory of justice occupies a sophisticated kind of middle position: 
Epicurean justice is artificial in that it is the product of human agreement, but natural in 
that it has a firm basis in what is beneficial, which is not a matter of agreement, but a fact 
about the world.187  Since the firm basis of justice rests on facts about the world, I will 
argue that the Epicurean conception of justice is naturalistic. To do so, I will explain in 
more detail what I mean by ethical naturalism and discuss how Epicurean naturalism 
differs from another kind of naturalism, namely, Aristotelian naturalism (4.1.). 
Having described justice in this way, I then turn to characterizing further the 
relationship between justice and the law on the Epicurean view in the second section of 
this chapter (4.2.). Here, I will draw on the vocabulary of modern analytical philosophy of 
law. While modern legal terminology is necessarily anachronistic when applied to the 
Epicureans, it will nevertheless allow me to better characterize the Epicurean view and 
so improve on previous attempts of classification. Scholars who have discussed the 
Epicurean theory of justice and law have either understood it as a kind of natural law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 In the same vein, I take it that Polystratus’ On Irrational Contempt shows that the main 
objection that the Epicureans see themselves confronted with is whether human-made constructs 
such as the agreements that lead to the existence of justice really merit obedience. In this text, 
Polystratus argues that it does not follow from the fact that the fine (to kalon) and the shameful (to 
aischron) and things like them (ta toiauta) exist by convention (nomo(i)) that they do not truly exist 
(kath’ alētheian einai), as an unidentified opponent claims. While the just (to dikaion) is not 
mentioned explicitly in the Polystratus’ text, it is, on my reading, ontologically in the same domain 
(see the more detailed discussion in chapters 6 and 7). Accordingly, even if the just is not 
mentioned in On Irrational Contempt, one could imagine that philosophers of other ancient 
schools raised a similar objection against the Epicurean theory of justice, a theory that heavily 
relies on agreements and so on convention. On Polystratus, see Philippson 1909, Isnardi Parente 
1971, Indelli 1977, Adorno 1980, Bett 1994: 144ff., Alberti 1996, Warren 2002: 142ff., Giovacchini 
and Lemaire 2014, and Indelli’s 1978 edition (including a commentary). 
187 See also Müller 1972: 104. 
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theory or a kind of legal positivism.188 I agree with scholars who hold the latter view, but I 
will stress in my reading that nature plays a bigger role in Epicurean theory than is 
sometimes thought (even if the view is overall not a natural law theory). On my reading, 
the Epicureans claim that content of the law may (and in fact ideally does) not only 
include moral principles, that is, what is just, but also may (and in fact ideally does) 
include a natural fact about the world, namely, what is beneficial.189 
4.1. Epicurean Naturalism 
Let us begin with the examination of the naturalness of justice in Epicureanism. 
First, as I have argued in previous chapters, the Epicureans defend a kind of social 
contract theory, according to which justice and the laws come about by different kinds of 
agreements. One would therefore expect Epicurean justice and laws to be man-made 
and artificial. After all, agreements are artificial: On the Epicurean view, they come about 
as human artifacts, and there is no justice without beings who form an agreement. One 
may therefore prima facie find it surprising to read in KD 31 that there is something 
naturally just (to tēs phuseōs dikaion) on the Epicurean view.  
What ‘to tēs phuseōs dikaion’ exactly is has regularly puzzled scholars. The first 
problem concerns the strange genitive.190 In the context of the nomos-phusis-debate, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Yet if the terms ‘legal positivism’ and ‘natural law theory’ are used, they are usually not 
precisely defined.  
189 This is not to say that what is beneficial or what is just puts restraints on the law. A law, for the 
Epicureans is a social fact for the Epicureans, and a law does not cease to be a law if it is no 
longer just or no longer beneficial. However, if a law is no longer beneficial and just, it ceases to 
be a good law. In other words, one must distinguish the ontological account of what law is (as an 
agreement a social fact) from the success conditions of the law (e.g. a good or just law).  
190 See Bollack 1975: 353f. for an overview of the different ways of translating the maxim. 
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one would rather expect the dative ‘phusei.’191 Given the habitual usage of the dative 
‘phusei,’ the claim that there is something “just by nature” would then mean that justice is 
natural in the world in the sense of a non-artificial thing, which does not vary according 
to circumstances or agents. Accordingly, if KD 31 reads that there is something “just by 
nature” (to phusei dikaion), this maxim would express the idea that justice on the 
Epicurean view exists as a non-artificial thing that does not vary according to 
circumstances or observer. Yet given everything that was said about Epicurean theory in 
the previous chapters, such a reading of KD 31 would completely contradict all results: 
Justice really is an agreement for the Epicureans, and so arises anew in a different way 
from place to place. Consequently, it would be very strange if KD 31 asserted that justice 
exists phusei in the sense just described.  
To explain the genitive, then, it is helpful to consider a parallel case in other 
Epicurean texts.192  In KD 7, for example, Epicurus writes about “what is naturally good 
[to tēs phuseōs agathon].”193 This is usually taken to mean the following. It is not that 
there are things that are naturally good in the sense of being once and for all good for 
the Epicureans (as on the above reading of the dative ‘phusei’), but rather that given 
how the world is set up, a certain thing is good at this moment. The world could be 
structured differently and the things that are good now would not be good then, but at 
least now they are good. In other words, following Anthony Long and David Sedley, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Another alternative is to understand the genitive as equivalent to ‘kata phusin’ (according to 
nature), as Goldschmidt and Arrighetti translate. These translators understand the topic of the 
maxim to be the nature of justice (and so reverse genitive and nominative in the phrase). For 
discussion, see Voelke 1982 and Morel 2000: 396.  
192 The following is indebted to Müller 1972: 89ff. 
193 For similar passages, see Letter to Menoeceus 133, KD 15, and GV 25. KD 7 also mentions 
“what is naturally appropriate (to tēs phuseōs oikeion).” 
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suggest to translate the genitive ‘phuseōs’ literally as ‘nature’s,’ and to keep in mind that 
nature for the Epicureans here does not refer to a permanent essence, but rather to a 
natural process that reflects the changing structure of the world.194 In short, nature’s 
justice is the justice as it is found in the world rather than the essence of justice. 
Against such a non-essentialist reading, one might be tempted to adduce a 
passage in Philodemus. It reads: “Some things are just or unjust by nature [phusei] and 
never change, others vary according to locality and condition.”195 At first sight, this 
sentence suggests that there are things that are just by nature on the Epicurean view in 
the sense that I suggested should be ruled out, namely, in the sense of a kind of justice 
that exists as an essential nature, independently of agents or circumstances. In 
response to such a reading, one first has to note that the text is part of those Epicurean 
texts preserved on Herculanean papyri. As a result, there are several lacuna in the text 
and the reading of the sentence strongly depends on additions by a modern editor, 
Siegfried Sudhaus. However, even if one accepts the reading offered by Sudhaus, a 
more literal translation than the one by Harry Hubbell that I quoted is: “… to/by those 
things196 able to have the status of the just and unjust by nature [phusei],197 so as to 
never change in this [regard], but the opposites that of the opposites,198 others change 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Accordingly, Verde rightly observes: “il concetto epicureo di 'natura,' in un certo senso, non è 
una nozione stabile, immobile ma energicamente e attivamente dinamica, per questo, a mio 
parere, occorrerebbe parlare di 'processo naturale' più che di natura” (2010: 215). 
195 …τοῖς δυν[αµένοις τὴν] φύσει δικαίου κ[αὶ ἀδίκου χ]ώ[ρ]αν ἔχειν, [ὥστ᾽ ἐν τού]τωι κατὰ µη[θὲν 
ἀλλάτ]τειν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τόπους καὶ περιστράσεις. Rhetoric I.259 
col XXIV.26ff. Sudhaus. Trans. by Hubbell.  
196 The quotation begins with a definitive article and a participle in the dative. Since the beginning 
of the sentence is lost, it is unclear how the text that has come down to us connected to the lost 
part of the sentence. 
197 For the same expression, see KD 37 on manuscripts B and F: “ἔχει τὸ τοῦ δικαίου χώραν.” 
198 A verb needs to be supplied here from the part of the sentence that is missing.  
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according to locality and condition.” In short, the sentence does not at all present the 
clear contrast between just things by nature and justice that are not by nature, which is 
falsely suggested by Hubbell’s translation. Admittedly, the passage clearly claims that 
there is something able to have the status of just by nature (phusei), but without more 
context, it is impossible to say what – if anything – this implies about something being 
just by nature in Epicureanism.199 In fact, it is not even clear if Philodemus is speaking 
propria voce in the passage. Consequently, the reading of nature I have suggested 
above, namely, that there is no justice by nature, understood as a permanent essence, 
is thus not threatened by this passage in Philodemus. 
On the reading I have outlined, the just is not by nature in the sense of a 
permanent essence. The Epicureans adopt a procedural understanding of nature. 
However, this still leaves the Epicurean conception of nature in KD 31 quite 
indeterminate, and so a closer look at the second half of the maxim may be helpful to 
determine what exactly nature in the case of justice consists in. In the second half, 
nature’s justice is connected with benefit, which means that on the Epicurean view, 
being beneficial is the nature of justice. What is beneficial, in turn, on the Epicurean 
view, can change with time and circumstances, but it is not itself the product of an 
agreement. At any given time, what is beneficial is thus a ‘natural’ fact based on the 
determinate, objective condition of the world.200 Accordingly, the entirety of facts about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 In this context, note that Demetrius Lacon spends some time clarifying the expression ‘by 
nature,’ distinguishing three different senses in which it can be used. PHerc 1012 col. LXVII 
Puglia. I take this to be a later development in the school, though, in response to criticism from 
rival philosophers. This could suggest that Demetrius is employing a different conception of ‘by 
nature’ than Epicurus did. 
200 The Epicureans are very aware of the problem that a theory of justice that allows anything to 
be just is bound to be arbitrary. Accordingly, while it is possible to reject what is just and 
beneficial within a given community and introduce something else in its stead, this seems to be a 
rather silly undertaking. After all, others will not adopt such an idiosyncratic understanding and 
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the world at a certain point in time determines what will be beneficial at that time. This 
means that anthropological, sociological, psychological, and political facts about human 
beings, zoological facts about possible predators and prey, geographical facts about the 
terrain, and physical facts about the laws of nature, among many other facts, all help 
determine at any given moment in time what things are beneficial. As a result, there will 
never be only one thing that is beneficial, but rather a plethora of things. Which of these 
things, insofar as they relate to the dealings of human beings with each other, that is, are 
potentially in the domain of justice, are actually just at a certain time and in certain 
circumstances is then determined by the fact that human beings agree on them. In short, 
on the Epicurean view, facts about the world provide the foundation for justice: At any 
given time, what is beneficial is based on an objective, determinable state of affairs, and 
it can receive the status of being just, when this benefit pertains to the dealings with 
other people (is specific to a certain domain) and human beings have agreed on it. As a 
result, there will always be more things that are beneficial than the things that are just, 
that is, sanctioned by agreements, on the Epicurean view. Put again differently: While 
the Epicureans emphasize the importance of agreements in their theory of justice, they 
also place agreements on a firm basis, namely, nature itself (understood as what is 
beneficial), which mitigates the fear that Epicurean theory is only artificial and as such 
arbitrary.201 
That the firm basis of the Epicurean theory of justice is what is beneficial 
(understood as a natural fact about the world), on my reading, qualifies the Epicurean 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
such a scenario will only show that an agent who introduces a new understanding will now be 
less safe, operating with a radically different assumption – and have to deal with the 
consequences. See Philodemus, Rhetoric I.257f. col. XXIII.16ff. Sudhaus.  
201 See also Philippson 1910a: 293ff. and Konstan 2008: 102. 
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theory of justice as naturalistic. There are several competing kinds of ethical naturalism 
in contemporary ethics and any definition of naturalism is bound to be controversial.202 
Nevertheless, I will adduce two different definitions of ethical naturalism in what follows 
and argue that on each of them, the Epicurean view is naturalistic. According to the first 
definition of ethical naturalism I would like to consider, the distinguishing feature of 
ethical naturalism is that moral entities are either themselves natural properties, that is, 
properties that can be investigated by natural science, or stand in some relationship to 
these properties.203 This is definitely true of Epicurean naturalism as I set it out above. 
After all, the just, a moral entity, is explained in terms of the beneficial, a non-moral 
entity. Understood in this way, Epicurean naturalism is first and foremost a rejection of 
metaphysical and theological explanations in the ethical domain. In contrast to an 
approach according to which moral values are appealed to in reference to an invisible 
measure (Solon) or logos (Heraclitus, the Stoics) or a non-sensible Form (Plato), the 
Epicurean approach thus explains what is moral by drawing only on the empirical 
investigation of nature.204 In fact, physical principles are even used to offer a bottom-up 
etiological explanation of culture in Epicureanism. Recall also in this context that 
Lucretius’ culture story is the final part of Lucretius’ account of the physical creation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 See, for instance, Sturgeon 2006, Dowell 2013, and Lenman 2014. 
203 McDowell 2013: 3532f. 
204 “Mit der dargelegten Konzeption von Rechtsentwicklung und Staatenbildung haben Epikur und 
seine Schüler das Recht von jeder metaphysischen Begründung abgelöst. Die stoische 
Vorstellung von einem den gesamten Kosmos durchdringenden und lenkenden Weltengesetz 
wird ebenso scharf zurückgewiesen wie die platonische Überzeugung von der Existenz einer 
transzendenten Idee der Gerechtigkeit. Für Epikur gibt es keine allgemeine und absolute 
Gerechtigkeit (δικαιοσύνη) jenseits der partikulären Gemeinschaft, da das Recht aus einem 
zwischenmenschlichen Vertragsakt hervorgeht und jede Vertragsgemeinschaft ‘Recht’ und 
‘Unrecht’ individuell, d.h. gemäß ihrer spezifischen Auffassung vom gemeinsamen, 
wechselseitigen Nutzen, bestimmt.” Scholz 1998: 263f. On the Epicurean criticism of the Platonic 
Form of justice, see also chapter 6.   
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the world in book V of On the Nature of Things. In other words, on the Epicurean view, 
justice is not only dependent on benefit as a natural fact, but ethics as a whole is 
etiologically dependent on physics. Consequently, moral phenomena can be explained 
in the terms of non-moral phenomena, on the Epicurean view. This does not mean that 
all explanations in Epicurean ethics should or do start with the physical domain.205 
However, it does mean that the mode of investigation in Epicurean ethics is modeled 
after the mode of investigation in physics, which implies that Epicureans can always 
draw on the study of the natural world to refute metaphysical or religious assumptions 
that are to the detriment of a naturalistic ethical theory.206  
It is instructive here to contrast Epicurean ethical naturalism with the naturalism 
that is usually attributed to Aristotle, namely, a kind of biological naturalism.207 According 
to this view, one must first know what kind of beings human beings are before one can 
determine what their excellence or virtue (aretē) is. And, at least, in its traditional form in 
Aristotle, this means that one must rely heavily on the study of biology to determine what 
is virtuous for human beings, which in a post-Darwinian age presents some problems for 
contemporary Virtue Ethicists who want to adopt an Aristotelian framework. By contrast, 
the Epicurean view is naturalistic in explaining moral entities in terms of non-moral 
entities, but it does not primarily rely on biology. Instead, it more broadly draws on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 The discussion of Epicurean pleasure in the Letter of Menoeceus, for instance, probably does 
not exclusively rely on an understanding of atomistic principles, even if it could also be explained 
with the help of atomistic principles. See Mitsis 1988: 46, fn. 93 pace Glidden 1980: 184. By 
contrast, in order to grasp the arguments for the claim that death is nothing to us, some 
knowledge of Epicurean physics is inevitable. 
206 This observation also helps explain why the study of nature and its phenomena occupies such 
a prominent place within Epicureanism, although research into natural phenomena is not done for 
its own sake, but for the sake of achieving an ethical end. 
207 See Annas 2005 and Hursthouse 2013. 
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study of nature, that is, physics or science more generally. In fact, in contrast to Aristotle 
who composed a wealth of biological writings, Epicurus seems to have subsumed 
biology under his study of the natural world (physics) and so not to have devoted 
separate treatises to the study of animals or plants.208 It may thus be helpful to consult a 
second definition of naturalism that distinguishes Epicurean naturalism from its 
Aristotelian counterpart. This version of ethical naturalism again stresses that entities in 
the ethical realm are not fundamentally different from entities in the physical realm and 
that ethical investigation should be modeled after scientific explanation. According to 
Nicholas Sturgeon, who advances such a view, an ethical view is naturalistic if it fulfills 
two conditions, one metaphysical, the other epistemological: 
(a) that such ethical properties such as goodness of persons, character traits, 
and such things as the rightness and wrongness of actions, are natural 
properties of the same general sort as the properties investigated by the 
sciences, and (b) that they are investigated in the same general way that we 
investigate those properties.209 
 
To show that the Epicurean view fulfills these two conditions will be the object of 
subsequent chapters. I will argue in more detail in chapter 6 that there is no indication 
that the just is a property for the Epicureans that is not “of the same general sort” as the 
properties studied in physics and other sciences. And I will show in chapter 7 that human 
beings come to have an understanding that something is just in the same way that they 
come to have an understanding that the cat is black. In other words, my discussion of 
naturalism ends with a promissory note. Nevertheless, I hope to have made plausible in 
this section that despite its commitment to agreements, the Epicurean theory of justice is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 See the list of works attributed to him by Diogenes, Lives X.27f. 
209 2006: 92. As Sturgeon goes on to note, much in the definition depends on what counts as a 
natural property. According to Sturgeon, this at the very least entails a rejection of the 
supranatural. 
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a naturalistic theory. More importantly, though, I have argued that justice on the 
Epicurean view can be explained in non-ethical terms and that benefit, as a non-ethical 
fact plays a key role for understanding what it means to be just. 
4.2. Epicurean Legal Positivism 
Having situated the Epicurean theory in the nomos-phusis-debate and described 
the Epicurean view as a kind of naturalism, I will next turn to classifying the Epicurean 
theory in terms of the vocabulary of modern analytic philosophy of law. In doing so, I will 
focus on the relationship between justice (or morality) and law in Epicureanism and I will 
begin with a short discussion of ‘natural law theory’ and ‘legal positivism’ as the two main 
theories that discuss this relationship. Unfortunately, what exactly the defining difference 
between natural law theory and legal positivism is, is a contentious matter and the topic 
of the major debates of the 20th century in general jurisprudence such as the one 
between H.L.A. Hart and Richard Dworkin. In fact, there are three competing theses that 
are used by different authors to distinguish legal positivism from natural law theory: (1) 
the separation thesis, (2) the pedigree thesis, and (3) the content thesis. In what follows, 
I will discuss these three theses briefly, and so develop a framework with which I can 
categorize the Epicurean view more accurately. 
First, according to the separation thesis, legal positivism differs from natural law 
theory, in that the latter, but not the former, argues that there is a necessary connection 
between what is moral and what is legal. Hart asserts in his seminal work The Concept 
of Law, for instance, that “we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention 
that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of 
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morality, though in fact they have often done so.”210 While this thesis is perhaps the most 
famous thesis that is associated with legal positivism, it is rather unpopular among legal 
positivists themselves who reject it as insufficient, confused, or straightforwardly false.211 
One may first notice that the thesis is ambiguous in scope. It could either mean that (A) it 
is necessarily the case that there is no connection between law and morality or that (B) it 
is not necessarily the case that there is a connection between law and morality. Yet this 
problem aside, there are even some legal positivists (namely, inclusive positivists) who 
reject both readings of the separation thesis. Likewise, it seems that some natural law 
theorists could accept the separation thesis, at least under the reading that their view 
does not entail the claim that unjust laws do not count as laws, which is often falsely 
attributed to them.212 
A more helpful way to describe the difference between natural law theory and 
legal positivism is therefore the so-called pedigree thesis. According to this thesis, legal 
positivism differs from natural law theory in positing that the existence of law depends on 
social facts, not on its merit.213 The idea here is that human beings make the law and 
that this is the sole criterion of determining what law is and what it is not, and this thesis 
is usually taken to be the one that most legal positivists accept and which is used to 
distinguish natural law theory and legal positivism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 2012 [1961]: 185. See also Hart 1958. 
211 See, for instance, the discussion in Green 2008. The following discussion is also indebted to 
the comments in Green 2009. 
212 See Kretzmann 1988. 
213 The classical statement of this thesis is found in John Austin (1998 [1832]: 184): “The 
existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one 
enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.” 
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However, there is also a problem in regard to the pedigree thesis. In saying that 
the existence of law depends on social facts, the pedigree thesis leaves open whether 
morality can still factor into the law. Take, for instance, §4302 of the Pennsylvania Penal 
Code, which prohibits incest. This law against incest is a social fact insofar as 
lawmakers in the state of Pennsylvania who were mandated by the people created it. 
Yet whether the law came to be as a social fact or not, its content is arguably importantly 
formed by morality. It is not merely that people came together and created the law, but in 
making the law lawmakers and the people of the state had certain ideas about moral 
values that made its way into the written law. Put differently, the pedigree thesis is a 
thesis about the origin of law, but it leaves open whether content of the law may or may 
not include moral ideas.   
Let us therefore consider a third and final thesis, the so-called content thesis. In 
current scholarship, in the wake of Dworkin’s criticisms of Hart’s ideas,214 there is some 
debate among legal positivists about this thesis, which asserts that the law may 
incorporate moral facts into its content. Some scholars reject the thesis and are as a 
result called exclusive or hard positivists, whereas others embrace the thesis and are 
labeled inclusive or soft positivists.215 
Having mapped out the terrain in this way, let us return to the Epicureans. First, it 
is noteworthy – especially in the ancient context – that law and justice (which, again, I 
take here to be the stand-in for morality as a whole) for the Epicureans are conceptually 
distinct entities, as the distinction between the laws or customs (nomoi) and the just (to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 See above all Dworkin 2013 [1977]. 
215 Hart 2012 [1961], Waluchow 1994, Coleman 2001 are some of the most prominent defenders 
of inclusive positivism, while Raz 1994 and Shapiro 1998 are prominent defenders of exclusive 
positivism. 
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dikaion) in their writings clearly shows.216 This is worth pointing out because such a 
distinction is not at all self-evident.217 In fact, an example for this confusion in what may 
be a pre-Epicurean text is Hippias Major 284d, where Socrates notes that “Then, when 
those who attempt to set down laws miss the good, they have missed the lawful and the 
law as well.”218 Of course, in the context of the Hippias Major, Socrates’ pronouncement 
may be rhetorical, and due to the nature of Platonic dialogues, especially one about 
which there is no consensus of whether it can be reliably attributed to Plato, the claim 
does not need to be understood as Plato’s own view. Be this as it may, the passage just 
quoted shows that in distinguishing between what is lawful and what is just, the 
Epicureans avoid the fault of crudely running together two ideas that should be 
conceptually separated but that are not always kept apart. 
Since I already dismissed the separation thesis as inadequate, let me begin the 
classification of Epicurean theory by taking a look at the pedigree thesis. It states that 
the existence of law depends on social facts. As I have shown in previous chapters, the 
laws on the Epicurean view are created by preeminent individuals and then recognized 
by the many. Furthermore, this means that laws are social facts; they arise anew in 
different places and at different times. The Epicureans thus clearly support a version of 
the pedigree thesis and, for this reason, I suggest that we may aptly describe their view 
as a kind of legal positivism. However, it is interesting to note that in contrast to modern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Alberti 1995.  
217 In modern languages such as German and French, the conceptual distinction between justice 
and the laws is more difficult to make than in English in that ‘Recht’ and ‘droit’ can both refer to 
what is just and what is lawful. (I leave aside that Recht and droit may also refer to the idea of a 
right, which can create even more confusion.) In Greek, by contrast, the distinction is as clear as 
it is in English. 
218 Ὅταν ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ ἁµάρτωσιν οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοῦς νόµους τιθέναι, νοµίµου τε καὶ νόµου 
ἡµαρτήκασιν. 
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legal positivists, the Epicureans also argue that the existence of justice (not only that of 
law) depends on social facts, as I argued above. After all, justice is said to be a kind of 
agreement. In other words, Epicurean theory does not stop at the analysis of the law. 
Indeed, most of the Principal Doctrines deal with justice and the law; the expression 
“what is acknowledged as just (nomisthenta dikaia)”, which is used in these maxims, can 
equally refer to the agreements that lead to justice and to those agreements that lead to 
the existence of the law. Modern legal positivism, by contrast, does not address issues 
of justice directly. The main reason for this is that legal positivism is a legal theory, not 
an ethical or political theory. Standing in the tradition of Kelsen’s “pure” theory of law, 
modern legal positivists pace natural law theorists are usually committed to investigating 
the law while setting aside moral issues.219 This does not mean that metaethical 
assumptions do not also find their way into their theories. Yet they never explicitly take a 
stand on justice as Epicurean theory does. So while Epicurean theory clearly posits the 
social origin of law and so is very close to modern legal positivism, it also offers a theory 
of justice and connects ethics and legal philosophy in a way that is methodologically 
uncharacteristic of modern legal positivist approaches. 
This brings us to the content thesis. It states that the law may incorporate moral 
facts as its content. As I argued above, a law on the Epicurean view is (ideally) a just law 
and this means that the law is (ideally) beneficial. What is beneficial, in Epicureanism, in 
turn, is a natural fact about a state of affairs in the world. In short, then, according to the 
Epicurean view, whether a law is just is reducible to the natural fact of whether it is 
beneficial. This means that while Epicurean theory allows that moral facts can become 
the content of the laws, these moral facts by themselves are irrelevant in terms of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 See Kelsen 2008 [1934]. 
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explanatory role; what matters ultimately is the category of benefit, which determines 
what is moral. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to say that the Epicureans accept a 
version of the content thesis. After all, laws on the Epicurean view ideally include 
considerations of what is just or more precisely about what is beneficial. The Epicurean 
version of positivism, then, (ideally) incorporates moral facts into the law qua what is 
beneficial. Accordingly, the Epicurean theory of justice and law is most fittingly described 
as a kind of inclusive positivism. 
At this point, let me emphasize again that on the Epicurean view a law that is not 
just does not cease to be a law. Such a law merely ceases to meet the success 
conditions for laws; it is no longer a good, that is, beneficial, law. In other words, while 
natural facts about the world ideally play an important role for agents when they form 
agreements and make laws, agreements and laws are above all social facts on the 
Epicurean view. As the result, the Epicureans are not committed to the claim that benefit 
or justice put a constraint on what counts as a law (as natural law theories typically do), 
but only to the claim that the law may incorporate what is beneficial and what is just into 
its content.  
Now, despite the fact that the Epicurean theory of law is positivistic and its 
emphasis lies on the fact that agreements arise in different places and at different times, 
Epicurean theory also emphasizes that there may be things that at any given moment 
will be ‘universally’ just, that is, just for everyone everywhere.220 These things are not just 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Usener 1892: 444, Philippson 1910a: 298, Strauss 1965 [1953]: 107ff., and Brown 2010 
[2009]: 191 and fn. 41. Brown rightly points out that one major hindrance to such all-
encompassing justice and law is that Epicurus himself claimed that only certain people have the 
ability to become Sages (see Diogenes, Lives X.117 and fr. 226 Usener as well as KD 32 and 
Philodemus, On the Gods III col. XIV Diels). This is true insofar as this comment implies that 
certain people will never be capable of forming agreements. However, it is false insofar as the 
agreements of justice are not about anything random whatsoever that a select few have agreed 
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for everyone everywhere without qualification, though, but rather they all happen to be 
just at this time, given that they are beneficial. In the same vein, Diogenes of Oenoanda 
even champions a kind of cosmopolitanism, observing that “while the various segments 
of the earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world 
gives all people a single country the entire earth, and a single home, the world.”221 Since 
Diogenes writes in the 2nd century CE, it is sometimes assumed that this text is rather 
the product of his eclecticism and so rather the result of the dominance of Stoic 
philosophy than really a position that Epicurus himself could have articulated.222 Yet 
there is no need to dismiss Diogenes’ testimony as altogether un-Epicurean. While there 
is indeed no reason to assume Epicurus held cosmopolitan ideas, there is some reason 
to think that his theory can accommodate the idea that there can be things that are just 
for everyone everywhere at a given moment in time.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
upon, but supposedly what is beneficial for all (from an anthropocentric point of view). 
Conversely, note that even on a natural law theory like Aquinas’, there is room for deviation from 
the universal law: “But with reference to the particular conclusions of practical reason, neither is 
the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor is it equally known even to those for whom it is the 
same. Now, it is right and true for all to act according to reason. From this principle, however, it 
follows as a kind of particular conclusion that deposits should be returned. And this is true in the 
majority of cases, but it may happen in a particular case that it would be harmful, and, 
consequently, unreasonable to return a deposit, for instance, if someone requested it in order to 
attack his country [Sed quantum ad proprias conclusiones rationis practicae, nec est eadem 
veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes; nec etiam apud quos est eadem, est aequaliter nota. Apud 
omnes enim hoc rectum est et verum, ut secundum rationem agatur. Ex hoc autem principio 
sequitur quasi conclusio propria quod deposita sint reddenda. Et hoc quidem ut in pluribus verum 
est, sed potest in aliquo casu contingere quod sit damnosum, et per consequens irrationabile, si 
deposita reddantur, puta si aliquis petat ad impugnandam patriam.]” (Summa Theologiae I-IIe, q. 
94, a. 4; Trans. by Henle, modified; see also the similar case that is discussed at Republic 331b 
ff.). In other words, just as natural law theory is not committed to the claim that what is lawful is 
the same everywhere, legal positivism is not committed to the claim that what is lawful is different 
everywhere.  
221 καθ᾽ ἑκάστην µὲν γὰρ ἀποτοµὴν τῆς γῆς ἄλλων ἄλλη πατρίς ἐστιν, κατὰ δὲ τἠν ὅλην περιοχὴν 
τοῦδε τοῦ κόσµου µία πάντων πατρίς ἐστιν ἡ πᾶσα γῆ καὶ εἶς ὁ κόσµος οἶκος. Fr. 30 Smith; 
Trans. by Smith. 
222 See the discussion in the introduction to Smith’s edition of Diogenes of Oenoanda (139f.).  
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In KD 36, for instance, Epicurus distinguishes between a general aspect (kata to 
koinon) and a peculiar aspect (kata to idion) when it comes to justice: “In its general 
aspect, justice is the same for everyone, for it is a kind of mutual benefit in the dealings 
of men with one another: but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country or 
any other circumstances the same thing does not turn out to be just for everyone.”223 
This could be understood in at least two ways.224 First, it could mean that there is truly a 
difference in principle between general and peculiar justice. According to such a reading, 
there are some norms that are so general that they apply to all people in all 
circumstances and then there are other peculiar norms that do not apply to all people in 
all circumstances and there is no connection between the two sets of norms. It would 
thus follow that if human beings keep to the most general norms (justice in its general 
aspect), it is possible that all people everywhere share these general norms making 
‘universal justice’ possible.225  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 κατὰ µὲν <τὸ> κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό, συµφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους 
κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσον δή ποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον 
εἶναι. Trans. by Bailey, modified. 
224 See especially Müller 1972: 99ff. and Bollack 1975: 376. 
225 The Epicureans would thus be closely following a distinction made by Aristotle (see Philippson 
1910: 295 as well as Müller 1972: 99). At Nicomachean Ethics, V.7.1134b18ff., Aristotle 
distinguishes between natural and legal justice: “Of the politically just, one part is natural, the 
other part is legal. The natural part is that which has the same force everywhere and does not 
seem this or that to someone. The legal part, by contrast is that which from the beginning does 
not differ in one way or another, but when it has been laid down, it differs, for instance, the 
release on the receipt of a ransom of a mina, or the sacrificing of a goat but not two sheep, and 
further the laws that are passed in regard to particular cases, for instance, sacrificing to Brasidas, 
and the provisions of decrees [Τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ µὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ νοµικόν, 
φυσικὸν µὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναµιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ µή, νοµικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
µὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ µνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα 
θύειν ἀλλὰ µὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νοµοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ, 
καὶ τὰ ψηφισµατώδη].” Trans. mine. In the same vein, Aristotle distinguishes between positive 
laws and customs on the one hand and natural law on the other hand at Rhetoric I.13.1373b4ff.: 
“[By the two kinds of law,] I mean peculiar and general law. By ‘peculiar law’ I mean the law 
defined by individuals with regard to themselves, and some of this law is unwritten and some of it 
is written. By ‘general law’, by contrast, I mean the law that is in accordance with nature [λέγω δὲ 
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On the alternative reading, there is no difference in principle between general 
and peculiar justice. According to this reading, general justice and particular justice are 
not two kinds of justice, but rather different ways of realizing the same kind of justice. In 
this vein, for instance, refraining from harm and not being harmed is beneficial and thus 
just for everyone everywhere, but the ways in which this is realized is different from 
place to place: While some communities, for instance, consider incarceration as a 
sufficient deterrent and have one understanding of what exactly constitutes harm, others 
consider community administered physical punishments as more fitting and have a 
varying understanding of what constitutes harm. 
Both readings explain how there is general justice for the Epicureans. However, 
the former reading threatens to eliminate the idea that really all justice for the Epicureans 
is conventional, and it falsely assumes that conventionality of law is at odds with its 
universality. Yet such an assumption is unwarranted. For instance, one may imagine 
certain behaviors to be conventionally sanctioned yet still be – in some form or another – 
universally accepted by all human beings. Concrete examples are difficult to give 
because it means taking a stance on what counts as a conventionally sanctioned 
behavior and on what role nature plays in the sanctioning process. Nevertheless, one 
could perhaps imagine restrictions on social roles and on sexual relationships to be 
conventionally sanctioned and yet find that these sanctions occur everywhere in one 
form or another. If this is right, then there is no reason to separate the two aspects of 
justice and the latter reading is to be preferred. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
νόµον τὸν µὲν ἴδιον, τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον µὲν τὸν ἐκαστοις ὠρισµένον πρὸς αὐτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν 
µὲν ἄγραφον, τὸν δὲ γεγραµµένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν].” Trans. mine. 
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KD 36 aside, there is another piece of evidence for the claim that something may 
be just for everyone everywhere at a given time, namely, in Hermarchus. Although the 
text discusses what is lawful, not what is just, it claims that there are things that are 
legislated that will fit everyone alike and that it is these things a skillful legislator should 
seek out: 
people likewise go wrong about what is general and what is peculiar. Some fail to 
distinguish the things legislated that fit everyone alike: some disregard them, 
thinking they are among the ‘indifferents’,226 others take the opposite view and 
think that laws which are not universally beneficial to be beneficial everywhere.227  
 
Since the criterion that bestows merit on the laws is the same as the one that 
bestows merit on justice, namely, the beneficial, it seems to follow that if there is 
something that fits everyone in legislation, then there will also be something that fits 
everyone in regard to justice. The passage explicitly invokes universal benefit (ta 
katholou sumpheronta) as the good-making feature of laws.228 While this could be taken 
to refer to a single community only, I see no reason why it needs to be. Consequently, it 
seems that universal benefit will also be a good-making feature of universal justice. It is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 This is an allusion to the Stoic doctrine that only virtue is choice-worthy in itself and that 
everything else is either a preferred or a dis-preferred indifferent. See, for instance, Meyer 2008: 
141ff. 
227 διαµαρτάνουσιν ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν τε κοινῶν ὁµοίως καὶ τῶν ἰδίων. Καὶ γὰρ τά παραπλησίως 
ἐφαρµόττοντα νοµοθετήµατα πᾶσιν οὐ καθορῶσί τινες, ἀλλ᾽ οἳ µὲν τῶν ἀδιαφόρων δοξάζοντες 
εἶναι παραλείπουσιν, οἵ δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν δόξαν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν, καὶ τὰ µὴ καθόλου 
συµφέροντα πανταχοῦ τινες. Porphyry, On Abstinence I.12.2f.; Trans. by Clark, modified and 
emphasis added; on this passage, see especially Osborne 2007: 207ff. 
228 That laws are ‘universally beneficent’ in this passage cannot only refer to the fact that laws 
have a general aspect, just as there was a general aspect of justice. First, the technical 
vocabulary used in the two passages is different (koinon vs. katholou). And second, the thing 
legislated as just (nomotethēmata) refers to actual things that were set down and not abstract 
principles of law-giving.  
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thus wrong to dismiss the idea that there cannot be things that are just for everyone 
everywhere at a given moment on the Epicurean theory of justice and law.  
I have now completely set out my reading of Epicurean justice and the law. To 
conclude the chapter, let me briefly review the most important contributions in 
scholarship and explain how my reading differs from them. In his two influential 1910 
articles, Robert Philippson identifies Epicurus as a participant in the nomos-phusis 
debate and then claims that Epicurus was an advocate of natural law theory.229 In 
support of this reading, Philippson cites the usage of the word ‘nature’ in KD 31, which 
we already explained differently above. Furthermore, Philippson adduces Polystratus’ 
On Irrational Contempt for Common Conceptions to show that entities that exist relative 
to something (pros ti) exist by nature (phusei).230 Unfortunately, I cannot argue for this 
claim in more detail here, but I take this to be a misunderstanding of the meaning of a 
difficult passage in Polystratus, the point of which is rather that pros ti entities can exist 
by convention and simultaneously be said to exist truly. So while Philippson deserves 
great merit for being one of the first modern scholars to discuss the Epicurean theory of 
justice and law in a scholarly text, his discussion is overall inaccurate and does not 
capture the Epicurean position well. 
Reimar Müller and Victor Goldschmidt, by contrast, who argue in their respective 
books in the 1970s that justice is primarily a matter of agreement for the Epicureans, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 1910a: 292. See also the remarks in Falchi 1902 who develops a similar reading of the 
Epicurean conception of justice, but whose work has been completely neglected by subsequent 
scholars writing on the topic. 
230 “Eine Bestätigung unserer Auffassung wird uns Polystratus geben, der gegenüber der 
Behauptung seiner Gegner, die bestehenden Sittlichkeitsbegriffe seien als künstliche, nicht als 
natürliche zu betrachten, weil sie überall verschieden seien, beweist, dass durch die Relativität 
die Natürlichkeit und Gültigkeit von Begriffen nicht aufgehoben werde” (Philippson 1910a: 294). 
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remedy this defect in Philippson.231 They both stress the aspect of agreement and hence 
of conventionality in Epicurean theory in their respective accounts, which I take to be the 
correct reading of the Epicurean position on justice and the law. In this vein, Müller, for 
instance, points out that what is naturally just cannot be meant in the sense of something 
that is just in itself without recourse to human posits.232 However, on such reading, the 
‘impurity’ of Epicurean theory (pace Kelsen’s ideal of purity in legal theory) does not 
receive sufficient attention and neither of these two authors clearly defines what they 
mean by natural law theory or legal positivism. I correct these shortcomings in my 
readings of the Epicurean conception and so importantly qualify the ‘conventionalist’ 
readings offered by Müller and Goldschmidt.  
Finally, Antonina Alberti’s 1995 contribution is the most recent attempt to make 
sense of the naturalness of justice in Epicureanism. While her article deserves much 
praise for emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between justice on the one hand 
and the laws on the other hand,233 Alberti first mischaracterizes the debate in scholarship 
when it comes to the naturalness of justice and confounds Goldschmidt’s and Müller’s 
views.234 More importantly, though, she fails to address appropriately the ‘impurity’ of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Although Philippson on the one hand and Müller and Goldschmidt on the other hand also 
emphasize different parts of Epicurean theory, it does seem to me that their disagreement about 
the Epicurean position is substantial (pace Indelli 1978: 47). 
232 “Im Sinne der Antithese φύσει-νόµῳ kann also Epikur nicht den natürlichen Ursprung des 
Rechts behauptet haben, wie Philippson annahm. Epikurs Begriff des ‘naturgemäßen’ oder 
‘natürlichen’ Rechts darf nicht im Sinne eines ‘Naturrechts’ verstanden werden, das ‘an sich’, 
unabhängig von bewußten und spezifischen Festlegungen des Menschen existiert und absolute 
Gültigkeit hat” (Müller 1972: 93; see also Goldschmidt 1977: 25ff.). 
233 But see also the remarks in Philippson 1910a: 299. 
234Alberti 1995: 170f. and 179f., fn. 30. While Goldschmidt indeed reduces justice to positive law, 
as Alberti claims, Müller is often more careful. Goldschmidt is also more ready to speak of the 
Epicureans as legal positivists (1981: 309), but Müller, for instance, writes: “Wenn Philippson und 
andere ihn [Epicurus] als Vertreter einer Naturrechtsauffassung in Anspruch genommen haben, 
so muß hervorgehoben werden, daß dieser Begriff des ‘Naturrechts’ bei Epikur nur in einem Sinn 
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Epicurean conception and, while on the right track in drawing on Hart’s work, also fails to 
characterize the Epicurean conception of law as a kind of inclusive legal positivism, as I 
do here. 
4.3. Summary 
In this chapter, I discussed the Epicurean theory of justice from a metaethical 
perspective and then classified the Epicurean theory of law in terms of the vocabulary of 
modern analytic philosophy of law. I began by situating the Epicurean theory in the 
ancient nomos-phusis-debate, claiming that the Epicurean view occupies a kind of 
middle position between the view that the laws are completely man-made or artificial and 
the view that they are completely natural. I then argued that the most important aspect of 
the Epicurean theory of justice from a metaethical perspective is that justice, an ethical 
fact, can be reduced to benefit, a natural fact about the world, and argued that this 
classifies the Epicurean view as naturalistic. After having worked out the metaethical 
understanding of justice in Epicureanism, I next drew on the vocabulary of modern 
analytic philosophy of law in order to characterize the Epicurean conception of law. I 
argued that the Epicurean view is best understood as a kind of inclusive positivism, that 
is, the view that law (ideally) incorporates moral facts. Finally, I contrasted my reading of 
Epicurean justice and law with that of other scholars, showing how my reading differs 
from previous ones. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
verstanden werden kann, der sich vom Inhalt gewöhnlicher naturrechtlicher Theorien (wie Platons 
oder der Stoa), die absolute Normen setzen, prinzipiell unterscheidet” (1972: 92; but see also 
Müller 1988: 120). In any event, none of the authors discussed is careful in defining what they 
exactly mean by legal positivism and natural law theory, which makes it difficult to characterize 
their views (and the Epicurean view itself) precisely.  
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5. CONTRACTUAL JUSTICE AND ARETETIC JUSTICE: WOULD A 
SAGE VIOLATE A LAW, KNOWING SHE WILL ESCAPE 
DETECTION? 
 
A key purpose of the laws and the punishments attached to them is to compel 
agents to act in accordance with the principles that motivate the laws (ideally ideas of 
justice). If an agent could escape detection, would she violate a law? For the 
Epicureans, the answer seems prima facie to depend on which agent one has in mind, a 
virtuous or a non-virtuous agent. In the case of a non-virtuous agent, one who does not 
possess the virtue of justice, the answer seems to be that she would violate the law. 
After all, such an agent in Epicureanism is only motivated to obey the law by the fear of 
detection and the punishments associated with breaking the law. Once this fear and 
these punishments are taken away, there is nothing stopping the agent from violating the 
law. In the case of a Sage, an ideal agent who possesses the virtue of justice, by 
contrast, the answer seems to be that she would not violate the law. After all, such an 
agent is not primarily motivated to obey the law by the fear of detection and of 
punishments, but because she has ‘internalized’ certain patterns of behavior so that she 
will act according to these patterns regardless of whether there are laws telling her to act 
a certain way or not. 
 Now, interestingly, this is not quite the answer we find in the ancient texts. 
Plutarch reports that Epicurus himself raises the question in one of his works “whether 
the Sage who knows that he will not be found out will do certain things that the law 
forbids.”235 Fortunately Plutarch also supplies us with Epicurus’ reply. Unfortunately, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 εἰ πράξει τινὰ ὁ σοφὸς ὧν οἱ νόµοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, εἰδὼς ὅτι λήσει. Against Colotes 1127d = 
fr. 18 Usener. Trans. by Einarson and De Lacy, modified. 
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however, this reply is rather cryptic. Epicurus supposedly answers: “the unqualified 
predication is not free from difficulty.”236 In other words, Epicurus answers ‘Maybe’ and 
so does not straightforwardly deny that a Sage would not violate a law under any 
circumstances. On the Epicurean view, then, there are some situations in which even a 
Sage would violate a law. And so, the interpretative challenge posed by the passage in 
Plutarch is for any scholar to explain what Epicurus meant by (1) specifying the 
circumstances in which an Epicurean Sage would violate a law and by (2) arguing why 
the Sage has good reasons to violate the law in such circumstances.  
 In this chapter, I will address this challenge by investigating what kinds of desires 
Sages cultivate and how they satisfy them. In other words, I will complement the 
investigation of the Epicurean conception of justice and law in the previous chapters by 
an account of Epicurean moral psychology. I will argue that Sages focus on pursuing 
their natural and necessary desires and that nature is set up in such a way that the 
pursuit of these desires usually does not require Sages to violate a law. However, there 
may be situations in which natural and necessary desires cannot be satisfied without 
violating a law. In such a case, one may argue, however, that the law in question has 
ceased to be just. I will thus claim that besides the virtuous or non-virtuous disposition of 
an agent, the second factor that needs to be taken into account when answering the 
question whether an agent would violate a law knowing she will escape detection is 
whether the law to be violated is, in fact, just. The Epicureans distinguish between 
justice and the laws, and they recognize that these two can come apart. Things 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 οὐκ εὔοδον τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐπικατηγόρηµα. Ibid. Trans. by Einarson and De Lacy. See also 
Westman 1955: 185f., following Diano 1946: 147 who argues that ‘epikatēgorēma’ has to mean 
‘predicate.’ Alternatively, the word, according to the LSJ, could also mean ‘charge/accusation’ or 
‘sign/indication.’ 
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legislated as just (the laws) may have ceased to be just and no longer correspond to the 
preconception (prolēpsis) of the just.237 In such a case, I argue that a Sage would violate 
the law if she concludes that such a violation will be beneficial to her, but she will not 
commit an injustice, precisely because the law has ceased to be just. This hesitant 
answer on Epicurus’ part explains why the unqualified predication is not free from 
difficulty. 
In discussing this puzzle, I will also address a further issue, namely, that of the 
relationship between contractual justice and aretetic justice in Epicureanism. As we saw 
in previous chapters, the Epicureans defend a kind of social contract theory, according 
to which (1) justice comes to be through agreements that agents form with each other 
and (2) the laws come to be through a different and later set of ‘agreements.’ However, 
besides the justice that comes about as the result of an agreement, the Epicureans also 
argue that justice is a virtue: a character disposition that individual agents possess. 
Consequently, a much-discussed question in scholarship is how these two kinds of 
justice are related.238 This issue of the relationship between the two kinds of Epicurean 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 See the more detailed discussion in chapter 7.  
238 In recent Anglophone research, some scholars have denied that there are two different 
conceptions of justice in Epicurus, mainly on the basis that there is no textual basis for the 
distinction. See Armstrong 1997: 324, O’Keefe 2001a: 134f., and Brown 2010 [2009]: 192. The 
traditional view that states that there are in fact two different conceptions is found in Philippson 
1910: 296, Arrighetti 1973: 553, Müller 1972: 104f., Bollack 1975: 364f., Mitsis 1988: 91f., and 
Annas 1993a: 293ff. While critics are right in pointing out that the distinction between contractual 
and aretetic justice is not explicitly drawn in any Epicurean text, there is quite a large amount of 
textual evidence that indicates that justice must also have been a virtue for the Epicureans. First, 
according to Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus wrote a work called  “On Justice and the Other Virtues 
[Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν]” (Lives X.28). And second, Cicero in his lengthy 
discussion of Epicurean virtues also includes justice (On Ends I.50ff.). Finally, there are several 
passages, in which the term ‘dikaionsunē’ is used, which refers to justice as a virtue, and not ‘to 
dikaion’, which is typically used to refer to the justice that comes about by agreements. Besides 
the already quoted passage in Diogenes’ Lives, see KD 33, frr. 518 and 519 Usener, Philodemus, 
On Piety ll. 2149f. and 2260f., Obbink, On Property Management XXIV.17 Tsouna, On Anger 
XXIV.39 Indelli, and Diogenes’ of Oenoanda Golden Age fragment (fr. 56, col. I.6f. Smith). 
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justice arises in regard to the passage quoted in Plutarch because a certain motivation 
to be just corresponds to these two kinds of justice. In the case of contractual justice 
(and the laws), this motivation is often first and foremost the fear of repercussions for 
violating the agreements.239 In the case of aretetic justice, by contrast, this motivation is 
first and foremost that the agent has grasped that a certain action is the beneficial thing 
to do.240 In other words, then, the problem addressed in the passage quoted in Plutarch 
raises the issue of whether contractual justice becomes wholly irrelevant to motivate 
agents to act, once they have achieved aretetic justice. And so, an additional interest in 
discussing the question of whether a Sage would violate a law knowing she could 
escape detection is that it is connected to the issue of how the two forms of justice work 
together to ensure that different kinds of agents act justly. 
In what follows, I begin with a brief discussion of two ancient explanations of the 
question of whether the Sage would violate a law, knowing she will escape detection, to 
set the stage for my solution (5.1.). I then develop this solution in detail (5.2. and 5.3.). 
Finally, I discuss some objections to the solution and comment on the relationship 
between contractual and aretetic justice in Epicureanism (5.4. and 5.5.). 
5.1. Cicero and Plutarch 
 In Antiquity, the only sources for the discussion of Epicurus’ question are Cicero 
and Plutarch. These texts say quite a bit about the debate and the misunderstandings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Perhaps one also needs to add Philodemus, Rhetoric II.282, fr. IX as well as On Poems V, col. 
XXXIV.3 Mangoni to this list. 
239 So agents are not motivated to adhere to the terms of an agreement because they have 
consented or because there is a natural law that tells them to do so, as one might perhaps 
expect, thinking of modern theorists such as Hobbes and Locke. 
240 Not because it is in itself beneficial to do a certain action but because it is beneficial for an 
agent to perform an action in order to obtain freedom from mental distress (ataraxia). 
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that have been produced in regard to the Epicurean conception of justice and law. 
Cicero does not directly refer to the question as it is quoted later in Plutarch. However, 
he at least reports a possible answer to whether the Sage would violate a law, knowing 
she will escape detection, insofar as he discusses the response “certain 
philosophers,”241 who are generally identified with the Epicureans, give to the challenge 
posed by the Ring of Gyges story.242 Even if the scenario developed in the Ring of 
Gyges story is not quite the same as the scenario posed by the question of whether the 
Sage would violate a law, knowing that she will escape detection,243 Cicero’s text is still 
relevant because of the affinity to the Ring of Gyges story and the question of the law-
breaking Sage. As a result, one can easily image that the Epicureans, on Cicero’s 
reading, gave a similar answer to both scenarios. 
Cicero’s discussion of the Ring of Gyges story is found in Book III of On Duties. 
This book deals with the conflict between the right (honestum) and the beneficial (utile), 
and therefore, the Ring of Gyges story is introduced as a problem of aretetic justice in 
Cicero, namely, as the challenge of how the pursuit of pleasure entails the exercise of 
virtue for the Epicureans.  
According to Cicero, who is greatly annoyed about such stubbornness, the 
Epicureans 
declare that the story related by Plato [about the Ring of Gyges] is fictitious and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 philosophi quidam. Cicero, in On Duties III.39.  
242 See especially Woolf 2013. According to this thought experiment, a shepherd finds a ring that 
gives him the power to become invisible, which allows him to perform any action he wants, 
including those that are considered immoral. The challenge raised by the story is thus to identify 
reasons for being just, even if there are no societal sanctions to be feared by committing an 
injustice.  
243 More on this difference below.  
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imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was actually true or even possible! But the 
force of the illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to know or even suspect 
the truth, when you do anything to gain riches or power or sovereignty or sensual 
gratification – if your act should be hidden forever from the knowledge of gods 
and men, would you do it? The condition, they say, is impossible. Of course it is. 
But my question is, if that were possible which they declare to be impossible, 
what pray, would one do? They press their point with right boorish obstinacy: 
they assert that it is impossible and they insist on it; they refuse to see the 
meaning of my words, “if possible.”244 
 
Instead of tackling the problem of how seeking pleasure entails the acquisition of 
justice head on, the Epicureans in the passage are said to react to the Ring of Gyges 
story in a roundabout way. On a first reading of the above passage, they outright deny 
that there are such situations. And on an alternative reading, they acknowledge that 
there are such scenarios as described by the Ring of Gyges, but claim that in such a 
case, agents would nevertheless not violate a law because they can never be sure that 
they will not be detected at some point in the future. Such fear of detection is 
incompatible with a main goal of Epicurean psychology: to maintain a state of freedom 
from mental distress (ataraxia). Taken as a reply to the objection that Epicurean agents 
would violate a law when they could be sure to escape detection,245 the Epicureans, 
according to Cicero, would then either deny that there are ever any situations in which 
the ‘could escape detection’-condition holds (on the first reading) or, alternatively, they 
would deny that one can ever be sure and that an agent will always fear detection, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone, quasi vero ille aut factum id esse 
aut fieri potuisse defendat. Haec est vis huius anuli et huius exempli: si nemo sciturus, nemo ne 
suspicaturus quidem sit, cum aliquid divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis causa feceris, si 
id diis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sisne facturus? Negant id fieri posse. 
Nequaquam potest id quidem, sed quaero, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent. 
Urgent rustice sane. Negant enim posse et in eo perstant, hoc verbum quid valeat non vident. On 
Duties III.39; Trans. by Miller. 
245 That is, instead of a direct answer to the Ring of Gyges story, which is the immediate context 
of the discussion. 
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is not conducive to maintaining ataraxia (according to the second reading).246 In other 
words, according to both readings, the Epicureans can block the objection that the 
Epicurean Sage would violate a law if she knew that she would escape detection.  
 However, it seems to me that both readings come at a big price. The first reading 
(that the Epicureans refuse to accept the scenario presented to them) seems to me to be 
a very uncharitable reading of the Epicurean view. It not only presents the Epicureans as 
quite obtuse interlocutors, but also ignores that the Epicurus himself raised the question, 
as I already pointed out. Also, it is unclear how refusing to accept the scenario as a real 
possibility squares with the answer that Plutarch reports that Epicurus gave, namely, that 
“the unqualified predication is not free from difficulty.”  
The second reading, in comparison to the first reading, takes the Epicureans 
seriously as interlocutors. However, it then succumbs to the same objection as the 
previous one. It is unclear on this reading why there would be a difficulty to give an 
answer if Cicero were right in assuming that an Epicurean Sage will never violate a law 
because of the fear of being found out. The answer that Plutarch reports on Epicurus’ 
behalf requires that the Sage can at least violate the law in some circumstances. 
Accordingly, the major task of this chapter is to find a more satisfactory answer, one that 
allows us to specify the circumstances, in which a Sage would violate a law. 
Before doing this, however, let us briefly examine the interpretation of Epicurus’ 
answer (“the unqualified predication is not free from difficulty”) that Plutarch gives us. 
Unfortunately, he is not much better than Cicero when he contends that it simply means 
that the Sage will say to herself:  “I shall do it [that is, violate the law], but I do not wish to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 For support for the first reading, see Roskam 2012: 24ff. For the second one, see Rist 1972: 
123. 
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admit it.”247 This again amounts to dismissing Epicurus’ answer as untenable and to 
thinking that the Sage will be an immoral agent who is surreptitiously willing to harm 
others if she can.248 Plutarch’s reading is not surprising, given the general attitude 
thinkers of other schools had towards Epicureans.249 In any case, the systematic 
dismissal of Epicurus’ view has influenced opinions of notable scholars. Especially early 
scholars writing on Epicurus have often just accepted the view that the Epicureans do 
not have any means at all in their arsenal to answer the question whether the Epicurean 
Sage would violate a law if she knew that she will escape detection.250 But again, if the 
passage really posed such a problem for Epicurean theory, then it seems odd that 
Epicurus himself raised the question. In what follows, I will thus show that there is a 
more charitable and sophisticated reading of the Epicureans available than the one 
offered in Cicero and Plutarch. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 πράξω µέν, οὐ βούλοµαι δὲ ὁµολογεῖν. Against Colotes 1127D. Trans. by Einarson and De 
Lacy. 
248 The context of the discussion is wholly polemical. The passage is located at the end of Against 
Colotes where Plutarch tries to show that an Epicurean life is a life without any regard to the laws. 
249 Besides the treatise by Plutarch, Cicero’s On Ends I-II is a great example of this as are some 
of the stories collected by Diogenes Laertius’ Lives. In this vein, for instance, it is reported that 
Epicurus, the philosopher of pleasure vomited twice a day because he overindulged in food and 
drink (X.6).   
250 See especially Taylor (1911: 94) and Zeller 2013 [1923]: III.1, 463 [448], fn. 4. A version of this 
view is still found in Diano 1946: 147 who claims that the question as it is posed creates a double 
bind for Epicurus: if he answered that the Sage would violate a law, this would mean that no one 
could in the end be safe. If he answered that the Sage would not violate the law, he would admit 
that there is something just in itself, which flies in the face of Epicurean theory. (“At οὐκ εὔδον, 
non ab omni difficultate expeditum, τὸ ἁπλοῦν dicit κατηγόρηµα, id est ut ἁπλῶς, plane et 
simpliciter, ‘aget’ aut ‘non aget’ respondeat. Cur? Quia sicilicet si quid contra leges sapientem 
acturum esse dicerit, stultis quoque eandem facultatem fecerit, quo facto nemo securus esse 
potest; sin autem negaverit, aliquid per se iustiam esse confessus erit totamque suae disciplinae 
rationem everterit.”) 
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5.3. Epicurean Moral Psychology and Justice 
 Let us begin to give an answer to whether the Sage would violate a law, knowing 
that she will escape detection, by examining more closely the Sage’s motivations to act. 
In doing so, we can draw on the work of Paul Vander Waerdt, Rolf Westman, and 
Reimar Müller, since they all claim that a look at Epicurean moral psychology explains 
why the Sage will not violate a law.251 As I have already noted, I will argue that although 
this feature plays a crucial part in explaining the scenario of a law-breaking Sage, it will 
not be sufficient on its own. Since Vander Waerdt’s account is the most developed one 
of the three just mentioned, I will focus on his contribution to develop my account.  
 According to Vander Waerdt, one must distinguish a positive and a negative 
reason why Epicurean agents might not violate a law.252 The negative reason is the fear 
of being punished and the positive reason is that obeying a law will yield a benefit, 
namely, be conducive to a state of freedom from mental distress.253 Now, most 
Epicurean agents obey the law because they fear detection and punishment for their 
actions, but Sages do not. They obey the law because they grasp its usefulness. In this 
vein, 5th century CE anthologist Stobaeus reports that for the Epicureans, “the laws are 
laid down because of Sages, not so that they do not commit an injustice, but so that no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 See Westmann 1955: 185ff., Müller 1972: 86, fn. 203, and Vander Waerdt 1987.  
252 Vander Waerdt 1987: 406 and 410. See also Plutarch, That a Pleasant Life is Impossible 
1104b. 
253 One could argue that both the positive and negative reason involve fear, since the Epicurean 
Sage will pursue what is beneficial in order not to have to be plagued by the fear that results from 
living an unjust life. Nevertheless, there seems to be a difference between acting because there 
are certain external restraints in place (that is, sanction mechanisms) and acting because of a 
certain character disposition. 
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injustice is done to them.”254 And Hermarchus writes: “[I]f everyone were equally able to 
observe and be mindful of benefit, they would have no need of laws in addition; of their 
own choosing, they would steer clear of what is forbidden and do what is prescribed.”255 
In other words, then, laws protect the Sage from other people’s wrong-doing, but do not 
have the purpose of guiding the Sage in her actions. Likewise, in Hermarchus, we also 
find the distinction between two different ways of obeying the law.256 According to the 
first way, the motivation for obeying the law is supplied by a system of punishment that is 
set up in order to deter people from “acting against public or private interest.”257 
According to the second way, the motivation for obeying the law is an understanding of 
what is beneficial and of the fact that it is better to act on this understanding than not to 
act on it. This understanding seems to be exactly the one that the Sage possesses. In 
short, then, the main reason why a Sage follows a law is because this law is beneficial.  
 Now, what kinds of beneficial things do Epicurean Sages pursue? To answer this 
question, one must examine the desires agents – and specifically Sages – cultivate. 
According to the Epicureans there are three kinds of desires:258 First, there are natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 οἱ νόµοι χάριν τῶν σοφῶν κεῖνται, οὐχ ὅπως µὴ ἀδικῶσιν ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως µὴ ἀδικῶνται. Fr. 530 
Usener. Trans. mine. 
255 εἰ δὲ πάντες ἐδύναντο βλέπειν ὁµοίως καὶ µνηµονεύειν τὸ συµφέρον, οὐδὲν ἂν προσεδέοντο 
νόµων, ἀλλ᾽ αὐθαιρέτως τὰ µὲν εὐλαβοῦντο τῶν ἀπειρηµένων, τὰ δὲ ἔµπαττον τῶν 
προστεταγµένων. Ibid. I.8.4; Trans. by Clark, modified. By contrast, Plutarch claims that 
“Epicurus does believe that one has to keep from wrong-doing for any other reason than the fear 
of punishment [οὐ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῆς ἀδικίας οἴεται δεῖν ἀπείργειν ἢ φόβῳ κολάσεων]” 
(That It is Impossible 1104b = fr. 534 Usener; Trans. mine). However, this remark is contradicted 
by testimony in Epicurean authors, which seems more reliable than what Plutarch writes. 
256 Fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On Abstinence I.8.4f. These different ways of obeying the 
law roughly correspond to what Hart called “being obliged” and “having an obligation.” See Hart 
2012 [1961]: 82ff. 
257 τὸ µήτε κοινῇ µήτε ἰδίᾳ τὸ ἀλυσιτελὲς πράττειν. Ibid., I.8.3. 
258 Epicurus, KD 29 and 30, GV 21, Letter to Menoeceus. 127f., Cicero, On Ends I.45 and II.26ff., 
and fr. 456 Usener. See also Annas 1989: 147ff., Annas 1993a: 190ff., Meyer 2008: 108ff., and 
O’Keefe 2010: 124ff. For slightly different accounts, see Cooper 1999: 498ff. and Conche 1977: 
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and necessary desires. Second, there are natural and unnecessary desires. And third, 
there are unnatural and unnecessary desires. The first class of desires consists of those 
desires that pertain to our basic needs. These desires are ‘natural’ in the sense that we 
simply have these desires by virtue of being human beings who have a certain 
constitution. Hunger and thirst, for instance, are such desires. And this class of desires is 
‘necessary’ in the sense that the objects of these desires are necessary for our 
happiness, to be free from disturbance, or simply to subsist. This contrasts with the 
second class of desires, the natural and unnecessary desires. These desires, according 
to Epicurus, also broadly pertain to our basic needs and are hence natural, but they are 
‘unnecessary’ because their objects are not strictly necessary to fulfill our basic needs.259 
The desire to drink lemonade and the desire to eat a Kobe steak are examples of such 
desires. While drinking lemonade or eating a Kobe steak will certainly satisfy our natural 
desires, arguably, it is not necessary to drink lemonade or eat a Kobe steak to do so; 
any other drink and food would fulfill the same function of satiating our thirst and hunger. 
Finally, this leaves the last class of desires, unnatural and unnecessary desires. Such 
desires are, for instance, the desire for fame, power, or wealth. Such desires are not 
natural because they do not address any of the basic human needs and they are 
unnecessary because their objects are not strictly necessary for our happiness, a life 
free from disturbance, or simply, sustenance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63ff. (followed by Salem 1989: 75ff.). Tsouna (2007: 20f.) points out that this classification of 
desires is slightly expanded on in PHerc 1251 col. VI.1ff.. We can ignore these differences in this 
context however. For more broad accounts of pleasure in antiquity that also include the 
Epicureans, see Gosling and Taylor 1982 and Wolfsdorf 2013.  
259 The somewhat odd case is sexual desire which according to the Epicureans is also natural 
and unnecessary, although there is no natural and necessary desire that corresponds to it (to 
make the generic vs. specific desire distinction work). On this problem, see Annas 1993a: 193f. 
and fn. 29, O’Keefe 2010: 184, fn. 3. 
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According to the Epicureans, the Sage will focus on fulfilling his natural and 
necessary desires, partaking of natural and unnecessary desires only when she is sure 
that their objects can be obtained without any problem, and she will altogether evade the 
pursuit of unnatural and unnecessary desires.260 The reasons are quite simple: First, the 
Sage has no interest in having unnatural and unnecessary desires because these 
desires are not conducive to ataraxia.261 If one pursues and acquires wealth, power, or 
fame, one will become concerned about not losing these goods and as a consequence 
worry more.262 One’s soul will thus be disturbed and one cannot lead the life of ataraxia. 
What is more, however, as the scholion to KD 29 states, only the satisfaction of natural 
and necessary desires directly removes the pain we feel as a result of our bodily 
constitution; neither does satisfying unnatural and unnecessary nor natural and 
unnecessary desires. Satisfying natural and unnecessary desires such as the desire to 
drink a particular drink, as the same scholion explains, only vary the pleasure we 
experience, but do nothing to alleviate our pain.263 They are, according to KD 30, 
products of “empty opinion[s].”264 In other words, this means that any desire that is non-
generic (necessary) or does not pertain to our basic needs (natural) is a false desire that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 KD 30 and GV 21. 
261 GV 81, Letter to Menoeceus 130f., and Cicero, On Ends I.44 as well as I.59. 
262 See also fr. 582 Usener, where the Sage is said not to commit an injustice “for gain [epi 
kerdei].” 
263 “Natural and unnecessary desires are those that only vary the pleasure, but do not remove the 
pain [φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας δὲ τὰς ποικιλλούσας µόνον τὴν ἡδονήν, µὴ ὑπεξαιρουµένας δὲ 
τὸν ἄλγηµα].“ Trans. mine. Certainly, one may think that this is odd, since a desire to drink 
lemonade also entails a desire to drink. However, for the Epicureans these two desires seem to 
be separate from each other.  
264 παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὗται γίνονται. See also KD 29 where the same claim is made about 
unnatural and unnecessary desires. 
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we wrongfully pursue.265 Instead, according to Epicurus, the Epicurean Sage will focus 
exclusively on cultivating natural and necessary desires and derive her pleasure from 
this source, since natural and necessary desires, in contradistinction to the other classes 
of desires, are not unlimited.266 Greediness (pleonexia) is thus not a problem for the 
Epicurean Sage. Furthermore, natural and necessary desires can be easily satisfied:267 
Nature is set up in such a way that our generic desires for basic human needs are easy 
to satiate. And so, the Epicurean Sage will have no problem satisfying natural and 
necessary desires; she will not have a reason to commit an injustice, as Torquatus, the 
Epicurean spokesperson in On Ends, explicitly claims:  
for the rich and clever generous conduct seems more in keeping, and liberality 
wins them affection and good will, the surest means to a life of peace; especially 
as there is no motive for transgressing: since the desires that spring from nature 
are easily gratified without doing any man wrong, while those that are imaginary 
ought to be resisted, for they set their affections upon nothing that is really 
wanted.268 
 
In the same vein, the Epicureans claim that for the Sage, living the life of 
pleasure is living the life of justice and living the life of justice is living the life of pleasure: 
“It is not possible to live pleasurably without living in a reasonable, fine, and just manner 
nor to live in a reasonable, fine, and just manner without living pleasurably.”269 In short, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 In this context, see also the comments in Mitsis 1988: 62f., fn. 10. 
266 KD 15. 
267 KD 15 and 21. 
268 et opes vel fortunae vel ingenii liberalitati magis conveniunt, qua qui utuntur, benivolentiam sibi 
conciliant et, quod aptissimum est ad quiete vivendum, caritatem praesertim cum omnino nulla sit 
causa peccandi. quae enim cupiditates a natura proficiscuntur, facile explentur sine ulla iniuria, 
quae autem inanes sunt, iis parendum non est. nihil enim desiderabile concupiscent. Cicero, On 
Ends I.52f.; Trans. by Miller; emphasis added. 
269  Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίµως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως <οὐδὲ φρονίµως καὶ καλῶς 
καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. KD 5; Trans. mine. See also Letter to Menoeceus 132f., Cicero, On 
Ends I.50ff. and I. 57. 
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then, since natural and necessary desires, which the Sage exclusively cultivates, are 
easy to satisfy and justice for the Epicurean consists in refraining from harming others, a 
Sage can presumably most of the time easily fulfill his desire without needing to harm 
anyone. She will not have a motivation to be unjust. 
Now, being just and being lawful is not the same thing. Unfortunately, Vander 
Waerdt, in his article, at times seems to confuse the two, and consequently, he argues 
that the Sage will also not violate a law. But this, on my view, amounts to conceding too 
much. Accordingly, the solution offered by Vander Waerdt has to be amended. While 
Vander Waerdt is right that the Sage will not commit an injustice, he is wrong in 
assuming that the Sage will not violate a law, which seems to be the only way to make 
sense of the cryptic answer that Epicurus gives. Let us therefore turn to the importance 
of  justice for the law in question in order to understand why the Sage might violate a 
law, knowing she can escape detection. 
5.4. The Importance of a Just Law 
 On my reading, the second key factor to explaining the question of whether the 
Sage will violate a law is to refer to circumstances in which laws are just or unjust, that 
is, circumstances in which violating a law is not equivalent to committing an injustice. 
This means adding a complication to the problem: Not only are there different 
motivations why an agent can perform a just action (the fear of detection and 
punishment on the one hand or grasping that an action is beneficial on the other hand), 
but there are also different institutional configurations that result from the fact that the 
preconception (prolēpsis) of the just does or does not agree with the laws that are in 
place. In this section, I first present the view, held by Robert Philippson, that the issue of 
whether the law is just has no bearing on the question of whether the Sage will violate a 
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law. Second, I reject Philippson’s view and present the view that I endorse, namely, that 
it is of utmost importance to the Sage whether the law in question is just or unjust.  
In his article, Philippson distinguishes between two scenarios:270  
(1) The preconception of the just can agree with the things that are legislated 
(that is, the law in question is just).271  
(2) The preconception of the just can disagree with the things that are legislated 
(that is, the law in question is unjust).  
In the first case, Philippson argues that there is no reason for the Sage to be 
unjust. Since justice and laws are in agreement and the Sage is virtuous and so does 
what is just, as I have also argued in the previous section of this chapter, there is no 
reason for the Sage to do anything that is forbidden by the laws, even if she knew that 
she could do so and escape detection. The second case is thus the more interesting 
one. Here the Sage has reason to do something that is illegal, given that her allegiance 
to the preconception of justice might be thought to be greater than her allegiance to a 
law that has ceased to be just. According to Philippson, however, even in such a 
situation, the Sage would not violate a law. Like Socrates in Plato’s Crito, Philippson 
argues that the Sage will adhere to the law of the state or else (unlike Socrates) choose 
to emigrate, which he backs up by referring to a passage in Philodemus:  
Some things are just or unjust by nature and never change, others vary 
according to locality and condition. Laws which are not of this nature, but 
established for various reasons ought to be obeyed [tērein axiountas], or if 
philosophers do not think that they can live well under these laws they ought to 
leave the country. They can be social to a high degree by observing those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 1910: 302ff.  
271 See KD 37 and 38 as well as the more detailed discussion in chapter 7. 
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principles which make for likeness and not for difference; we can do this without 
being observed as well as with publicity; with pleasure and not under compulsion; 
steadily and not in an uncertain fashion.272 
  
In other words, according to Philippson’s reading, obedience of the laws is 
valuable in itself for the Epicurean Sage. 
Given what we have said so far, the obvious problem with this explanation is that 
it does not allow that the Sage would at least in some circumstances violate a law, a 
consequence that, as I pointed out above, seems to be required to make sense of 
Epicurus’ answer that “the unqualified predication is not free from difficulty.” However, 
this issue is easily addressed by slightly modifying the explanation by allowing the Sage 
to violate a law when a law has ceased to be just, as, for instance, Benedict Einarson 
and Phillip De Lacy have also suggested.273 In such a case, breaking the law seems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 “τοῖς δυν[αµένοις τὴν] φύσει δικαίου κ[αὶ ἀδίκου χ]ώ[ρ]αν ἔχειν, [ὥστ᾽ ἐν τού]τωι κατὰ µη[θὲν 
ἀλλάτ]τειν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία [τ]ὴν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τόπους καὶ περιστάσεις. Ὅσα δ᾽οὐκ 
ὄντα τοιαῦτα τεθεµάτισται παρ[ά] τισιν δι᾽ ἁσδήποτ᾽ αἰτίας, [κ]αὶ ταῦτα τηρεῖν ἀξιοῦντας ἢ 
µεταβαίνειν ἐκ τῶν τόπων, ἐὰν [µ]ὴ καλῶς ζ[ῆ]ν [οἴωνται· δύνασθαι δ᾽οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτοὺς 
ὁµιλητι]κ[ω]τά[τ]ους εἶναι καὶ τῶ[ι] µὴ τὰ διωρισµένα µόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τὴν ὁµοείδειαν αὐτοῖς 
ἔχοντα διαφυλάττειν, κἀκεῖνα µὴ µόνον συνειδότυων ἀλλὰ κἄν λανθάνωµεν ἁπαξάπαντας, καὶ 
µεθ᾽ἡδονῃς ἀλλ᾽οὐ δι᾽ἀνάγκην, καὶ βεβαίως ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σαλευοµένως.” Rhetoric I.259, col XXIV.26ff. 
Sudhaus. Trans. by Hubbell. See also the discussion of the opening sentence of this passage in 
chapter 4. The same claim (that one should obey the laws even if they are unjust) is also made 
by Perelli (1967, 196), albeit on more dubious grounds. Referring to Hermarchus (Porphyry, On 
Abstinence I.9), Perelli writes: “Pur predicando per il sapiente l’astensione dalla vita pubblica, 
Epicuro afferma l’utilità e la convenienza di ubbidire alle leggi dello stato; da Porfirio si ricava che, 
come per Socrate nel Critone, l’obbedienza è dovuta anche quando le leggi non siano guiste.” 
Note, however, that the passage in Porphyry does not discuss the obedience of an unjust law. At 
I.9, Hermarchus claims that even unintentional homicide (ton akousion phonon) was penalized by 
the first law-givers so as not to set a precedent for people to imitate such behavior unintentionally 
or negligently. (This is a strange claim; it seems rather unlikely that cases of (true) unintentional 
homicide will rise dramatically even if they are not penalized.) In Hermarchus, this act of 
legislation is, however, justified by referring to utility: It is not beneficial to a society as a whole to 
have a high number of (unintentional or intentional) homicides occurring in it. It is therefore a just 
law, not an unjust law, as Perelli claims. 
273 See the comment on p. 313, fn. b of Einarson and De Lacy’s edition of Against Colotes; see 
also Denyer 1983: 144ff. and Mitsis 1988, 90f., fn. 75. 
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unproblematic; it does not imply that the Sage also committed an injustice by violating a 
law.  
This explanation has the merit that it takes Epicurus’ reply seriously and it mainly 
differs from Philippson’s in the assessment of whether obedience of the law as such has 
value for the Epicureans. In Epicureanism, human beings obey laws insofar as they are 
beneficial (sumpheron). Accordingly, the just and, consequently, the things that have 
been legislated as just in accordance with the preconception of the just (the laws) are in 
KD 31 explicitly linked with what is beneficial. If there is no benefit to be obtained by 
obeying the law, then obeying is pointless.274 This could mean that a law is obeyed after 
all because it is better to have a law in place than to have no law at all. However, it could 
also mean that it is better for an agent to violate a law because she is focused on 
obtaining what is beneficial, not on what is just or lawful.  In the same vein, Geert 
Roskam points out that a central tenet of Epicureanism is “conditional reasoning,” that is, 
the dependence of the choice of action on whether it is conducive to benefit.275 And 
Plutarch himself, in Against Colotes, shortly after discussing Epicurus on whether the 
Sage would violate a law, quotes The Letter to Idomeneus, of which only fragments have 
survived. There, Epicurus advises “not to live in servitude to the laws and to opinions, as 
long as they refrain from making trouble in the form of a blow administered by your 
neighbor.”276 And this entails violating a law in some cases, namely, when an agent can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 ‘Benefit’ here cannot only refer to an individual benefit that an agent receives when obeying a 
law, but must also refer to the benefit of the group. Otherwise, the free rider problem arises. I 
already briefly alluded to this problem and the relationship between the benefit of individuals and 
the benefits of the group in chapter 2. 
275 See his 2007 book. 
276 µὴ νόµοις καὶ δόξαις δουλεύοντα ζῆν, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἂν µὴ τὴν διὰ τοῦ πέλας ἐκ πληγῆς ὄχλησιν 
παρασκευάζωσιν. Plutarch, Against Colotes 1127d. Trans. by Einarson and De Lacy, modified. 
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escape detection. Finally, Philodemus writes that agents should observe the laws, but 
only insofar as they do not conflict with exercising virtue: “it is necessary that all obey the 
laws and common customs as long as they do not command anything impious.”277 In 
other words, if there is a conflict between the laws and what is beneficial, an Epicurean 
agent may well do what is beneficial rather than obey the law. After all, it seems difficult 
to imagine, then, that the Epicurean agents would be forced to adhere to a law, knowing 
that the law is not beneficial and that there are no repercussions to be feared if they 
violate it.  
This brings us to the Philodemus passage that was quoted above and that 
Philippson adduces to support his view. Unfortunately, the text is very uncertain and we 
do not have any context to evaluate it. Perhaps, however, rather than being understood 
as a general statement in favor of obeying the law, it can also be understood as a 
suggestion connected to leading a life that will lead to freedom of mental distress 
(ataraxia): It is better for the Sage to obey the laws of the state or else to migrate if she 
wants to live an unperturbed life.278 If this is so, then Einarson and De Lacy’s reading 
(that a Sage will violate an unjust law) seems preferable to Philippson’s (that the Sage 
will never violate a law), especially since the passage in Plutarch seems to require a 
non-categorical answer to the question of whether the Sage would violate a law.279 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 [χρ]ὴ πάντα πείθεσ[θαι] τοῖς νόµ[οι]ς καὶ [τοῖ]ς ἐθισµοῖς ἕως [ἂν µ]ή τι τῶν ἀσεβῶν 
[προ]στάτ[τ]ωσιν. On Piety 1379ff. Obbink. Trans. mine.  
278  See Roskam 2012: 33. 
279 For additional criticism of Philippson, see Vander Waerdt 1987: 407, fn. 20. Note also that 
already Zeller (2013 [1923], III.1, 463 (448)) refers to the same passage in Philodemus as 
Philippson to back up the claim “dass man das Rechte nicht nach dem Buchstaben, sondern 
nach dem Geist der Gesetze […] tue.” 
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What might a scenario in which a Sage will violate a law look like? The best 
candidate seems be one in which there is a law that is at odds with the satisfaction of 
natural and necessary desires that Sages have.280  To be more specific is difficult, 
though, because such specificity depends on having a complete list of all desires 
Epicurus considers natural and necessary. Yet Epicurus does not provide us with such a 
list. Epicurus merely writes that “among [natural and] necessary desires, some are 
necessary for happiness, others for the freedom from bodily disturbance, yet others for 
life itself.”281 In any case, all scenarios would have to be based on this specification on 
Epicurus’ part. Perhaps an example of such a scenario would be a special situation, in 
which a Sage might decide to steal, in order to obtain food or drink to sustain herself.282 
However, even such a scenario is problematic insofar as nature is set up in such a way 
according to the Epicureans that the satisfaction of natural and necessary desires is 
always quite easy. Furthermore, as I argued at length in the previous section of this 
chapter, Epicurean agents are able to ‘scale back’ their desires to a very large extent, so 
far as to evade as much as possible to be in the position of ever not being able to satisfy 
them. It seems, therefore, that by being content, for instance, with ‘less’ and ‘simpler’ 
things (eating a ration of beans instead of a four-course meal), Epicureans are well able 
to evade being in a situation in which they would be forced to violate a law (at least in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 This is also stressed in fr. 582 Usener: “Epicurus says that he who in his opinion is wise does 
not want to commit an injustice for some profit, for he cannot have assurance that he would 
escape notice. On the condition of having assurance to escape notice, he would commit the 
injustice according to him [καὶ ὅ γε Ἐπίκουρος ἀδικεῖν ἐπὶ κέρδεῖ τινὶ <µὴ> βούλεσθαί φησι τὸν 
κατ᾽ ἀυτὸν σοφόν· πίστιν γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν οὐ δύνασθαι. ὥστε εἰ πεισθήσεται λήσειν, 
ἀδικήσει κατ᾽αὐτον.]” 
281 τῶν δ ἀναγκαίων αἱ µὲν πρὸς εὐδαµονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τοῦ τὴν σώµατος 
ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. Letter to Menoeceus 127; see also the discussion in Bollack 
1975: 113f. 
282 See Vander Waerdt 1988: 417. 
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the great majority of all cases). Be this as it may, the Epicurean answer seems to insist 
on the fact that at least in some scenarios, a Sage will be allowed to violate a law, even 
if such a case is very difficult to specify. Again, as I have argued, though, the crux of the 
Epicurean solution seems to be that in these difficult to specify case, the Sage is 
violating a law, but not committing an injustice, since the law in question has ceased to 
be just.  
5.4. Criticisms of the Solution  
In the rest of the paper, I will consider four objections to the solution I proposed 
and comment on the relationship between contractual and aretetic justice that this 
solution entails. Furthermore, I will discuss two scenarios, in which the Sage will 
supposedly violate a law, arguing that these scenarios are not good examples of 
scenarios, in which a Sage will violate a law. 
I begin with an objection that different readers of previous versions of this chapter 
have raised against my solution. It concerns the role the “knowing that she will escape 
detection”-clause plays for the solution I just outlined. After all, one might think that on 
the solution I proposed, a Sage could also violate a law knowing that she will not escape 
detection. But if this is so, then one wonders whether this is a problem for Epicurean 
view as I have presented it.  
Let me begin to address this objection by spelling it out more. Note that there are 
in reality not only the two scenarios that Philippson discussed, namely, whether the law 
in question is just or unjust, but, in fact, in each case of these scenarios, the Sage might 
or might not escape detection. This gives us a total of four scenarios:    
(1) The laws are just and the agent knows that she will not escape detection.  
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(2) The laws are just and the agent knows that she will escape detection.  
(3) The laws are unjust and the agent knows that she will not escape detection.  
(4) The laws are unjust and the agent knows that she will escape detection.  
Since I have suggested that the Sage will never commit an injustice, the first two 
scenarios can be dismissed immediately; if the Sage will never commit an injustice, she 
will a fortiori never violate a just law. In regard to the fourth scenario, I have suggested 
that the Sage will – under certain conditions – violate a law. I took this to be the case 
that explains why Epicurus claims that “the unqualified predication is not free from 
difficulty.” However, on this solution, one wonders if the Sage would also violate a law if 
she knows that she will not escape detection. If she will, then the answer I have 
proposed (namely, that the law in question is unjust) may seem to be insufficient to 
explain Epicurus’ answer; it would be unclear what function of the escape-detection-
clause has for the question that Epicurus raises. After all, in this case, Epicurus may 
have also asked whether the Sage would violate a law, leaving aside the issue of 
detection. For instance, in a society that as a whole has agreed on outlawing 
Epicureanism, is it not better for the Epicurean Sage to violate this law and risk 
detection, since there are overwhelming hedonistic reasons to practice Epicureanism 
than not do so?283  
In response to this, I think it is best to reply that the detection-clause above all 
plays a rhetorical function in Epicurus’ answer. Epicurus might have chosen to raise the 
question in a less controversial form (will the Sage violate a law, knowing she will 
escape detection) rather than in the more controversial form (will the Sage violate a law, 
even if she knows that she will not escape detection). After all, by looking at Plutarch’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 See Mitsis 1988, 90f., fn. 75. 
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reaction in Against Colotes, one can already see what controversy the former version 
stirred, so it is not difficult to imagine how Epicurus’ contemporaries would have reacted 
to the latter one. Alternatively, raising the issue of detection is an easy way to recall the 
different motivations Epicurean agents have to be just (that is, being just because 
sanction mechanisms are in place or because an agent has a virtuous character). The 
invocation of the detection-clause may thus merely echo these different motivations. In 
this case, the role of the detection clause is again mainly rhetorical. In any case, 
whatever Epicurus’ reasons may have been to include the detection clause, it seems to 
me that the Epicurean view also forces us to concede that a Sage would violate a law, 
knowing that she will not escape detection. However, I do not think that this makes the 
solution I have presented less plausible, even if it means that it follows that a Sage 
would also violate a law under some circumstances if she knew that she would not 
escape detection.   
A second objection to the solution I argued for in this chapter concerns the 
account of moral psychology that I endorsed. Raphael Woolf advances such an 
objection against Vander Waerdt’s account. And it also applies to my account insofar as 
I agree with the reading of Epicurean moral psychology that Vander Waerdt advances, 
even if I do not think that this account of moral psychology on its own can explain under 
what circumstances the Sage will violate a law. Woolf’s objection is part of a paper on 
the Ring of Gyges and is only briefly articulated in a footnote.284 Woolf claims that, on the 
Epicurean view, thinking about pain and fear causes agents to cultivate certain desires 
that lead agents not to experience pain and fear. In this vein, for instance, a Sage will 
not commit an injustice, because committing such an injustice is connected with the fear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Woolf 2013: 809f., fn. 29. 
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of being found out and the pain of potential punishments. However, if the non-detection-
clause holds, then it seems that the Sage in question will no longer experience the fear 
or the pain connected to potential punishments. She will thus no longer need to 
associate committing an injustice with fear and pain, which Woolf claims constituted the 
reason for not committing an injustice in the first place.  As a result, the Sage would now 
commit the injustice precisely because fear and pain would no longer be holding her 
back. 
In response to this objection, note first that Woolf slightly modifies the scenario in 
which the Sage is said to be able to escape detection. Whereas the Sage in the Plutarch 
passage is tempted to do a single injustice some of the time, the Sage in Woolf 
possesses the permanent capability to escape detection (as in the Ring of Gyges 
thought experiment). In other words, the case Woolf has in mind is quite different from 
the case that I discuss. Second, Woolf’s objection allows me to clarify the process by 
which the Sage comes to have knowledge of what is just. After all, as a consequence of 
the shift in focus, Woolf brings up the question of how an agent is ‘habituated’ to act. In 
order for his argument to work, Woolf seems to tacitly assume that a Sage can be 
‘dehabituated’ from being just (that the Sage can thus loose her status of being a Sage if 
certain sanction mechanisms are not in place and temptation arises). However, this 
additional assumption seems to be unwarranted, given the textual evidence.285 The 
result of being a Sage and possessing ataraxia on the Epicurean view is precisely that 
one will not be tempted to be unjust, regardless of whether certain conditions that might 
favor committing an injustice hold. Accordingly, we read in Diogenes Laertius that for the 
Epicureans, “he who has once become wise never more assumes the opposite habit, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 On the way agents learn in Epicureans, see especially Rosenbaum 1996. 
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not even in semblance, if he can help it.”286 It is therefore irrelevant whether a Sage, 
once she has truly become a Sage, is subjected to desires that she would not have 
pursued otherwise; the sudden emergence of the possibility to commit an injustice will 
not ‘dehabituate’ the Sage to commit an injustice, as Woolf seems to assume.287 
Two more objection to the solution I presented are found in David Gill. He takes a 
different strategy than Woolf, but also targets the moral psychological explanation 
advanced by Vander Waerdt (and that I also endorse) in his criticism, which is backed by 
a proposal on how to understand the relationship between contractual and aretetic 
justice. Unfortunately, Gill’s paper was never published and despite some effort I was 
not able to obtain a copy. As a result, I can only refer to the comments in Julia Annas’ 
Morality of Happiness where Gill’s critique is very briefly summarized: 
Gill […] argues that this [account of moral psychology that Vander Waerdt and I 
endorse] cannot account for (1) Epicurus’ repeated insistence on the impossibility 
of achieving complete security (cf. especially KD 34 and [GV] 7) nor for (2) the 
fact that Epicurus insists that the content of justice may vary with circumstances, 
so that the motivation to be just must be capable of explaining such differential 
behavior, whereas the lack of inappropriate desires would seem to explain the 
same behavior everywhere. Such an account, Gill argues, threatens to make the 
contractual account of justice applicable only to non-Epicureans, while good 
Epicureans will not need it; but this is difficult to reconcile with the totality of the 
evidence.288   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 τόν ἅπαξ γενόµενον σοφὀν µηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαµβάνειν διάθεσιν µηδὲ πλάττειν ἑκόντα. 
Diogenes, Lives X.117; Trans. by R.D. Hicks. 
287 Likewise, if a Sage were to commit unjust acts, she would cease being a Sage. In this case, 
there are no intrinsic reasons to be just for the ‘Sage’ (which distinguishes Sages from the non-
Sages) and this ‘Sage’ would also never be confronted with any binding legal restrictions; she 
would thus never be hindered to act unjustly in any circumstances. In this case, the ‘Sage’ would 
permanently stand outside of justice, being eager to be unjust. If she could also escape detection, 
then she would be like a god among mortal beings. Arguably such cases of great asymmetry 
between parties are no longer cases of justice proper for Epicureans. See Thrasher 2013: 429. In 
such a case, then, it seems right to concede that if someone has the permanent ability to act in 
whichever way one wants without having to fear any repercussions, this person has no incentive 
to be just. 
288  See Annas 1993a: 297, fn 31.  
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Let us comment on the two criticisms in turn. The first criticism states that the 
account of moral psychology cannot plausibly explain the impossibility of achieving 
complete security. Since this claim is not spelled out, it is unclear to me why this is so. 
After all, the account I endorsed does not need to maintain that all agents will be able to 
achieve the disposition of a Sage. In fact, throughout this inquiry, I have very much 
stressed the fact that this is not so. As a result, I think that one may very well 
acknowledge that even if Sages do not commit injustices themselves, it is still possible 
that injustices may be committed against them and so that complete security is 
impossible on the Epicurean view. 
The second criticism states that the account of moral psychology is deficient in 
assuming that the lack of certain desires explains just behavior. Since this lack would be 
the same everywhere where there is justice, the objection seems to state that the lack of 
desires merely explains why the same things would be just everywhere, but they would 
not explain why different things can be just in different circumstances. But this is 
precisely what the Epicureans claim in regard to the content of justice.  
In regard to this criticism, I think one must distinguish between what is just and 
what is beneficial, as I have in previous chapters. The lack of certain desires, then, 
explains why certain things are beneficial everywhere, but they do not explain why 
certain things are just everywhere. Justice depends on more than an objective fact about 
the world, that is, it also depends on the social act of the agreement itself, which may 
vary from place to place. In other words, while not harming and being harmed is 
beneficial everywhere due the constitution and structure of desires that agents have, it 
also depends on the particular circumstances unique to a specific community, that is, the 
132	  
	  
agreements agents will form in order to obtain what is beneficial. So while a certain set 
of behaviors may thus constitute just action in one place, another set of behaviors may 
constitute just action in another place, even if both sets of behavior are beneficial.    
Finally, I do not understand why the account of moral psychology that Vander 
Waerdt and I defend makes contractual justice apply to non-Epicurean agents. 
According to Annas, who claims to be following Gill in her account, the relationship 
between contractual and aretetic justice has to be understood as follows:289 Contractual 
justice is not merely a supplement for aretetic justice, but it is understood as its 
foundation; contractual and aretetic justice share the same conditions of development. 
The idea here is that while the reasons to be aretetically just and to be contractually just 
(that is, belief in the utility of committing a deed on the one hand and the fear of 
detection/punishment on the other hand), Epicurean agents do not need to think of the 
fear of detection/punishment every time they act. Rather, Epicurean agents are thought 
to function most efficiently if they have developed a disposition that reflects the idea that 
the content of justice is also what is most conducive to leading a happy life. However, 
again, the degree to which agents can develop this disposition, which is the virtue of 
justice, depends on contractual justice: 
[W]hen these conditions [of contractual justice] are fulfilled, individuals can 
develop justice and the other virtues that people need in order rightly to direct 
their lives towards achieving ataraxia. Where the conditions of justice are not 
fulfilled, people are motivated to just behavior solely by fear of punishment; but 
where they are fulfilled, people are motivated to be just solely by the desire to 
achieve tranquility. Justice can be the virtue Epicurus wants it to be only in a 
society where the conditions of the contract hold; but this is not what the 
Epicurean bears in mind when she is just.290  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Annas 1993a: 298ff. 
290 Ibid., 298f. 
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This basic picture of the relationship between contractual and aretetic justice, 
according to this view, then, is that the latter is nested in the former. The social contract 
human beings form with each other, that is, that people are just because of the 
agreements they form, is the basis for the development of a virtue, aretetic justice. And 
while people form agreements with the goal of achieving ataraxia (freedom from mental 
distress), they need constant reminders (in the form of sanction mechanisms) in order to 
be kept on track. However, in any given situation, agents can – so to say – ‘choose’ 
(dependent on the amount of virtue they possess) whether to act justly by themselves or 
whether they are only just because of the sanction mechanisms that are in place (at 
least in a less than perfectly just society where agents are tempted to commit unjust 
deeds). 
Now, it is important to point out that ‘contractual justice’ here is ambiguous. It can 
refer both to the agreements that lead to justice but it can also refer to the agreements 
that lead to the laws. As I have already explained above, the laws in Epicurean theory 
are indeed superfluous when it comes to helping Sages act justly. After all, a Sage will 
pursue what is just regardless of whether there are laws in place or not. In this way, 
contractual justice really is irrelevant for Sages. But the same cannot be said about 
agreements. After all, not everything that is beneficial is also just, but only those 
beneficial things that have been agreed upon are. Arguably, then, agreements play a 
major role for Sages and so contractual justice, understood as the agreements agents 
form with each other is far from being irrelevant for Sages. In this context, consider also 
the ‘Golden Age’ fragment of Diogenes Oenoanda. It claims that in a certain state 
“everything will be full of justice and mutual friendship, and there will come to be no need 
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of city-walls or laws and all the things we manufacture on account of each other.”291 
Unfortunately, the context of this fragment is unclear and so it might also introduce a 
hypothetical scenario that is then ultimately dismissed as unrealistic.292 It is, however, 
tempting to see it as the description of an established community of Sages. In any case, 
the text claims that in a perfectly just society laws are not needed to motivate agents to 
act justly.293 However, the passage does not mention that there are no agreements in 
such a community. The point seems to be that such a community does not have any 
need for the sanction mechanisms that are characteristic of the laws. But again, this 
does not imply that agreements in such a community are not needed.294 As I have 
suggested, they might still fulfill the function of specifying what is actually just in the 
given society, since justice is more than what is beneficial, an objective fact about the 
world, and also involves a component of agreement that varies from place to place. 
In short, then, it seems to me that the model of moral psychology that Vander 
Waerdt and I endorse is compatible with the reading of the relationship of contractual 
and aretetic justice that Gill and Annas advance, and Gill’s criticisms fail to present a 
challenge to the reading that I have advanced here.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Δικαιοσύνης γὰρ ἔσται µεστὰ πάντα καὶ φιλαλληλίας, καὶ οὐ γενήσεται τειχῶν ἢ νόµων χρεία 
καὶ πάντων ὅσα δι᾽ἀλλήλους σκευωρούµεθα. Fr. 56 Smith; Trans. by Smith; see also Barrigazzi 
1978: 12ff. 
292 See Roskam 2007: 131ff. 
293 See Müller 1991: 128. 
294 O’Keefe points out that if one may imagine communities in which there are no agreements, it 
is difficult to specify what acting justly consists in these communities, especially since justice is 
also in part dependent on the particularities of a place (2001a: 135). As is clear from what follows, 
I do not think that the antecedent of the conditional holds and pace O’Keefe, one must distinguish 
between (1) justice that is based on agreements and leads to moral norms and (2) the laws, and 
does not acknowledge that ideally the content of both the laws and justice as a virtue is based on 
the agreements that different members of society have formed with each other. 
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To conclude this chapter, let me address two scenarios, in which it has been 
alleged that a Sage would violate a law (to save a friend and to murder an enemy). 
These discussions will allow us to clarify some more details in regard to the proposed 
solution.  
Gerhard Seel suggests that a Sage would violate a law to save a friend.295 He 
gives no further argument for the plausibility of this scenario. The same is also true for 
Roskam,296 who rejects the possibility that a Sage would save the friend in such 
circumstances. There are, however, at least some passages in the Epicurean corpus 
that support the idea that the Epicurean Sage would do far-reaching things to benefit her 
friend.297 And so, it seems prima facie plausible that this might also include violating a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Seel 1996. Without engaging with previous scholarship, Seel also offers a competing 
explanation of the question of whether the Sage would violate a law if she knew she could escape 
detection. He frames the question as a conflict between the claim that the Sage never does 
anything that the laws prohibit and the claim that the Sage in certain circumstances does 
something that the laws prohibit. And he furthermore sees this conflict is expressed as a 
contradiction between two Principal Maxims. On the one hand, KD 34, according to Seel, 
“sembra affermare che, oltre alla paura di essere scoperto dalle autorità competenti, non esista 
nessun’ altra consequenza negativa alla trasgressione della legge.” Ibid., 344. On the other hand, 
KD 5 argues that the life of pleasure is the sufficient condition for the just life, which means that 
the Sage will be just regardless of whether negative consequences are attached to transgressing 
a law. In what follows, Seel then argues that KD 34 is written from the perspective of the non-
Sage, whereas KD 5 is written from the perspective of the Sage. And he claims that this means 
that most people will need coercion and the fear of being detected to obey the law, but that the 
Sage will obey the content of the law willingly, without needing fear associated with the sanction 
mechanisms that are in place to guide her. Consequently, the conflict is solved, because KD 34 
no longer provides a basis for committing injustices. There is a second motivation for the Sage to 
act justly, namely, the understanding of what it means to be beneficial. Seel’s proposal is largely 
in line with what I have outlined in this chapter, especially since Seel argues that the Sage will 
actually break a law. However, the problem with Seel’s approach is that given the dogmatic 
character of the Kuriai Doxai, the assumption that different Kuriai Doxai are articulated from 
different perspectives is rather unlikely. (Thanks to Andreas Kamp for this suggestion.)   
296 Roskam 2012: 35. 
297 The most important piece of evidence in support of such a view seems to be Diogenes 
Laertius, Lives 121b: “sometimes [the Sage] will die for a friend [ὑπὲρ φίλου ποτὲ τεθνήξεσθαι].” 
This arguably may also entail transgressing a law, although this is not explicitly stated in the text 
and does not seem to be required for the Sage if he dies for a friend. Note here that much 
depends on the word ‘pote’ (‘sometimes’ or ‘at some point in time’), which seems to mirror the 
same indeterminacy that Epicurus expresses in the Plutarch passage. Next, in support of the 
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law. Yet the fundamental problem with this suggestion is that it stipulates that a Sage will 
be required to help a friend because this is the just thing to do. But this need not be the 
case. On the most basic understanding of the Epicurean view, justice consists only in an 
agreement to refrain from harming others, not in the duty of beneficence towards them. 
In other words, then, helping a friend may not be a requirement of justice for the 
Epicureans. An interesting case, however, would be one in which a Sage scarifies 
himself for a friend vis-à-vis a potential harm from a third party, for instance, a Sage who 
sacrifices her own life when a wild animal attacks so that her friend can escape. 
However, again, even if a Sage decides to die in such a scenario, it is unclear whether 
this is really a requirement of justice on the Epicurean view or may above all be 
prompted by the fact that nothing can harm the Sage who, according to the Epicureans, 
will even be happy on the rack.298 Consequently, it is unclear whether the Sage will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
view, there is also GV 56-57: “If the Sage is tortured, he feels the same pain as if his friend were 
tortured, and he would die for him. For if he betrays the friend, his whole life will be demolished 
because of this treachery and it will be upset [Ἀλγεῖ µὲν ὁ σοφὸς οὐ µᾶλλον στρεβλούµενος <ἢ 
στρεβλουµένου τοῦ φίλου, καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τεθνήξεται· εἰ γὰρ προήσεται> τὸν φίλον ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ 
πᾶς δι' ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ ἀνακεχαιτισµένος ἔσται].” The main problem with this passage, 
however, is that half of the text is supplied by an editor, Ettore Bignone. And likewise, while at 
Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.120, we read that an Epicurean Sage “will never give up a friend 
[φίλον τε οὐδένα προήσεσθαι],” it is first not quite clear what ‘giving up’ entails, that is, how far the 
allegiance to a friend extends. And second, the manuscript does not contain the word ‘give up 
[proēsethai]’ at all, which is the correction proposed by Bignone, but rather ‘acquire [ktēsesthai]’, 
which gives the sentence a quite different meaning.  
298 Diogenes, Lives X.118; see also the discussion in Rosenbaum 1987. There is also some 
evidence that suggests that a Sage might not in the end be very rattled by what happens to a 
friend. In this vein, GV 66 advocates for the right attitude towards one’s friends: “Let us show 
sympathy for friends not by lamenting but by having them in mind [συµπαθῶµεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ 
θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες].” Trans. mine. It is not clear to me whether the passage means 
that the Epicurean should merely “have his friends in mind” (as I translated above) and thus react 
calmly to bad news from his friends (rather than lament) or whether the Epicurean agent should 
adopt a mindful attitude (‘mind’ his friends) in a time when hardship has fallen upon them (rather 
than just lament their fate). For the first reading, see Packer Porter 1938: 100. For the second 
reading, see Nickel 2003: 273. In this context, see also fr. 213 Usener: “Sweet is the memory of a 
dead friend [ἡδὺ ἡ φίλου µνήµη τεθνηκότος].” Trans. mine. Furthermore, while friends in general 
are conducive to the Sage’s ataraxia, it seems difficult to argue that having a specific person as 
one’s friend will also be conducive to one’s ataraxia. This would be like arguing for natural and 
unnecessary desires, instead of natural and necessary desires. Philological issues aside, this still 
137	  
	  
violate a law for a friend, unless it can be unambiguously shown that acting justly also 
entails having a specific relationship towards one’s friends. 
 This brings us to Roskam’s suggestion that a Sage will violate a law to murder an 
enemy. In his paper, Roskam gives the example of Epicurus killing Timocrates.299 
Timocrates was a member of the Epicurean school and the brother of Metrodorus. Other 
than Metrodorus, who became one of Epicurus’ most faithful and most promising 
disciples, Timocrates left the Epicurean school and used his insider knowledge to start a 
campaign against his former colleagues, consisting of both theoretical refutations of 
Epicurean arguments and of nasty personal attacks on Epicurus.300 For all we know, 
Epicurus dealt with this annoying situation in a composed manner: He himself engaged 
with Timocrates’ arguments and ordered his disciples to do so as well.301 In any case, 
though, Roskam argues that it is fair to suppose that the apostate Timocrates was a 
great nuisance to Epicurus, one that greatly disturbed his ataraxia. Now, if Epicurus who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
leaves GV 56-57 and the claim that the Sage’s ataraxia might be seriously perturbed by the loss 
of a close friend and this might mean that the Sage will no longer be able to lead an undisturbed 
life. However, this seems difficult given Epicurean theory on the whole: Epicurus usually argues 
for the easiest possible way to satisfy one’s desires and it seems that a Sage should be aware of 
the fact that emotional bonds that are too strong will not be conducive to her ataraxia. In any 
event, the understanding of the state of ataraxia that is required to give credence to GV 56-57 
makes ataraxia appear to be a very volatile state. If a loss of a dear friend means the loss of 
ataraxia for life, then this again portrays ataraxia as a state that is capable of quantification, a 
view against which I argued above. It seems more likely, then, that the Epicurean Sage will again 
rely on conditional reasoning to determine whether she will actually help a friend. 
299 Roskam 2012: 37ff. 
300 Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.6. 
301 Ibid. X.23, X.28, X.117, Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I.93, and Plutarch, Against Colotes 
1126c. 
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himself was a Sage-like or even divine figure302 had known that he could have escaped 
punishment, would he have killed Timocrates? 
 Roskam answers in the affirmative, laying out four conditions the Sage will have 
to fulfill in order to perform such a deed. First, according to Roskam, the Sage will not 
act out of emotion. Second, the Sage will probably derive no pleasure from the killing 
itself. Third, the murder has to serve the interests of the Garden and not be based on 
empty desires. And four, it has to be certain that the Sage’s ataraxia is not disturbed by 
this act. “In short, if Epicurus decided to kill Timocrates, he would do so in cold blood, in 
a premeditated way, and without the slightest remorse post factum.”303  
Roskam is certainly right that for the Epicureans even murder would in principle 
be subject to the same conditional reasoning that all acts are subject to according to 
Epicurean theory. Pace Roskam, however, it seems that there is no good reason for the 
Epicurean Sage to murder anyone. One can easily explain how any agent would be 
willing to murder someone on the basis of non-natural desires, like the desire for fame 
and power. Yet a Sage will not have such desires and only cultivates natural and 
necessary ones. Nature, in turn, is set up in such a way that the satisfaction of these 
desires is easy; in fact, it seems possible without harming others, which is precisely what 
being just consists in. As a result, it is difficult to see what a scenario would look like in 
which a Sage would want to murder someone. Being greatly troubled by Timocrates’ 
smear campaign hardly fits the bill. Diogenes Laertius even explicitly writes: “Injuries are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 This is attested by Lucretius who explicitly claims that Epicurus was a god. On the Nature of 
Things V.8. and it is also corroborated by the anecdote that Colotes, during one of Epicurus’ 
lectures, fell down on his knees and showed his reverence to the god-like Garden philosopher. 
Epicurus allegedly mirrored the gesture. Plutarch, Against Colotes 1117b f. = fr. 141 Usener.  
303 Roskam 2012: 38. Emphasis in original.   
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done by men either through hate or through envy or through contempt, all of which the 
Sage overcomes by reasoning.”304 Roskam’s reading, then, ascribes Epicurus a far more 
simple theory of moral reasoning than he in fact held. 
5.5. Summary 
 In this chapter, I discussed a challenge to Epicurean justice: “Would the 
Epicurean Sage violate a law if she knew she could escape detection?” Thereby, I also 
discussed the motivations Epicurean agents have to be just and the relationship 
between aretetic and contractual justice. I argued that generally aretetic and contractual 
justice operate in different spheres and have different addressees, but that the two 
spheres overlap insofar as the content of the agreements that lead to morality both 
(ideally) determine the law (if it is just) and justice understood as a virtue. I therefore 
argued the Epicurean Sage will violate a law in circumstances in which she cannot fulfill 
her natural and necessary desires – even if these situations are rare and difficult to 
specify, as discussions of Roskam’s and Seel’s suggested scenarios showed. I argued 
that in such situations laws will be unjust and so that whenever the Sage violates a law 
she will not commit an injustice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Βλάβας ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἢ διὰ µῖσος ἢ διὰ φθόνον ἤ διὰ καταφρόνησιν γίνεσθαι, ὧν τὸν σοφὸν 
λογισµῷ περιγίνεσθαι. Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.117. Trans. by Bailey. 
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6. THE METAPHYSICS OF EPICUREAN JUSTICE 
Having laid out the basic Epicurean view of justice and law and having discussed 
moral-psychological issues in regard to the Epicurean theory as well as the relationship 
between contractual and aretetic justice in previous chapters, I will now turn to 
metaphysical issues. By discussing the metaphysics of justice, that is, of both 
contractual and aretetic justice, my aim is not to make the Epicureans into something 
they were not, namely, metaphysicians, but rather to contribute further to our 
understanding of Epicurean justice by also discussing justice from the perspective of 
Epicurean metaphysics.305 Furthermore, this chapter can be understood as an 
addendum to the naturalism discussion in chapter 4 and it will help set up my comments 
about how agents come to have an understanding of justice in chapter 7.  
In what follows, I will focus on KD 33 and the claim that there is no justice in itself 
(kath’ heauto). More precisely, I will argue that this implies that justice is conceived of as 
a kind of accidental property (sumptōma) for the Epicureans. In doing so, I will explain in 
what way KD 33 entails a critique of Platonic metaphysics. Pace scholars who assume 
that KD 33 is a direct denial of the existence of Platonic Forms, I will show that Platonic 
ideas are only indirectly criticized in this maxim; moreover, I will argue that the critique of 
Plato is only intelligible when close attention is paid to Platonic and Hellenistic technical 
vocabulary. 
The most concise statement of what Epicurean justice is from a metaphysical 
perspective is found in KD 33: “There is never any justice in itself [kath’ heauto 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 For the view that the Epicureans reject all metaphysics in their theory, see, for instance, 
Goldschmidt 1977: 248 (followed by Müller 1983: 182, fn. 73). 
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dikaiosunē], but a kind of agreement [sunthēkē tis] over not harming and being harmed 
in the dealings with each other in any place whatever at any time whatever.”306 
Unfortunately, this maxim by itself is rather cryptic and some set up is required to spell 
out what this exactly means. A good starting point is to identify a potential target of the 
maxim. Several commentators have proposed that it is Plato’s conception of justice, 
although the suggestion is usually not explained in greater detail.307 Prima facie, this 
suggestion seems to be motivated by Plato’s critique of Sophistic contractual theories of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 οὐκ ἦν τι καθ᾽ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς µετ᾽ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ᾽ ὁπηλίκους δή 
ποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ µὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλαπτεσθαι. A careful reader of the maxim 
may be quite surprised to read that Epicurus mentions dikaiosunē, that is, justice as a virtue, 
here. After all, in chapter 4, I argued that Epicurus distinguishes between justice as a virtue 
(aretetic justice) and justice as an agreement (contractual justice). If this distinction is correct, 
Epicurus claims in KD 33 that there is no aretetic justice ‘in itself’ and that instead, there are only 
agreements (that is, contractual justice) in different places and at different times. Yet given that 
the second part of the maxim (the part that follows after the comma) positively states that justice 
is “a kind of agreement,” one would have perhaps expected a different claim: that there is no 
contractual justice (to dikaion) ‘in itself’ and that there are only agreements in different places and 
at different times. After all, if KD 33 had read that there is no contractual justice in itself (kath’ 
heauto dikaion), contractual justice in itself would have been contrasted with contractual justice 
as it is found in different places and at different times. However, this is not what KD 33 claims. It 
claims that there is no aretetic justice in itself, but that there are only agreements in the world. 
This is more difficult to understand. However, as I argued in chapter 4, the existence and content 
of aretetic justice also depends on the existence and content of the contractual justice 
(understood as the agreements that lead to the determination of what is just in a given 
community): Only if there are or have been agreements, will contractual justice (to dikaion) have 
content. And, in turn, only if contractual justice has content will aretetic justice (hē dikaiosunē) 
have content, since it also depends on the agreements that are being formed among human 
beings. In short, then, I take that KD 33 expresses this admittedly more difficult idea and that 
what may strike the reader as odd can be explained in terms of the relationship between aretetic 
and contractual justice. 
307 See, for instance, Philippson 1910: 293, Müller 1972: 104f., and Long and Sedley 1987: II.130 
pace Alberti 1995: 181 (who denies the target is Plato and claims that the reference is to 
Epicurean ontology; it is unclear, however, why KD 33 can not be both anti-Platonic and entail a 
reference to Epicurean ontology, as already Bignone claimed in his edition of Epicurus’ texts 
(66f., fn. 4)). Goldschmidt 1977: 72f. attempts to provide a more detailed explanation, but fails to 
see that this passage needs to be situated in the debate about the Aristotelian categories and 
that the maxim implies that justice exists as an accidental property on the Epicurean view. The 
same is true for Bailey in his edition of Epicurus’ works (369) who gets the overall metaphysical 
implications of the maxim for the ontological status of justice right, even if he strangely refers to 
justice as a sumbebēkos rather than a sumptōma (more on this distinction below). 
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justice in Republic II, that is, theories, which the Epicureans revive in their writings,308 
and by the occurrence of the word ‘dikaiosunē,’ which is an important term throughout 
the Republic.309  
While I agree with the overall assessment that Epicurus’ metaphysical 
conception of justice entails a metaphysical critique of the Platonic conception, I will 
show in this chapter that scholars have too readily drawn the conclusion that the 
passage is a direct criticism of Platonic views. On my reading, the criticism of Plato is 
indirect at best. I will therefore spell out in more detail the metaphysical critique of 
Platonic justice that follows from KD 33 by paying close attention to the usage of the 
term ‘kath’ heauto.’ If one does so, I will claim, KD 33 can be shown to state that justice 
is conceived of as an accidental property (sumptōma) and that this understanding of 
justice also entails a metaphysical critique of Plato as well as other rival schools.  
6.1. The Platonic View: Justice as a Form 
In order to explain the admittedly complicated and roundabout metaphysical 
critique of KD 33, let us begin with Plato’s view. It is first interesting to note that a corpus 
search of Plato’s works shows that Plato does not use the language of KD 33: ‘kath’ 
heauto’ is never used in conjunction with ‘dikaiosunē’ as one would expect if the maxim 
were a simple echo of a Platonic text. Furthermore, ‘kath’ heauto’ is only used three 
times total in the Platonic corpus and one of these usages is even in the Definitions, 
which are generally considered to be spurious.310 Nevertheless, Plato comes close to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 See, for instance, Müller 1972: 45ff. as well as my comments in chapter 1. 
309 That ‘dikaiosunē’ refers to justice, understood as a virtue, is left aside on this reading. 
310 See Statesman 273e, Parmenides 158d, and Definitions 412d. Charmides 158d and 
Definitions 414d have ‘kath’ heautou’, but of ‘kata’ plus the genitive of ‘heauto’ is altogether 
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asserting that justice is in itself, when he maintains elsewhere that justice exists ‘auto 
kath’ auto’ (itself in itself) or refers to justice ‘auto’ (itself).311 By using the words ‘auto 
kath’ auto’ and ‘auto,’ Plato famously signals that he is referring to the ‘Form (eidos)’ of 
justice. A Form, in turn, is a special metaphysical entity in Platonism, one that is 
characterized as not being located in time or space. Justice, so conceived, is an abstract 
entity,312 one that exists independently of just things in the world (sensible particulars), 
which are concrete and, as part of the spatiotemporal realm, exist in a radically different 
way than Forms do. 
That justice, understood as a Form, is an abstract entity is the first claim that the 
Epicureans will take issue with in their critique of KD 33. The two others claims are that 
justice as a Form is a universal and that justice is among the most basic entities in the 
ontological schema. I take these claims to be also characteristic of the Platonic theory of 
Forms, although I am aware that any claim one might make about Platonic theory is 
bound to be controversial, since the details of Plato’s theory of Forms (especially the 
exact relationship between Forms and sensible particulars) are difficult to specify and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
different in meaning and so can be bracketed here. The three occurrences in Plato contrast with 
ten in Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus 57, 67, 68, and 71, Letter to Pythocles 90, KD 8, 33, and 34, 
and fr. 26.41 and 37.38 Arrighetti). Not all these passages use ‘kath’ heauto’ in the technical 
sense I am about to discuss, but this simple corpus search already foreshadows the conclusion 
for which I am arguing here, namely, that the term ‘kath’ heauto’ is more widely used in Epicurus 
and therefore of a different significance than it is in Plato. 
311 See, for instance, Symposium 211b. Plato also uses ‘auto’ to refer to the existence of the 
Form of justice (Republic 612b; see also ibid., 435b). I bracket the problem of what the 
relationship between the Form of the dikaion and the Form of diakiosunē in Plato is (for the 
former, see Parmenides 130b). 
312 See, for instance, Symposium 211a ff. Sometimes causal inertness also is taken to be part of 
what it means to be an abstract object. Since Forms may be thought to be causally efficacious in 
some way on Plato’s theory, I take abstract objects in this context to be objects that are merely 
outside of space and time, and I leave aside the problem of causal efficacy. On the meaning of 
auto kath’ auto and kath’ heauto, etc., see Ademollo 2014: 47ff. and especially Bronowski 2014: 
263. 
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have prompted scholars to give a variety of different readings. Nevertheless let me 
comment on the second and third claims I just mentioned.  
In regard to the second claim (that justice, as a Form, is a universal), note that 
there do not seem to be Forms for all kinds of sensible particulars on the Platonic 
view.313 This means that although the theory of Forms resembles a theory of universals, 
it is controversial whether it actually amounts to such a theory.314 But even if there are 
certain problematic cases, justice, on the Platonic view, is not one of them. As a result, 
the Platonic claim that justice is a Form carries an allusion to the problem of universals 
and so a stance on the relationship and status of the type justice vis-à-vis tokens of the 
type (that is, sensible particulars), even if the theory of Forms on the whole does not 
amount to a theory of universals.315 Insofar as the Epicureans give a different answer to 
the problem of universals, this different answer can then be seen as a critique of Platonic 
theory. 
Finally, the third claim that is entailed by the Platonic theory of Forms and the 
Epicureans will take issue with is the claim that the Form of Justice is among the most 
fundamental entities in the ontological schema. On the Platonic view, sensible 
particulars are said to participate (methechein) in or have (exein) a Form.316 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 In this context, compare Socrates’ statement that there are no Forms of hair, mud, and dirt at 
Parmenides 130c f. 
314 This problem in regard to the Forms is also known as the one-over-many problem, best 
exemplified at Republic 596a: “[W]e customarily hypothesize a single Form in connection with 
each of the many things to which we apply the same name [εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαµεν 
τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνοµα ἐπιφέροµεν].” Trans. by Grube/Reeve. For 
critical discussion, see Sedley 2014. 
315 For discussion of the type token-distinction in regard to Forms, see Mourelatos 2006: 61f. 
316 See, for instance, Symposium 211b, Phaedo 102b f., and Republic 476d. 
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Unfortunately, it is unclear what this exactly means. However, it is clear that this implies 
that Forms and sensible particulars are distinct entities and that Forms are more 
ontologically fundamental than sensible particulars. In fact, on this view, the Forms are 
the most real, most basic, and most fundamental ontological entity in the ontological 
schema,317 while sensible particulars exist in a different way, being subjected to 
becoming (that is, are and are not) and in some way ontologically dependent on 
Forms.318 Put differently, in stating that justice is a Form and observed in sensible 
particulars, Plato also implies that justice as a Form is basic, while justice as a sensible 
particular is not.319 
6.2. The Epicurean Metaphysical Critique of Platonic Justice and Justice as a 
Property 
 
After laying out the Platonic view, I will now return to the Epicureans. I will show 
that in maintaining that justice does not exist in itself (kath’ heauto), the Epicureans take 
issue with all three Platonic claims I just identified. For the Epicureans, (1) justice is not 
an abstract entity, (2) justice is not a universal in the way that the Form of justice could 
be said to be a universal,320 and (3) justice in no way is the most real, most basic, and 
most fundamental entity in the ontological schema. I will argue that the Epicurean claim 
that justice does not exist kath’ heauto means that justice does not exist as a substance 
and so that KD 33 is advanced with specific metaphysical assumptions that are part of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Accordingly, at Phaedrus 247c, a Form is an “ousia ontos ousa.” The doctrine of participation 
(methexis) is discussed, for instance, at Phaedo 74a ff. and 103a ff.  
318 See, for instance, Republic 475e ff. 
319 Note, though, that it is generally thought that on the Platonic view there may be the Form of 
justice without sensible particulars that instantiate the Form, but there are no just things without 
there also being a Form of justice. 
320 Again, insofar as Plato really offers a theory of universals by advancing the theory of Forms.  
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the Epicurean ontological schema. In other words, I will show that the Epicurean claim 
that justice does not exist kath’ heauto entails that it also does not exist auto or auto 
kath’ auto, but that KD 33 is not a straightforward negation of a Platonic claim. The 
critique of Plato’s view in KD 33 is more sophisticated than commentators usually seem 
to think. 
I begin with some historical context. I have already noted that the expression 
‘kath’ heauto’ hardly occurs in Plato, and in fact, when one examines the three passages 
that I cited above in more detail, it is clear that the word is not used as a technical term 
anywhere.321 The origin of ‘kath’ heauto’ as a technical term must therefore lie 
elsewhere. I will suggest that its origin lies in Aristotle’s Categories (even if the term itself 
is not used in this work).322 Furthermore, I will argue that the expression ‘kath’ heauto’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Statesman 273d f. (the context is the myth of Cronus): “It is for this reason that the god who 
ordered it, seeing it in difficulties, and concerned that it should not, storm-tossed as it is, be 
broken apart in confusion and sink into the boundless sea of unlikeness, takes his position again 
at its steering-oars, and having turned round what has become diseased and been broken apart 
in the previous rotation, when the world was left to itself, orders it and by setting it straight renders 
it immortal and ageless [διὸ δὴ καὶ τότ' ἤδη θεὸς ὁ κοσµήσας αὐτόν, καθορῶν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα, 
κηδόµενος ἵνα µὴ χειµασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνοµοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα 
πόντον δύῃ, πάλιν ἔφεδρος αὐτοῦ τῶν πηδαλίων γιγνόµενος, τὰ νοσήσαντα καὶ λυθέντα ἐν τῇ 
καθ' ἑαυτὸν προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ στρέψας, κοσµεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρων 
ἀπεργάζεται].” Trans. by Rowe. Parmenides 158d (the context is the third deduction): 
“Accordingly, it follows for things other than the one that from the one and themselves gaining 
communion with each other, as it seems, something different comes to be in them, which affords 
a limit for them in relation to each other; but by their own nature, by themselves, affords 
unlimitedness [Τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἑνὸς συµβαίνει ἐκ µὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, 
ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἡ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις 
καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν].” Trans. by Gill and Ryan. Definitions 412d: “Freedom: being in control of 
one’s life; having sole authority in all respects; power to do what one likes in life; being unsparing 
in using and possessing property [Ἐλευθερία ἡγεµονία βίου· αὐτοκράτεια ἐπὶ παντί· ἐξουσία τοῦ 
καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν βίῳ· ἀφειδία ἐν χρήσει καὶ ἐν κτήσει οὐσίας].” Trans. by Hutchinson. 
322 See also the important discussion of relatives in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (V.15.1020b25ff.). 
While the Magna Moralia also contains a passage that at first sight might be thought to discuss 
the discussion of justice kath’ heauto in relation to justice pros ti (I.33.3.1ff.), it does not seem to 
me that the terms ‘kath’ heauto’ and ‘pros ti’ (or more precisely ‘pros heteron’) are used in the 
same way that they are used in Epicurus or the other Hellenistic texts I discuss in more detail. 
Another important text for the origin of the term ‘kath’ heauto’ is Plato’s Sophist 255c ff. See 
especially the discussion in Dancy 1999. Verde 2010: 198 rightly connects the discussion of the 
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specifically refers to the independent existence of substances, which is taken to contrast 
with the dependent existence of properties. In the Categories, Aristotle famously 
distinguishes between the ten highest genera, substance (ousia) on the one hand and 
nine kinds of properties on the other hand.323 Already in antiquity, this classification of 
the highest genera was contested, though. It was thought, for instance, that Aristotle’s 
schema was not parsimonious enough, and that it could be simplified to comprise only 
two categories: substance and properties. The latter were usually glossed as something 
that exists relative to something else (pros ti), taking one of the nine property-categories 
as sufficient to sum up all others, and the former as something that can exist in itself 
(kath’ auto, not yet ‘kath heauto’). Accordingly, Simplicius reports: “others criticize the 
excess [in the number of Aristotelian genera] in another way. For the followers of 
Xenocrates and Andronicus think that everything is included in [the genera] ‘in itself’ 
[kath’ auto] and ‘relative to something’ [pros ti] so that according to them such an 
abundance in genera is superfluous.”324 From this simplification, it is then only a small 
step to existence kath’ heauto (that is, of using the reflexive instead of the non-reflective 
pronoun). This becomes clear when one takes a closer look at a treatise called 
Aristotle’s Divisions (Divisiones Aristotelae), a text that received its name in virtue of 
Diogenes Laertius’ report that Aristotle ascribed a certain set of distinctions to Plato.325 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Epicurean ontological schema with the discussion on the Categories that must have taken place 
in the Academy and Peripatos, although his comments are rather brief.    
323 Aristotle, Categories 1b25ff. 
324 ἀλλοι δὲ κατ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον αἰτιῶνται τὴν περιττότητα. οἱ γὰρ περὶ Χενοκράτη καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον 
πάντα τῷ καθ᾽αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ πρός τι περιλαµβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὥστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ᾽αὐτοὺς τὸ 
τοσοῦτον τῶν γενῶν πλῆθος]” (Xenocrates, fr. 15 Isnardi Parente and Dorandi = In Aristotelis 
Categorias 63.22-25 Kalbfleisch; see also Moraux 1973: 103. 
325 Lives III.80. On the history of this text, see Moraux 1977, Dorandi 1996, the comments in the 
introduction of Rossitto’s 1984 edition as well as the discussions of authors by the Tübingen 
School in Krämer 1959: 279ff. and Gaiser 1963: 80f. and 178f. 
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Scholars today universally think that Diogenes report is not to be trusted; the text was 
probably written some time after Aristotle’s death by an unknown author working in the 
Academy or Peripatos. Be this as it may, particularly interesting in the present context is 
the distinction that concerns different kinds of beings. According to this distinction, the 
realm of beings is divided into beings that exist in themselves (now finally: kath’ heauto) 
and beings that exist relative to something else (pros ti).326 The former are roughly what 
would qualify as substances in antiquity, for instance, human beings and gold,327 while 
the latter are what would qualify as properties, for instance, size, beauty, or speed. Put 
differently, then, this pseudo-Aristotelian distinction of beings is clearly another example 
for how the ten categories were simplified to two, namely, substances and properties. In 
claiming that justice is not kath’ heauto, I thus suggest that the Epicureans are not 
straightforwardly denying a Platonic claim, but rather following the tradition of simplifying 
the Aristotelian categorical schema, as exemplified by Simplicius’ report and the pseudo-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 “Of existing things some are in themselves and some are said relative to something. Things 
said to exist in themselves are those which need nothing in the interpretation, as man, horse, and 
all other animals. For none of these gains by interpretation. To those which are called relative 
belong all which stand in need of some interpretation, as that which is greater than something or 
quicker than something, or more beautiful and the like. For the greater implies a less, and the 
quicker is quicker than something [Τῶν ὄντων τὰ µέν ἐστι καθ᾽ ἑαυτά, τά δὲ πρός τι λέγεται. τὰ 
µὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ λεγόµενά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐν τῇ ἑρµηνείᾳ µηδενὸς προσδεῖται· ταῦτα δ᾽ ἂν εἴη οἷον 
ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα. τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν δι᾽ ἑρµηνείας χωρεῖ. τῶν δὲ πρός τι 
λεγοµένων ὅσα προσδεῖταί τινος ἑρµηνείας, οἷον τὸ µεῖζόν τινος καὶ τὸ θᾶττόν τινος καὶ τὸ κάλλιον 
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· τό τε γὰρ µεῖζον ἐλάττονός ἐστι µεῖζον καὶ τὸ θᾶττόν τινός ἐστι <θᾶττον>].” 
Diogenes Laertius, Lives, III.108f. Trans. by Hicks, modified. “Of the things that are some are in 
themselves, others in relation to something else. The former are the same in themselves, for 
instance, human being, house, coat, gold and everything that is without qualification, not by virtue 
of something else being necessarily. Those that are in relation to something are the following: the 
double and knowledge, for the double is said in relation to the half and knowledge in relation to 
something else [Τῶν ὄντων τὰ µὲν αὐτὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ πρός τι. Αὐτα µὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ 
ταῦτα ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος οἰκία ἱµάτιον χρυσίον καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἁπλῶς, µὴ τῷ ἕτερόν τι εἶναι ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τὰ δὲ πρός τι τοιαῦτα ἐστὶν οἶον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήµη· τό τε γὰρ διπλάσιον 
πρός τὸ ἥµισυ λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήµη πρὸς ἄλλο τι].” Aristotle’s Divisions 39bff. Mutschmann. 
Trans. mine. 
327 The text also mentions artifacts such as houses and coats, which are not substances on the 
Aristotelian view. I take it that this move is another modification of Aristotelian theory and confirms 
that the text cannot be a genuine work by Aristotle. 
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Aristotelian Divisions. Of course, it is impossible to know whether the Epicureans had 
direct access to the Divisions, but the suggestion gains a little more likelihood by the 
rather curious fact that Epicurus may have taken courses with Xenocrates, one of the 
two simplifiers of the Aristotelian schema identified above.328 Be this as it may, it seems 
possible that the distinction between existence kath’ heauto and pros ti was already 
established when Epicurus founded his school and that it may have been quite easy for 
him to pick it up. 
Having commented on the evolution of the term ‘kath’ heauto,’ let us next turn to 
its specific usage of ‘kath’ heauto’ in Epicurean texts and discuss what it means to exist 
as a substance on an Epicurean view (since the Epicurean view is decidedly different 
from the one espoused in the Divisions). Yet before doing so, let me set out the dialectic 
of the Epicurean critique of Plato in KD 33 as I see it: pace commentators who take KD 
33 to be a simple negation of the Platonic claim that justice exists itself in itself (auto 
kath’ auto), I argue that a metaphysical critique of Platonic justice follows from KD 33 
only insofar as the Epicurean ontological schema, which underlies the claim that justice 
does not exist in itself (kath’ heauto), is very different from the one that underlies the 
Platonic claim that justice exists itself in itself (auto kath’ auto). While Plato argues for a 
bipartite ontology consisting of Forms and sensible particulars, the Epicureans defend a 
monopartite ontology,329 which allows only body and void as existents on the same 
ontological plane. The difference between the Platonic and Epicurean approach is most 
clear in Plutarch’s Against Colotes. In this text, the Platonist Plutarch sides with Plato 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.13 and Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods I.72. See also the brief 
comments in DeWitt 1954: 50. 
329 Bronowski 2014: 262f. On the Epicurean ontological schema, see also Renault 1975, Sedley 
1988: 303ff., and Verde 2010: 197ff. 
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against Epicurus and his disciple Colotes.330 While the debate is not easy to fully 
reconstruct on the basis of Plutarch’s response alone, Colotes seems to have attacked 
the distinction between Forms and sensible particulars, claiming that there are only what 
Plato classifies as sensible particulars, while Plutarch, by contrast, a defender of the 
theory of Forms, argues for the soundness of a bipartite ontology. Be this as it may, the 
upshot for our reading of KD 33 is that rather than referring to a category within a 
different ontological schema (namely, Plato’s), the Epicureans are using a technical term 
that has a specific meaning within their own ontological schema. According to this 
technical term, justice cannot be a substance, but must be something else (that is to be 
specified). By contrast, in Plato, the claim that justice exists itself in itself or that there is 
justice itself (auto or auto kath’ auto) means that justice as a Form exists separate from 
the realm of being of sensible particulars, completely distinct from them. To put the same 
point again differently, see the figure below that shows that the Epicureans and their 
supposed opponents are articulating very different claims (bold indicates the claims that 
are being made by the respective schools in regard to ‘independent existence’):  
Platonic bipartite ontological schema (OS)  Epicurean monopartite OS 
Existence (E) auto kath’ auto/ auto (Forms)  [no equivalent] 
---------------------------------------------       = ---------------------------------------------------- 
E. of sensible particulars    E kath’ heauto (substance) | E. pros ti  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 1115c ff. Interestingly, Plutarch in this passage also refers to the Forms as existing kath’ auto, 
instead of auto kath’ auto, which adds to the confusion in identifying the precise meaning of ‘auto 
kath’ auto’ and ‘kath’heauto.’ On the passage and the argument between Colotes and Plutrach, 
see above all Kechagia 2011: 213ff. 
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Now, let us return to the three Platonic claims I distinguished above to provide 
more support for this reading and pull the loose strings together. Let us begin with the 
third claim: the Forms are the most real, the most basic, and the most fundamental of all 
entities in the Platonic ontology. According to this claim, even entities in the moral realm 
(like justice), insofar as they are Forms, are ontologically basic for Plato. In contrast to 
such a view, the Epicureans identify body and void as the first principles (archai) and 
insist that everything else can be explained in terms of them.331 Complex bodies 
(sunkriseis or sunkrimata)332 on this account are thus the combination of atomic ones (on 
account of the compatibility of the shape, size, and weight of the respective atoms).333 
And examples of such compounds include most prominently the macro-level objects of 
our everyday experience such as chairs, strawberries, or human beings, but also meso-
level objects such as the pores in our bodies that emit sweat, which are observable, but 
below the visible threshold and so not directly perceivable via sight.334  
What is more, the Epicureans even claim that actions and so matters of fact 
ultimately can be explained in terms of bodies and void. This is most clear in a passage 
in Lucretius who warns that an Epicurean in training should not be tricked by her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 Letter to Herodotus 41. 
332 Letter to Herodotus 39ff.; Lucretius, On the Nature of Things I.1008ff. and II.333ff. In regard to 
the number of atoms, the Epicureans dissent from Democritus who maintains that there is a finite 
number of atoms (Diogenes Laertius, Lives IX.44). 
333 On the Nature of Things II.581ff. and II.700ff. On the Epicurean view, neither is a strawberry 
made up of exclusively of strawberry atoms, that is, strawberry atoms all the way down, nor is it 
possible that all sorts of random combinations of atoms yield compounds, which allows the 
Epicureans to rule out physically the existence of centaurs and other chimeras. See also ibid. 
I.830ff. where Lucretius explicitly argues against the Anaxagorean doctrine of homoiomerous 
bodies.  
334 See fr. 293 Usener where a loadstone and iron are both said to be examples of compounds. 
For the pores example that is used to illustrate how we can come to know something, which is by 
nature non-evident (adēlon), see Sextus, Against the Mathematicians VIII.306. 
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opponents into acknowledging that actions or matters of fact ‘exist in themselves’ (esse 
per se): 
Again, when people assert that the rape of Tyndareus’ daughter [= Helen] and 
the subjugation of the people of Troy ‘exist,’ beware of the possibility of being 
trapped by them into an acknowledgement that these exist in themselves [per se 
esse], simply because those generations of human beings, of whom they were 
accidental properties [eventa], have been swept away beyond recall by ages 
past. For it could be said that any action [actum] is an accidental property 
[eventum] of the whole earth or of the actual regions in which it occurred. 
Moreover, if there had been no material substance, and no place and space in 
which all things happen, the beauty of Tydareus’ daughter would never have 
fanned into flame the fire of passion smoldering deep in Phrygian Alexander’s 
heart, so kindling the blazing strife of savage war; nor would the wooden horse, 
unknown to the Trojans, have discharged from its pregnant womb under cover of 
night the Greeks who filled Pergama with flames. From this you may clearly see 
that all deeds without exception have, unlike matter, no independent existence 
[per se esse], and cannot be said in the same sense as void; rather you may with 
justification term them accidental properties [eventa] of matter and of space in 
which all things happen.335 
 
In this passage, existing per se in Lucretius’ Latin translates existing kath’ heauto 
in Epicurus’ Greek. And in a previous passage, Lucretius affirms that the only things that 
exist per se are bodies and void, which again echoes the Letter to Herodotus, where 
bodies and void are described as ‘kath’ heauta phuseis.’336 In other words, to exist kath’ 
heauto, on the Epicurean view, means to the same metaphysical status as body and 
void. Since justice is said not to exist kath’ heauto in KD 33, then, it follows that justice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 denique Tyndaridem raptam belloque subactas/ Troiiugenas gentis cum dicunt esse, 
videndumst/ ne forte haec per se cogant nos esse fateri,/ quando ea saecla hominum, quorum 
haec eventa fuerunt,/ inrevocabilis abstulerit iam praeterita aetas;/ namque aliud terris, aliud 
regionibus ipsis/ eventum dici poterit quod cumque erit actum./ denique materies si rerum nulla 
fuisset/ nec locus ac spatium, res in quo quaeque geruntur,/ numquam Tyndaridis forma conflatus 
amore/ ignis Alexandri Phrygio sub pectore gliscens/ clara accendisset saevi certamina belli/ nec 
clam durateus Troiianis Pergama partu/ inflammasset equos nocturno Graiiugenarum;/ 
perspicere ut possis res gestas funditus omnis/ non ita uti corpus per se constare neque esse/ 
nec ratione cluere eadem qua constet inane,/ sed magis ut merito possis eventa vocare/ corporis 
atque loci, res in quo quaeque gerantur. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things I.464ff.; Trans. by 
Smith, modified. 
336 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things I.419 (see also I.506) echoes the Letter to Herodotus 39, 
and Letter to Herodotus 68 directly mentions kath’ heauta phuseis, which must be body and void.  
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cannot be ontologically basic for the Epicureans; justice is not bodily, that is, neither a 
macroscopic atom nor a compound body, nor is it void on the Epicurean view. However, 
justice is something that depends on body and void, because in Epicureanism 
everything depends on body and void in some way. The passage in Lucretius describes 
the dependence of actions and matters of fact on body as actions and matters of fact 
being accidental properties (eventa; Greek: sumptōmata) of body. In light of the second 
half of KD 33, which aptly suggests that justice is an agreement, it then seems 
reasonable to suppose that on the Epicurean view, justice (as an agreement, which 
ontologically falls into the same camp as actions and matters of fact) is best understood 
as a kind of accidental property.  
In the Epicurean ontological schema, accidental properties are one of two types 
of properties, the other being essential properties (sumbēbekota; Latin: coniuncta). 
According to Sextus Empiricus, who provides the most detailed description, an essential 
property is one that an entity cannot lose without ceasing to be that entity, while an 
accidental property is one an entity can lose and still remain the same entity.337 For 
instance, a body ceases to be a body if it no longer possesses weight, shape, or size, 
and fire ceases to be fire, when it is no longer hot, but a human being does not cease to 
be a human being if she is rich or poor. In the case of justice, it is clear that a certain 
action does not cease being a certain action if it is no longer just and that a person will 
not cease to be a person because she is no longer just.338 And so, justice for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 See Sextus Empircus, Against the Mathematicians X.221ff. See also Lucretius, On the Nature 
of Things I.449ff. and Letter to Herodotus 68ff. 
338 The idea that an unjust law is not a law at all is often wrongly attributed to natural law 
theorists. See, for instance, Kretzmann 1988: 100ff. as well as the discussion in chapter 4. 
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Epicureans seems to be most aptly described as a kind of an accidental property 
(sumptōma).339 
Now, the details of how justice is an accidental property in Epicureanism are 
difficult to spell out, especially in regard to specifying the body of which it is an accidental 
property. In the Lucretius passage just quoted, for instance, it seems unclear whether 
accidental properties are predicated of bodies and space in a general way (“the whole 
earth”) or more directly of parts thereof (certain “generations of human beings”).340 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 See Glidden 1985: 212f. (also 207ff.) and Alberti 1995: 180ff. As I already indicated above, 
Bailey, in his edition of Epicurus’ writings, refers to justice as a sumbēbekos. ‘Sumbēbekos’ can 
also mean property in general rather than essential property, but he translates the term as 
‘accident,’ which is strange. By contrast, Morel argues that the just should be understood as both 
an essential and an accidental property: “le δίκαιον a un statut identique à la couleur, qui figure 
dans la liste des propriétés permanentes, mais qui peut être également classée parmi les 
accidents. Tout composé a une couleur, mais un corps n’a pas toujour la même couleur” (2000: 
404; but see already Giussani 1896: 27ff. who develops the core of this proposal). In other words, 
Morel claims that all human communities need to be just, but the way in which they are just is 
accidental. This is an interesting suggestion, but I think the analogy that Morel draws ultimately 
fails. The same move Moral suggests to distinguish having a color and having a particular color 
could be made for all properties. In this vein, even the color red would be essentially predicated of 
all red objects and then the hues of red would be equivalent to the accidental redness of the 
particular object in question. Yet this poses problems for the rather simple Epicurean ontological 
schema that would be considerably expanded to include higher and lower level properties. (On 
the idea of communities as that of which properties are predicated, see also the discussion 
below.) More importantly, though, if properties were really predicated differently relative to 
different referents, as Morel suggests, it seems that they would not have much explanatory 
power, since one can easily construct a referent, which will have a certain property as an 
essential property, for instance, being clever is an essential property of the clever person and 
being quick is an essential property of the quick man. Finally, there is no textual support for the 
Giussani-Morel-reading. When Lucretius enumerates accidental properties at On the Nature of 
Things I.455f., for instance, he does not indicate that poverty can also be understood as an 
essential property, and there is no indication of any property that is both an accidental and an 
essential property, depending on context in any extant Epicurean text. 
340 A special problem in this context is whether atoms can have accidental properties and how 
predication works in this case. Atoms are described as featureless and so, for instance, do not 
possess all kinds of accidental properties: “For Epicurus maintained that the part is other than the 
whole, as the atom is other than the compound, since the former is devoid of quality whereas the 
compound has qualities [Ἐπίκουρος µὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἠξίου τυγχάνειν τὸ µέρος τοῦ ὅλου, καθάπερ 
τὴν ἄτοµον τοῦ συγκρίµατος, εἴγε ἐκείνη µὲν ἄποιός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ συγκρίµα πεποίωται]” Sextus 
Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians IX.335; Trans. by Hicks; see also Lucretius, On the 
Nature of Things II.730ff. Does this, then, mean that movement is an accidental property of 
atoms, given that atoms would not cease being atoms even if they ceased to move (although in 
fact, they are always in motion)?  
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Accordingly, it is difficult to say of what entities justice is a property. One interesting 
possibility is that justice could be the accidental property of benefit. After all, I argued in 
previous chapters that justice is closely connected to benefit, and that only something 
that is beneficial can be just, although there may be beneficial things that are not part of 
an agreement between agents and so not just. On this suggestion, justice would be a 
higher-level property: an accidental property of something that is itself an accidental 
property.341  
At first, the suggestion that justice is an accidental property of an accidental 
property may seem quite odd.342 However, there is a precedent invoking accidental 
properties of accidental properties (sumptōmata sumptōmatōn) in Epicureanism, which 
gives some plausibility to this reading, namely, the 2nd century BC Epicurean Demetrius 
Lacon who classifies time (chronos) as such a property.343 Unfortunately, the details of 
his account are unclear.344 However, in line with the Aristotelian idea that time is 
connected to movement or change (kinesis),345 Demetrius claims that time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Being beneficial is also an accidental property on the Epicurean view because one can 
imagine something to cease to be beneficial, yet still remain to be the thing in question. For 
instance, a law that has ceased to be beneficial still is a law on the Epicurean view. 
342 See also Lucretius, On the Nature of Things I.459ff. where time (tempus) is described as an 
eventum (= sumptōma), not an eventum eventi.  
343 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians X.219ff. and Outlines of Pyrrhonism III.137 as 
well as Aetius I.22.5 Diels = fr. 294 Usener. 
344 A good witness to this is Sextus who at Against the Mathematicians X.227 is equally struggling 
– just as we modern readers – to make sense of time in the Epicurean ontological schema: 
“Epicurus thinks that time is incorporeal, but not in the same sort of way as do the Stoics; for 
whereas they […] supposed that time is an incorporeal thing conceived as self-existent, Epicurus 
supposed it to be a property of certain things [ὁ Ἐπικουρος ἀσώµατον οἴεται τὸν χρόνον 
ὑπάρχειν, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς στωικοῖς· ἐκεῖνοι µὲν γὰρ […] ἀσώµατόν τι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ 
νοούµενον ὑπεστήσαντο τὸν χρόνον, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ συµβεβηκὸς τισιν.]” Trans. by Hicks. 
345 See Aristotle, Physics IV.10.217b29ff.  
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“accompanies (parepetai)” movement. And he likens this accompanying to being an 
accidental property, which again has a precedent in Aristotle.346 It is not surprising, then, 
that day and night for Demetrius, which are understood as processes of change, of 
which time is an accidental property, depend on the illumination (photismos) or privation 
(sterēsis) of sunlight, and are thus characterized as accidental properties of air. In fact, 
such a description is even foreshadowed in Letter to Herodotus, where – immediately 
after the discussion of properties – we find a short and cryptic passage on time.347 Time 
is described as “a peculiar accidental property [idion ti sumptōma],”348 which seems to 
have prompted Demetrius to categorize time as he does, although the degree of his 
faithfulness to Epicurus is difficult to assess.349 Still, the description of justice as an 
accidental property of an accidental property has some appeal, given the Epicurean 
ontological schema and the necessity to make sense of certain non-substances.350   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 Metaphysics IV.1020a26ff.; see also Neck 1964: 23f. as well as her introduction. 
347 72f. Compare also Lucretius’ comment on time at On the Nature of Things I.459ff. On the 
Epicurean notion of time, see Barrigazzi 1959, Neck 1964, Isnardi Parente 1976, Morel 2002, 
Monet 2007, Verde 2008, and Goeury 2012.  
348 Letter to Herodotus 73; see also PHerc 1413 col. 9.VII.5f. Arrighetti and Cantarella. Barrigazzi 
1959: 57 argues that Usener’s emendation of palin to panta in the manuscript (idion ti sumpotōma 
peri tauta palin) at Letter to Herodotus 73 obscures that even Epicurus had in mind that time is an 
accidental property of an accidental property: “Bisogna dare molto rilievo all’ avverbio πάλιν: il 
tempo è ‘a sua volta’ una contingenza particolare che riguarda queste cose [that is, days, nights, 
passions, movement, and rest].”  
349 Note that according to Sextus, Demetrius does not make an independent claim but “interprets 
(exēgeitai)” Epicurus. It is difficult to assess the status of this interpretation. It could mean that 
Epicurus really said what Demetrius is claiming he said (see, for instance, Barrigazzi 1959: 53, 
Neck 1964: 25 and Goeury 2012) or that what follows is Demetrius’ own opinion, not Epicurus’. 
350 A possible objection against the suggestion that justice and time are sufficiently similar from a 
metaphysical point of view to warrant the claim that both are accidental properties of accidental 
properties is that they differ in the fact that there is preconception of justice, but there might not 
be a preconception of time. (On preconceptions, see the more detailed discussion in chapter 7.) 
However, note that at Letter to Herodotus 72, Epicurus does not explicitly say that there is no 
preconception of time, as some commentators seem to think, but merely that we cannot 
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However, the reading just presented has some serious drawbacks, which 
ultimately makes it unlikely that justice is an accidental property of an accidental property 
for the Epicureans rather than simply an accidental property. First, the previous reading 
is not based on much textual evidence and would lead to some strange consequences. 
After all, it seems to result in a whole plethora of second-order properties and perhaps 
even to third-order or fourth-order properties. What for instance is benefit a property of? 
Agreements? If so, are agreements themselves accidental properties of institutions that 
then are accidental properties of the agents that make them up? This seems as strange 
as claiming that the property red has the property redness, which, in turn, has the 
property of being a color.  
Second, the passages ascribed to Demetrius are the only passages in the 
Epicurean corpus to speak of higher-order properties. Given that no other school 
endorsed such properties, their existence must have also seemed unusual to ancient 
readers, especially if time were not a special case. If the existence of a multitude of 
higher-level properties were really part and parcel of Epicurean core doctrines, it is quite 
surprising that they are not mentioned in any other source, which usually readily criticize 
anything in Epicureanism that may seem odd in any way.  
Third, in deciding how to best explain the passage in Demetrius that mentions 
accidental properties of accidental properties, it may be helpful to recall the relationship 
between the theory of Epicurus and that of later Epicureans. After all, most of the 
innovation in the Epicurean school probably took place in regard to issues that Epicurus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
investigate time like other things (ta loipa) by turning to its preconception (which puts the burden 
of proof on the modern scholars to explain why).  
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himself had not sufficiently treated. Consequently, the exact ontological status of time 
may be precisely such an issue.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in saying that properties are of a thing, as 
the above analysis suggest, it seems that an Aristotelian substance theory of objecthood 
is being ascribed to the Epicureans. However, such an ascription may be quite mistaken. 
As Betegh convincingly suggests, one should distinguish between two ways of analyzing 
bodies in Epicureanism: physically and metaphysically.351 In a physical analysis, 
compound bodies are analyzed in terms of the atoms that make them up. In a 
metaphysical analysis, by contrast, bodies are analyzed in terms of their properties. 
According to such an analysis, a body can be said to exist insofar as it is a bundle of 
properties, some of which are necessary to it being the body that it is and others of 
which are accidental to it being the body that it is. On this view, justice is an accidental 
property of bodies on the physical level352 insofar as it is part of the bundle of properties 
that make up the body, but it is not an accidental property of any of the properties in the 
bundle because being a property just means to be part of a bundle, not to be a part of a 
property of the bundle. Again, though, even on such an understanding, what exactly 
counts as the relevant body that is the bundle of properties is left open: In accordance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Betegh 2006: 280ff. 
352 Evidence for the ontological fundamentality of compounds besides atoms and void is found in 
Colotes who criticizes the view that compounds are not ontologically fundamental, ascribing such 
a view to Democritus: “He [Colotes] says that Democritus’ words ‘color is by convention, sweet is 
by convention, a compound by convention, and so the others, what is real are void and atoms’ 
are an attack on the senses [τὸ γὰρ νόµῳ χροιὴν εἶναι καὶ νόµῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόµῳ σύγκρισιν 
<ἅπασαν, ἐτεῇ δὲ τὸ κενὸν καὶ> τὰς ἀτόµους εἰρηµένον φησὶν ὑπὸ Δηµοκρίτου <µάχεσθαι> ταῖς 
αἰσθήσεσι]” (Plutarch, Against Colotes 1110e; Trans. by Einarson and De Lacy). Note that the 
ascription to Democritus is somewhat dubious because none of other versions of the 
Democritean saying mentions compounds, but rather ‘bitter (pikron)’, ‘hot (thermon)’, and ‘cold 
(psuchron)’ (68DK A49, B9, 117, 125). See especially the discussion in Furley 1993: 76, fn. 7. On 
the difference between Democritean and Epicurean views on sensible qualities, see especially 
O’Keefe 1997. 
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with Lucretius’ description above (“the whole earth”, past “generations of human 
beings”), any phenomenological accessible body seems to be a potential candidate. And 
so, it seems that, in the end, it is most probable that the Epicureans, who were generally 
not known for their metaphysical theorizing, probably did not spell out the metaphysical 
details of their ontological schema. 
Be this as it may, it should be clear that the Epicureans completely shake up 
Platonic ontology in making bodies and void ontologically basic entities (instead of 
Forms) and in classifying justice as an accidental property that depends on bodies. In 
the rest of this chapter, let us therefore briefly discuss the two other Platonic claims that I 
identified above in regard to Forms and see how these claims are also denied by the 
Epicureans. According to the second claim, Platonic justice as a Form can be 
understood as a kind of universal: Just things (tokens) participate in or have the Form 
(type) of justice. Since there is no Form of justice in Epicureanism, as in Platonism, and 
the Epicureans probably advance a kind of bundle theory, according to which universals 
are not in substances (in re), as they are on Aristotle’s theory,353 the Epicureans have to 
offer a different explanation of universals.354 Accordingly, they may be taken to suggest a 
view of universals, according to which a ‘universal’ is understood as the class of all 
tokens of a type in the world.355 The textual evidence for this position is rather scanty. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Aristotle asserts “if the primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the 
other things to exist [µὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι]” 
(Categories 2b5f.; Trans. by Ackrill) and that properties are things said to be “in a subject [ἐν 
ὑποκειµένῳ]” (ibid.1a20f. et passim; emphasis added). For the distinction between universals 
before, in, and after things (ante rem, in re, and post rem), see Ammonius, Commentary on 
Porphyry’s Isagoge 41.10ff. Busse. 
354 On this point, I have learned a lot from the discussions in Bronowski 2014 and as well as from 
David Sedley’s talk at a workshop at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville in March 2015. 
355 Such an account has some resemblance to trope theory. See, for instance, the discussion in 
Armstrong 1989: 113ff. 
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However, the idea is that the type red is merely the sum or class of all red tokens in the 
world and that there is no redness in the abstract, separate from the real-world tokens. 
In the case of justice, this means that Epicureans claim that justice is universal only 
insofar as there are the tokens of the justice in the world. There is no justice separate 
from these tokens. For example, this particular agreement can be just as well as that 
particular agreement and Epicurus, Hermarchus, and Meterodorus may all 
simultaneously be called just. Yet it is only the sum of all the entities in the world that are 
just (whatever these may be in detail), which together make up the universal ‘justice.’ In 
other words, then, in claiming in KD 33 that justice is not kath’ heauto, which means that 
justice is to be understood as an accidental property and not as a Platonic Form, the 
Epicureans are also taking issue with the idea that there are Platonic universals (at least 
insofar as there are universals on Platonic theory).356 
Finally, the first Platonic claim I identified above was that the justice qua Form is 
an abstract entity on the Platonic view. In contrast to such a view, the above discussion 
already showed that the Epicureans hold that only concrete objects exist. The Epicurean 
universe consists of body (sōma) on the one hand and void (kenon) on the other 
hand.357 And these two are always conceived of as concrete entities, leaving no room for 
abstract entities. It follows that justice on the Epicurean view is always spatiotemporal. 
While this is not explicitly spelled out, it seems that in the case of contractual justice, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 In other words, Epicurus (like Aristotle) importantly prefigures a view, according to which 
universal terms are merely names above and beyond the particulars (nominalism). However, it 
should be clear from the comments in this paragraph that the Epicureans do not themselves hold 
such a view, which only really arises in the Middle Ages. For the historical background, see de 
Libera 1996. 
357 Letter to Herodotus 40. On the intangible nature or void, see above all Inwood 1981, Sedley 
1982, and Konstan 2014. See also the parallel passage in Lucretius, On the Nature of Things 
I.418ff. 
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spatiotemporality refers to the actual agreement that agents form with each other, which 
can be said in some way to relate to atoms and void, perhaps because the agents who 
form agreements are themselves complexes of atoms and void. And in the case of 
aretetic justice, the spatiotemporality perhaps could be said to be the concrete, material 
soul of an agent, which is understood as an assemblage (athroisma) of (material) 
atoms.358  
6.3. Summary 
In this chapter, I argued that Epicurean justice is metaphysically understood as a 
property.  In doing so, I commented in detail on the claim of KD 33 that there is no 
justice in itself (kath’ heauto). Pace commentators who claim that it is a straightforward 
denial of a Platonic claim, I showed that the criticism of Plato’s view is indirect. By using 
the expression ‘kath’ heauto,’ Epicurus draws on an understanding of the Aristotelian 
Categories and the reception thereof in Xenocrates as well as in the anonymous treatise 
now-called Aristotle’s Divisions, according to which something may exist kath’ heauto, 
that is, like a substance, or pros ti, that is, like a property. It follows from this 
understanding, I claimed, that justice does not exist like body or void do, on the 
Epicurean view, which are the only ‘substances’ in the ontological schema, but rather 
that it exists like a property. Given the other examples of properties, I maintained that 
justice is most likely an accidental property, and so that when one compares this 
Epicurean classification of justice with the Platonic one, KD 33 constitutes a whole-sale 
rejection of the Platonic theory and all the ideas it entails. Pace Plato, (1) justice is not 
an abstract entity, (2) justice is not a universal in the way that the Form of justice could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 See Letter to Herodotus 63ff. as well as Lucretius, On the Nature of Things III.94ff. On the 
Epicurean conception of the soul, see Kerferd 1971 and Diano 1974: 129ff.  
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be said to be a universal, and (3) justice in no way is the most real, most basic, and most 
fundamental entity in the ontological schema.  
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7. EPICUREAN MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 In this chapter, I consider the Epicurean account of how human beings come to 
have an understanding of what is just. I begin my discussion with their account of how a 
perceiver comes to have an understanding of everyday objects. Everyday objects like 
human beings, dogs, and cats359 are apprehended via sense perception on the 
Epicurean view, and so, in what follows, I will give a brief summary of the Epicurean 
theory of sense perception.360 I focus on the case of seeing because it is the easiest and 
the one that is most commonly referred to among scholars, but it should be understood 
that analogous explanations could be provided for the other senses as well.361  
According to the Epicureans, compound bodies, that is, the macroscopic bodies 
of human everyday life, emit a constant stream of images (eidōla).362 These images are 
material, like the bodies that emit them; that is, they are three-dimensional hollow 
replicas of the things they are images of. For instance, the cat on the couch lying next to 
me as I write these lines, which has the ‘typical’ form of a cat, emits very fine images or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 In my discussion, I set aside the special case of artifacts, since it is unclear whether the 
Epicurean standard theory of perception, which leads to the creation of a preconception or 
prolēpsis (to be explained in more detail below), also applies to them. For some discussion, see 
Fine 2014: 236, including fn. 33.  
360 On the Epicurean theory of knowledge, see, for instance, Bailey 1964 [1928]: 232ff., Glidden 
1971, Rist 1972, Striker 1977, Taylor 1980, Asmis 1984, Everson 1990, Jürss 1991, Asmis 2010 
[2009], and Hahmann 2015. 
361 See Letter to Herodotus 52-53 (discussion of hearing and smell) as well as On the Nature of 
Things IV.522ff. (discussion of hearing, taste, and smell). For more detailed discussions of 
hearing and smell, see Lee 1978, Koenen 1997, and Koenen 1999.  
362 The most important passages to reconstruct the Epicurean theory of images are Letter to 
Herodotus 37f. as well as 46a ff. and On the Nature of Things IV.26ff. Also relevant is the 
discussion in Book II of On Nature (ed. Leone), although the state of the text is quite fragmentary. 
According to Diogenes Laertius (Lives X.28), Epicurus wrote treatises on images (Peri eidōlōn) 
and on sense perception (Peri phantasias), but these have not come down to us. 
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replicas of herself; these are themselves cat-shaped and perfectly reproduce her 
features. These cat-images then travel through space. When they eventually reach a 
perceiver’s sensory apparatus, it ‘processes’ the images and gives the perceiver the 
presentation (phantasia) of a cat. This presentation, the Epicureans claim, is always 
true; error is only introduced if the image is processed incorrectly through some mental 
operation.363 In this case, the mind inadvertently adds or subtracts something from the 
original image, which falsifies the testimony given by the senses. If the process of seeing 
is repeated, perceivers are able to learn: Repeatedly seeing the same or similar objects 
allows perceivers to group together the different presentations of, say, a cat and so form 
a kind of initial concept or preconception (prolēpsis; pl. prolēpseis) thereof. This gives 
perceivers a functional understanding364 of the thing they perceived, enabling them to 
reliably recognize an object as the thing in question and act accordingly.365 In short, 
then, when it comes to how we come to having an understanding of the world around us, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 See Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.31f. and On the Nature of Things IV.479ff. The latter passage 
discusses the famous case of the square tower that appears round when seen at a distance. 
364 As I argue in more detail below, this functional understanding does not yet constitute 
knowledge. I thus throughout this chapter distinguish between knowing something, that is, being 
able to provide an account of the thing in question, and having an understanding of something, 
that is, being able to identify something in a pragmatic, functional way.  
365 It is unclear whether a prolēpsis is of an individual or a universal. There is certainly no 
evidence of a prolēpsis of an individual human being, for instance, of the historical Socrates. One 
may therefore want to assume that there were no prolēpseis of individuals in Epicurean theory. 
See Fine 2014: 236 and Tsouna 2016: 200 pace Asmis 1984: 63. However, Diogenes Laertius 
reports at Lives VII.53 and 61 that there are concepts of individuals in Stoicism, which may 
suggest that this also applies to Epicureanism (at least if this feature of the theory of prolēpsis, 
which as a theory according to Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods I.43 was invented by 
Epicurus, and is not a Stoic innovation). Finally, complicating the matter further is the Epicurean 
taxonomy of genus and species terms. In his discussion of a passage in John Sikeliotes 
(appended to Usener’s Epicurea in the spicilegium fragmentorum et testimoniorum on p. 348f.), 
Sedley argues in a talk given at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville that Epicurus rejected 
the taxonomy of entities in terms of genus and species. If this is right, then the question of 
whether prolēpseis are of individuals or universals may not be well-posed because the 
Epicureans do not operate with this distinction. 
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the Epicureans agree with the classical empiricist claim that there is nothing in the mind 
that was not previously in the senses.366 
In this chapter, I largely set aside all the miscellaneous problems that concern 
the details of the Epicurean account of perception and instead turn to the neglected 
question of what consequences this standard account has for Epicurean moral 
epistemology. This will involve asking two questions: First, do Epicureans think that the 
moral case is analogous to the non-moral case just sketched? In other words, do 
perceivers come to have an understanding that something is just in the same way that 
they learn that the cat is black?367 And second, what kind of entities are the objects of 
moral cognition? Or put differently, are moral facts such as that it is just not to harm and 
not be harmed on this view ontologically in the same realm as non-moral facts like that 
Philadelphia is a city on the east coast of the United States?  
I will defend the view that for the Epicureans, moral facts are learned in the same 
way as non-moral facts, namely, through sense perception, and that they are 
ontologically in the same realm as non-moral facts.368 I will proceed as follows. First, I 
will establish that it follows from the metaphysical status of the just in Epicurean theory, 
for which I argued at greater length in chapter 6, that perceivers can only come to know 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 On the Epicureans as ‘empiricists,’ now see Tsouna 2016: 162f. 
367 The issues discussed in this chapter are closely related to the discussion of whether there can 
be “intuitive knowledge” of what is moral. See, for instance, Audi 2004 (which includes an 
overview of 19th and early 20th century authors who defended such view). By ‘intuitive 
knowledge,’ modern authors mean non-inferential moral knowledge. In any event, as I show 
below, a modern reader should note that Epicurean “intuitivism” differs from modern intuitivism 
insofar as modern intuitivism focuses on rational intuitions, while Epicurean intuitionism is based 
on empirical intuitions. 
368 See also Glidden 1985: 212 who considers such a view as an embarrassment to Epicurean 
theory. 
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what is just via the senses and suggest that human beings have a non-inferential369 
understanding of what is just (7.1.). Second, I explain this suggestion further by 
appealing to the Epicurean account of preconceptions (prolēpseis): I argue that 
prolēpseis are a kind of non-inferential concept370 based on sense data that allows 
agents to have an understanding of certain phenomena (7.2.). Finally, I end this chapter 
with some further observations on the role and political implications of the prolēpsis of 
the just for the Epicurean theory of justice (7.3.). 
7.1.  The Just and the Senses 
 In this section, I argue for the main claim of the chapter, namely, that, on the 
Epicurean view, that something is just is apprehended by the senses in the same way 
that it is apprehended that an apple is red. To do so, I will first review some key findings 
of chapter 6. In that chapter, I showed that the Epicureans distinguish between bodies 
(sōma) and properties (sumbebēkota in the broad sense of the term) of these bodies. 
Furthermore, the Epicureans claim that there are some properties that a body can lose 
without ceasing to be that body, namely, accidental properties (sumptōmata), and some 
properties that it cannot lose without ceasing to be that body, namely, essential 
properties (sumbebēkota in the narrow sense). A human being can, for example, dye her 
hair, that is, change the property of her hair, and even lose it altogether without ceasing 
to be a human being. By contrast, a human being cannot lose her soul or certain other 
properties without ceasing to be human. What essential properties exactly are in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 By ‘non-inferential,’ I mean that in forming a prolēpsis, the mind does not draw an inference 
from a certain state of affairs to a more complex state of affairs as in a syllogism where premises 
are aggregated to obtain a certain conclusion.  As I argue in more detail below, prolēpseis are 
obtained in a way that is mechanic. See also Goldschmidt 2006 [1978]:  47. 
370 By ‘concept,’ I mean something that is in the mind, leaving open the exact nature of such an 
entity. On concepts, see especially chapter 1 in Laurence and Margolis 1999. 
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specific case is difficult to determine. However, on the assumption that being animate is 
such a property, it would follow that a human being who is no longer alive is also no 
longer a human being.371 
In accordance with this distinction between two types of properties, I already 
argued in chapter 6 that being just on the Epicurean view is an accidental property. The 
reason is that this seems to be the result when the criterion of being able to lose the 
property in question is applied. After all, something can cease to be just without ceasing 
to be the very entity in question. For example, a person does not cease to be a person 
because she ceases to be just; she only ceases to have the property of being just that is 
not essential to being a person. 
 Finally, I claimed in chapter 6 that this metaphysical analysis of the just entails 
the claim that moral properties are ontologically on par with non-moral properties. The 
Epicureans do not think that moral properties should be analyzed differently than non-
moral ones because in their discussions of properties, they alternate moral and non-
moral examples and show no sign that the two need to be treated differently. This is 
especially clear in the discussion of the fine and the shameful in Polystratus’ On 
Irrational Contempt of Common Opinions, where it is argued that the fine and the 
shameful and similar entities are ontologically in the same realm as other relational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 I take this example from Sextus who claims that a human being for Epicurus is “such a form 
plus animateness [τὸ τοιουτονὶ µόρφωµα µετὰ ἐµψυχίας]” (Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.25; see also 
Against the Mathematicians VII.267). See also Philodemus, On Methods of Inference col. 
XXXIV.5ff. De Lacy and De Lacy where a prolēpsis is likened to a definition (idios logos) and one 
of the examples given is that of human being as a rational animal. It might be argued that this 
example is misleading insofar as a prolēpsis does not provide an essential definition of a thing, 
but rather a functional one, one that allows an agent to identify something as the definiendum, 
and that an Epicurean may either be agnostic about the essential properties of human beings or 
not include animateness among them. In response to this, let me point out that nothing depends 
on the particular property of animateness; I merely chose it as a possible example of an essential 
property (for the lack of another, unambiguous example in any of the extant Epicurean works). 
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properties such as size and health.372 Furthermore, it would be quite surprising if the 
Epicureans argued that moral properties were ontologically distinct from non-moral 
properties. After all, it seems the view that moral properties can be analyzed just as non-
moral properties was something of a common view in antiquity. Let me explain this by 
briefly referring to Plato’s and Aristotle’s view. 
While the exact scope of Plato’s theory of Forms is a matter of debate that 
cannot be discussed in detail in this context, it is clear that examples of Forms include 
examples of entities both in the moral and entities in the non-moral domains. There is a 
Form of justice and there is a Form of the equal.373 Accordingly, it seems strange to 
suppose that moral entities and non-moral entities would be analyzed in radically 
different ways. Likewise, in the sensible realm, there is no reason to suppose that tokens 
of justice have a different ontological status than tokens of the equal. After all, just-
tokens and equal-tokens participate in a Form, that of justice and that of the equal 
respectively.  
In the case of Aristotle, it is likewise strange to suppose that the analysis of the 
Categories is not meant to include moral entities. After all, justice prominently features in 
the discussion of quality (poiotēta), one of the nine accidents.374 Certainly, Aristotle’s 
focus in this discussion lies on justice as a virtue, but he also mentions the just (to 
dikaion) and so there is no reason to suppose that his analysis is not meant to be 
extended (A) to justice in other contexts and (B) to other moral entities insofar as they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 Col. ΧΧΙ.17ff. Indelli. 
373 See, for instance, Phaedo 65d and 74a. 
374 The discussion of quality is found in chapter 8 (8b25ff.) and justice is specifically discussed at 
10b12ff. (but see also 8b33). 
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express the property of something. There is no indication anywhere that Aristotle’s 
framework in the Categories is limited in scope and that a completely different 
framework needs to be applied to accommodate a set of special cases. In fact, insofar 
as the Categories deal with beings (onta) in general, one expects that also non-moral 
entities are in some way accounted for. In short, then, in treating moral entities as being 
in the same ontological realm as non-moral entities, the Epicureans are treating entities 
in the moral domain in the same way that prominent thinkers of other ancient schools do. 
 Having established the ontological status of moral entities in relationship to non-
moral entities in Epicureanism, we can finally turn to epistemological consequences of 
this doctrine. On the Epicurean view, it follows that there cannot be an epistemological 
difference in the perception of moral and non-moral entities. The reason is that the 
Epicurean theory of perception is based on atomistic principles. Perceivers receive their 
knowledge by means of the constant streams of material images that every body 
constantly emits and perception is explained solely in these terms and there is no other 
way that perceivers can come to know something than via these material images. Now, 
the cases of perceiving a cat and of perceiving the just are different insofar as the former 
case involves the knowledge of a bodily entity while the latter involves the knowledge of 
a property of a body. In other words, coming to have an understanding that, for instance, 
a human being is just (that justice is a property of a human being) is not quite analogous 
to coming to have an understanding of the cat as a whole, but rather to coming to have 
an understanding of one of its properties, for instance, that it is black and white (because 
color is a property of body). Furthermore, since properties cannot be considered without 
bodies of which they are properties, it would seem odd to speak of an image of justice in 
isolation on the Epicurean view, although the Epicureans certainly seem to refer to a 
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presentation (phantasia) of a property (even if in an abbreviated way of speaking). 
Accordingly, Epicurus writes: “And whatever presentation [phantasia] we receive by form 
of application, whether by the mind or by the senses, either of the form or of the 
properties [sumbebēkota], it is the form [or the properties] of the solid object, produced 
by the continuous compacting or residue of the image.”375  
Again, then, there is no reason to suppose that the same atomic principles that 
apply to the perception of non-moral entities do not also apply to the perception of moral 
entities. This is also confirmed by the following passage in the Letter to Herodotus:  
And we should not eliminate this clear evidence from what exists just because 
[accidental properties] do not have the nature of the entire thing which they are 
joined and we call a body, nor the nature of the permanent accompaniments; but 
neither are they to be regarded as independent natures, since this is not 
conceivable either in their case or in the case of permanent properties; but one 
must think that they all are, just as they appear, accidental properties and not 
permanent accompaniments nor again things which have the status of an 
independent nature. But they are observed just as perception itself presents their 
particular traits.376   
 
The primary concern in this passage is to distinguish accidental properties from 
other entities that exist: first and foremost, from bodies, which are the primary entities on 
the Epicurean view, and, second, from essential properties, which in the text are referred 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 καὶ ἣν ἂν λάβωµεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε µορφῆς εἴτε 
συµβεβηκότων, µορφή ἐστιν αὕτη τοῦ στερεµνίου, γινοµένη κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς πύκνωµα ἢ 
ἐγκατάλειµµα τοῦ εἰδώλου. Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 50; Trans. by Inwood and Gerson. 
Certainly, some features of this account remain mysterious, for instance, how we exactly have to 
understand the processes of compacting and residue. I set this problem aside, although I return 
to the mechanical aspect of perception below.  
376 καὶ οὐκ ἐξελατέον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ταύτην τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν ᾧ 
συµβαίνει ὃ δὴ καὶ σῶµα προσαγορεύοµεν, οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἀίδιον παρακολουθούντων, οὐδ' αὖ 
καθ' αὑτὰ νοµιστέον – οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο διανοητὸν οὔτ' ἐπὶ τούτων οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀίδιον 
συµβεβηκότων – ἀλλ' ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται, συµπτώµατα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα νοµιστέον, καὶ οὐκ ἀίδιον 
παρακολουθοῦντα οὐδ' αὖ φύσεως καθ' ἑαυτὰ τάγµα ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον αὐτὴ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν 
ἰδιότητα ποιεῖ, θεωρεῖται. Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus X.71; Trans. by Inwood and Gerson, 
modified and emphasis added. 
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to as “permanent accompaniments [aidion parakolouthounta].” Furthermore, in doing so, 
Epicurus makes clear (A) that accidental properties are among the things that exist377 
and (B) that “they are observed [theōreitai] just as perception itself presents their 
particular traits.” In other words, even in the case of accidental properties, the 
Epicureans claim that existence is confirmed by perception (aisthēsis). Again, the 
passage does not say that only certain accidental properties are perceived, but in fact, 
implies that this holds for all kinds of accidental properties, whether they are of moral or 
of non-moral entities. 
When reading this passage, a modern reader should keep in mind, though, that 
the Epicurean conception of perception is broader than the modern conception. As was 
already signaled in the Epicurus passage quoted above (Letter to Herodotus 50), 
Epicurean perception also includes mental perception. Unfortunately, the textual 
evidence on this special type of perception is rather limited.378 Yet it seems that the 
prolēpsis of the gods is acquired through the mind (dianoia). How exactly this works is 
unclear, but the basic idea seems to be that the mind itself can also function as a kind of 
sense and then independently from sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, grasp 
especially fine images that enter through the pores of the body and that the other senses 
are not suited to detect.379 We will have the opportunity to discuss this mode of coming 
to understand certain objects in the next section, in which I discuss the Epicurean theory 
of prolēpsis and show in more detail why one could not, or at least not exclusively, have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 See also the discussion in Polystratus, On Common Conceptions col. ΧΧΙ.17ff. Indelli as well 
as the comments at On the Nature of Things I.445ff. 
378 But see Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 9 Smith and Lucretius, On the Nature of Things IV.962ff.  
379 On mental perception, see, for instance, Essler 2011: 57ff. In this context, ‘focusings of the 
mind’ (epibolai tēs dianoias) seem to play some important role, although their precise role is 
rather unclear from the extant texts. For a recent discussion, see Tsouna 2016: 186ff.  
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an understanding of what is just via this route. To sum up the result of this section, 
however, one may say that there is no indication in the Epicurean texts according to 
which epistemology in the moral case differs from epistemology in the non-moral 
case.380 In fact, if the just is understood as an accidental property among others, it 
seems to follow that it is also apprehended just as other accidental properties are 
apprehended, namely, by being grasped through sense perception. 
7.2. The prolēpsis of the Just 
 In this section, I turn to the Epicurean account of prolēpsis.381  My aim is to show 
that prolēpseis are non-inferential in nature and so to support further the thesis of the 
previous section that human beings have a non-inferential understanding of what is just. 
In doing so, I will argue against the view that the prolēpseis of the just constitutes a 
special case and so is unlike that of the prolēpseis of the objects (or properties) of 
everyday experience, that is, that it is either a higher-level prolēpsis or that it is obtained 
via mental perception rather than through perception by the five senses.382  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 In this context, see also Cicero’s comments about Epicurean pleasure at On Ends I.5f. and 
30f. 
381 In what follows, I have decided not to translate the term ‘prolēpsis,’ since we are dealing with a 
technical term whose meaning is only to be (partially) expounded in the course of this section. 
Etymologically, the noun ‘prolēpsis’ is derived from the prefix ‘pro’ (before) and the verb 
‘lambanein’ (to take/grasp/apprehend). Hence, prolēpsis designates a process (as noun ending in 
‘sis’) by which we grasp something in a ‘prior way,’ although prolēpseis seem to refer to the 
outcome of the process (the concept) rather than the process itself. (A similar case is the 
Epicurean technical term ‘sunkrisis,’ which as a noun ending in ‘sis,’ does not designate the 
process of ‘compounding’ of atoms, but rather the product, the compound.) The standard way of 
rendering the term in English is ‘preconception’ (Long and Sedley).381 This is also reflected in 
other languages, for instance, ‘prénotion’ (Conche, Goldschmidt), ‘prenozione’ (Arrighetti), and 
‘Vorbegriff’ (Nickel, Striker). Alternative English translations are ‘anticipation’ (De Witt), 
‘presumption’ (Asmis), and ‘general concept’ (Bailey).    
382 For the former view, see Jürss 1977: 221f., Goldschmidt 2006 [1978]: 46ff., and Müller 1987: 
238. For the latter view, see Essler 2011: 171. 
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I begin with some background and general remarks to set the stage. Prolepseis 
are one of the most cryptic and hence the most discussed technical notions in 
Epicureanism. A reason for this is certainly that Epicurus uses the term ‘prolēpsis’ only 
six times in the extant writings,383 never defining what he means by it anywhere. And 
while ‘prolēpsis’ is used in writings of other Epicureans such as Deterius Lacon384 and 
Philodemus,385 these texts either confirm the puzzlement a reader gets from reading 
Epicurus or raise issues of their own.386 The same is also true of two further important 
(non-Epicurean) sources for prolēpseis, Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods I.43f. and 
Diogenes Laertius’ Lives X.31f. These texts create problems of their own, because both 
these authors only offer a filtered perspective on Epicurean doctrines: in the case of 
Cicero, a hostile one, and in the case of Diogenes, one of a compiler who makes heavy 
usage of non-Epicurean vocabulary. In short, the textual evidence is quite bad when it 
comes to prolēpseis.  
 Be this as it may, all ancient testimonia agree that the function of prolēpseis in 
Epicureanism is to help inquiry in some way: Without prolēpseis, there would be no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Letter to Herodotus 72, Letter to Menoeceus 124, KD 37 and 38, On Nature XXVIII fr. 12 col. 
III.9 and 14, and PHerc 1413 Arrighetti and Cantarella 10.II.4. (Usually PHerc 1413 Arrighetti and 
Cantarella is thought to belong to On Nature as well.) Finally, perhaps Letter to Herodotus 37 
need to be added as well. 
384 PHerc 1012, col. LXIII.2 Puglia. 
385 On Methods of Inference, col. XXXIV.7 De Lacy and De Lacy; On Piety ll. 1300 and 1887 
Obbink; On Property Management col. XX.9; XX.17; XX.27; XXI.7f. Tsouna; On Anger col. XLV.2 
Indelli; Rhetoric I.255 col. XXI.13f.; I.255 col. XXI.17; I.257 col. XXII.38f.; II.189 fr. III.7f.; II.244 
col. XLII.15; II.266 col. XIa.6 Sudhaus; On Poems I, col. CXCIII.20 Janko; On Poems IV, col. 
CXVII.20f. Janko: On Poems V col. XXX.31 Mangoni. Add perhaps On Methods of Inference fr. 
I.13 De Lacy and De Lacy, On Poems I, col. CXCVII.17 Janko; On Death, col. II.11 Henry.  
386 Lucretius uses notitia and notities at On the Nature of Things II.124, II. 745, IV.476, IV.479, 
IV.854, V.124, V.183, and V.1047. However, it is far from clear whether he is straightforwardly 
translating prolēpsis in all these passages rather than referring to another kind of concept, that is, 
translating ennoia (see Glidden 1985: 179 pace Tsouna 2016: 202).  
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investigation and hence no new knowledge.387 Consequently, prolēpseis are often linked 
to the question of Plato’s Meno.388 In this dialogue, Plato famously investigates how we 
will come to know something if in fact we have no idea whatsoever of what this 
something we are looking for is – not even in some outline or preliminary form. In such a 
situation we would face a dilemma: either we would already know the thing in question 
and thus not need to come to know it or we would not know it and not be able to come to 
know it either. 
 While there is much dispute among scholars on what the question of the Meno 
actually consists in,389 at least according to one common reading, Plato’s answer in 
some way involves the theory of Forms and the idea that all learning is recollection. 
According to this reading, it is because human beings have innate ideas (the Forms) in 
them, they already potentially know all things.390 These innate ideas then only need to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 The corresponding texts are fr. 255 Usener (all translations are mine): “The Epicureans allege 
that prolēpseis are the cause of our investigating and finding. They say that if something is 
perceived clearly, its investigation is useless, but if it is not perceived clearly, how could we 
investigate something, which we did not grasp beforehand, beside the prolēpseis? [οἱ δὲ 
Ἐπικούρειοι τὰς προλήψεις (αἰτιῶνατι τοῦ ζητεῖν ἡµᾶς καὶ εὑρίσκειν). ἃς εἰ µὲν διηθρωµένας φάσι, 
πετιττὴ ἡ ζήτησις· εἰ δὲ ἀδιαρθρώτους, πῶς ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὰς προλήψεις ἐπιζητοῦµεν ὅ γε οὐδὲ 
προειλήφαµεν]” (Plutarch in Olympiodorus). “According to the Sage Epicurus, there is neither 
investigating nor raising a difficulty without a prolēpsis [οὐτε ζητεῖν οὐτε ἀπορεῖν ἐστι κατά τὸν 
σοφὸν Ἐπικουρον ἄνευ προλήψεως]” (Sextus, Against the Mathematicians I.57). “No one is 
capable of investigating or raising a difficulty or believing nor even of dialectally proving 
something without a prolēpsis [µὴ δύνασθαι δὲ µηδένα µήτε ζητῆσαι µήτε ἀπορῆσαι µηδὲ µὴν 
δοξάσαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἐλέγξαι χωρὶς προλήψεως]” (Clemens of Alexandria, Stromata II.4). 
388 Meno 81a ff.; see also Phaedo 72e ff. 
389 See above all Scott 1995 and Fine 2014 (with references to further literature). 
390 In the Meno, Plato explicitly writes that there is nothing that the soul has not learned 
previously: The soul is immortal and has previously “seen all things here and in the underworld, 
there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is in no way surprising that it can recollect the 
things it knew before, both about virtue and other things [ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου 
καὶ πάντα χρήµατα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ µεµάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυµαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ 
ἄλλων οἷόν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναµνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο]” (81c; Trans. Grube, 
emphasis added). Determining the exact scope of the theory of Forms and who is the subject of 
recollection in Plato is a notoriously difficult exercise. It seems implausible, for instance, to 
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actualized (recalled) in the process of learning in order for us to have knowledge of 
something. In the Meno, this is demonstrated in the elenchus with the slave boy who 
solves the mathematical problem of doubling the area of a square, although everyone 
agrees that he has had no prior knowledge of how to solve this problem.391 
 Commentators usually agree that the Epicurean answer is decidedly different 
than the Platonic one, but they disagree on how. In fact, almost everything about 
prolēpseis other than the fact that their role in Epicurean epistemology is to help us gain 
knowledge has been contested. In this vein, although prolēpseis are mentioned besides 
perceptions (aisthēseis) and feelings (pathē) as one of the three Epicurean criteria of 
truth,392 some scholars have maintained that this was not originally so.393 And similarly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
suppose that the soul also has knowledge of historical facts and came to know these potentially 
before the historical events occurred. However, the claim that there are some concepts that are 
innate, such as first concepts of equality and identity, seems much more easily defensible.  
Likewise, it is unclear whether Plato is offering a general theory of learning in expounding his 
recollection doctrine or merely discussing the way that philosophers come to know the Forms.  
391 See 82a ff. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle also takes up Meno’s paradox and agrees that 
we can only learn something if we already have some prior understanding of the thing to be 
learned (I.71a1 ff.). In order to evade the dilemma posed by Meno (that is, that we can neither 
look for what we already know – because there is no reason to look in that case – nor look for 
what we do not know – because we have no idea what to look for), Aristotle distinguishes 
between two kinds of knowing. According to the first kind, we know something in some way but 
not in another (τρόπον µέν τινα ἴσως φατέον ἐπίστασθαι, τρόπον δ' ἄλλον οὔ; 71a25f.). And 
according to the second way, we completely know something (ἁπλῶς […] ἐπίσταται; 71a28f.). In 
other words, Aristotle solves Meno’s paradox by arguing that in any investigation, we already 
have knowledge in the first sense, that is, knowledge that the thing one is investigating exists, 
which is the prerequisite for finding out what properties the object of investigation has. However, 
when investigating into something ‘unknown’, we do not have knowledge in the second sense. 
This is only the case ”whenever we think we are aware both that the explanation because of 
which the object is its explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise [ὅταν τήν τ' 
αἰτίαν οἰώµεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγµά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ µὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' 
ἄλλως ἔχειν]” (71b10 ff.; Trans. Barnes). 
392 On the idea of a criterion of truth (kriterion tēs alētheias), see especially Striker 1974 and 
Striker 1996. 
393 “Thus Epicurus, in the Kanōn (‘Yardstick’), says that sensations, prolēpseis, and feelings are 
the criteria of truth [ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπικουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς 
αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη.].” Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.31; Trans. by Long and 
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the classification of prolēpsis as a kind of ‘a priori’ in any investigation has been 
challenged on the basis that this ignores the textual evidence.394  
 This is not the place to develop an in-depth theory of Epicurean prolēpseis, which 
despite recent treatments is still very much a desideratum of modern Epicurean 
scholarship.395 The main aim of this section is to provide further support for the claim that 
human beings have a non-inferential understanding of the just. Let us thus turn to the 
issue of how prolēpseis are formed on the Epicurean view. The starting point for such an 
investigation is the detailed description of prolēpseis that we find in Diogenes Laertius: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sedley (= 17A), modified. Furley argues that prolēpseis were not originally a criterion but only 
made into one by later doxographers (1967: 209, n.6). The same view is also spelled out in 
greater detail in Glidden’s dissertation, which was supervised by Furley (1971: 162ff.; see also 
Rist 1972: 18). Perhaps the most persuasive answer to this challenge has been given by Striker 
who provides a positive account of how prolēpsis is distinct from the other criteria sensations and 
feelings and explains why prolēpseis are an important criterion of truth in Epicureanism (1974). A 
related problem is when and how Epicurus introduced prolēpseis as a technical term. In On 
Nature XXVIII, fr. 12, col. 3 Sedley, Epicurus reports that prior to coining the term prolēpsis, he 
used other terms to express the same idea, which has important consequences for dating 
Epicurean works. In regard to the Letter of Herodotus 78, see above all Sedley’s suggestion that 
this passage is a later interpolation  (1973: 14ff.). Sedley now seems to have slightly changed his 
view on this matter, though (see Janko 2000: 133, fn. 3). On the term ‘prolēpsis’ in the Letter to 
Menoeceus and the connected issue of dating the text, see Hessler 2014: 30.  
394 As the name says, there is something ‘prior’ about prolēpseis. However, this does not mean 
that prolēpseis are prior in the sense of Kant’s a priori, even if Kant himself claims the Epicureans 
for his purposes: “Man kann alle Erkenntnis, wodurch ich dasjenige, was zur empirischen 
Erkenntnis gehört, a priori erkennen und bestimmen kann, eine Antizipation nennen, und ohne 
Zweifel ist das die Bedeutung, in welcher Epikur seinen Ausdruck πρόληψις brauchte” (Critique of 
Pure Reason A 166f./ B 208 = Kant 1998 [1787]). Usually, commentators agree that prolēpsis is 
formed empirically, that is, to use Obi’s phrase, its apriority “is dependent on its aposteriority” 
(1993: 94; see the detailed discussion below). 
395 The most important treatments are Long 1971, Manuwald 1972, Jürss 1977, Goldschmidt 
2006 [1978], Glidden 1983, Glidden 1985, Glidden 1990, Obi 1993, Everson 1994, Barnes 1996, 
Glidden 1996, Hammerstaedt 1996, Goggins 2007, Morel 2008, Fine 2014: 226ff., and Tsouna 
2016. The discussions in Sandbach 1930 and Dyson 2009, although their focus lies on Stoic 
prolēpseis, are also relevant for the understanding of the Epicurean doctrine. Finally, since one of 
the most important passages on prolēpseis concerns the gods, the literature on Epicurean 
theology is also in part relevant. On this, see the references in Essler 2011 as well as the 
discussion below. 
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Prolēpseis, they [the Epicureans] say, is as it were an apprehension [katalēpsis], 
or correct opinion [doxa orthē], or conception [ennoia], or universal ‘stored notion’ 
[katholikē noēsis enapokeimenē], that is, memory of that which has frequently 
become evident externally: e.g. ‘Such and such a kind of thing is a man.’ For as 
soon as the word ‘man’ is uttered, immediately its imprint [tupos] also comes to 
mind by means of prolēpsis, since the senses give the lead. Thus what primarily 
underlies each name [onomati to prōtōs hupotetagmenon] is something self-
evident [enargeis]. And what we inquire about we would not have inquired about 
if we had not had prior knowledge of it. For example: ‘Is what’s standing over 
there a horse or a cow?’ For one must at some time come to know the form 
[morphē] of a horse and that of a cow by means of prolēpsis. Otherwise, we 
could not have named something unless we knew their form according to the 
prolēpsis beforehand. Thus prolēpseis are self-evident.396 
 
The enumeration at the beginning of the passage shows that Diogenes struggles 
to characterize prolēpseis definitely (“as it were [hoionei]”). He does not provide a 
straightforward definition of the technical term, but rather likens it to other technical 
terms of epistemological debates of the time.397 In what follows, I would like to focus on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν 
ἐναποκειµένην, τουτέστι µνήµην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος, οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν 
ἄνθρωπος· ἅµα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται 
προηγουµένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. παντὶ οὖν ὀνόµατι τὸ πρώτως ὑποτεταγµένον ἐναργές ἐστι· καὶ 
οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαµεν τὸ ζητούµενον εἰ µὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειµεν αὐτό· οἷον τὸ πόρρω ἑστὼς ἵππος 
ἐστὶν ἢ βοῦς· δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνωκέναι ποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βοὸς µορφήν· οὐδ' ἂν 
ὠνοµάσαµέν τι µὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον µαθόντες. ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσιν αἱ 
προλήψεις. Lives X.33 (= LS 17E); Trans. by Long and Sedley, modified. 
397 See Asmis 1984: 62ff. First, by using the word ‘katalēpsis’ (literally ‘grasp’), Diogenes relates 
prolēpsis to a Stoic technical notion. For the Stoics, kataleptic or comprehensible impressions 
(phantasiai katalēptikai) are clear and distinct likenesses of the things as they are (see, for 
instance, Diogenes Laertius, Lives VII.46 and 54 as well as Cicero, Academica II.83ff.). 
Consequently, they serve as the basis for (epistemological) assent and so knowledge in Stoic 
theory. Kataleptic impressions are characterized by the fact that they are always true. And it 
seems that when Diogenes characterizes prolēpseis as kataleptic, he above all wants to 
emphasize this aspect. As Asmis points out (1984: 62), though, katalēpsis and katalambanō 
became technical terms that were used by all schools in Hellenistic philosophy. So while 
katalēpsis is a term of Stoic origin, it is also found in several (non-suspicious) Epicurean texts. In 
any event, note also that a further point of communality is that for the Stoics kataleptic 
impressions are criteria of truth, just as for the Epicureans prolēpseis (paired with aisthēseis and 
pathē). By using ‘doxa orthē’, Diogenes, by contrast, refers to terms that may be recognized by 
Platonists. After all, Plato discusses the role of correct opinion in regard to knowledge at Meno 
98a ff. and Theaetetus 201c f. And, here again, the fact that prolēpseis are always true seems to 
be the important point of comparison between the Platonic and the Epicurean conception for 
Diogenes. Finally, by evoking the idea of a ‘katholikē noēsis enapokeimenē’ and a ‘mnēmē tou 
pollakis exōthen phanetos,’ Diogenes seems to be appealing to Peripatetic ideas, as I discuss in 
more detail below. 
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Diogenes’ claim that prolēpseis are a “universal stored notion” and “memory of that 
which has frequently become evident externally,” which recalls the account of concept 
formation in Aristotle and the Stoics.398 According to the Aristotelian and Stoic accounts, 
conceptual knowledge stands at the last stage of a multi-step process. This process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 This is the standard view. See, for instance, Bailey 1964 [1928]: 245f. pace Glidden 1985: 
182. Aristotle writes: “So from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory 
(when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience; for memories that are many 
in number form a single experience. And from experience, or from the whole universal that has 
come to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those 
things), there comes a principle of craft and of scientific knowledge – of craft knowledge if it deals 
with how things come about, of scientific knowledge if it deals with what is the case [Ἐκ µὲν οὖν 
αἰσθήσεως γίνεται µνήµη, ὥσπερ λέγοµεν, ἐκ δὲ µνήµης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινοµένης ἐµπειρία· 
αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ µνῆµαι τῷ ἀριθµῷ ἐµπειρία µία ἐστίν. ἐκ δ' ἐµπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεµήσαντος τοῦ 
καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης 
ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήµης, ἐὰν µὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήµης.]” Posteior 
Analytics II.19.100a3ff.; Trans. by Barnes, modified. Likewise, Aetius reports the Stoic view: 
“When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding-part of his soul like a sheet of 
paper ready for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his conceptions. The first method 
of inscription is through the senses. For by perceiving something, e.g. white, they have a memory 
of it when it has departed. And when many memories of a similar kind have occurred, we then 
say we have experience. For the plurality of similar expressions is experience. Some conceptions 
arise naturally in the aforesaid ways and undesignedly, others through our own instruction and 
attention. The latter are called ‘conceptions’ only, the former are called ‘preconceptions’ as well. 
Reason, for which we are called rational, is said to be completed from our preconceptions during 
our first seven years [οἱ Στωικοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεµονικὸν µέρος τῆς 
ψύχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτην εὔεργον εἰς άπογραφήν· εἰς τοῦτο µίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιών 
ἐναπογράφεται. πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. αἰσθόµενοι γάρ τινος 
οἷον λευκοῦ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ µνήµην ἔχουσιν· ὅταν δὲ ὁµοειδεῖς πολλαὶ µνῆµαι γένωνται, τότε 
φαµὲν ἔχειν ἐµπειρίαν· ἐµπειρία γάρ ἐστι τὸ τῶν ὁµοειδῶν φάντασιῶν πλῆθος. Τῶν δὲ ἐννοιῶν αἱ 
µὲν φυσικῶς γίγνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρηµένους τρόπους καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως, αἱ δὲ ἤδη δι᾽ ἡµετέρας 
διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιµελείας· αὗται µὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται µόνον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. ὁ δὲ 
λόγος, καθ᾽ ὃν προσαγορευόµεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συµπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν 
πρώτην ἑβδοµάδα].” Aetius IV.11.1ff. = LS 39E); Trans. by Long and Sedley. In both cases, it is 
probably too rash to insist that the processes that are described are identical to the Epicurean 
account. In regard to the Stoics, Sandbach notes in an influential article in 1930 that it is telling 
that we do not have any texts that document a disagreement between the Stoics and Epicureans 
on what a prolēpsis is. He therefore reasons that this was surprising if the Stoics and the 
Epicureans indeed had very different conceptions of what counts as a prolēpsis (1930: 49f.). 
However, since absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, scholars have lately been 
backing away from such an assessment, trying to point out differences between the Stoics and 
the Epicureans when it comes to prolēpseis (see, for instance, Manuwald 1972: 14ff., Asmis 
1984: 64, Glidden 1985: 179, Goggins 2007, and Dyson 2009). In particular, Asmis points out 
(ibid.) that a major difference between both the Stoics and the Aristotelians on the one hand and 
the Epicureans on the other hand seems to be that the Epicureans thought that prolēpseis were a 
basic pre-scientific form of understanding, while the Stoic and Aristotelian accounts seem to aim 
at a more sophisticated form of knowing (in this context, see also the comments in Scott 1995: 
89ff.). 
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begins with isolated perceptions (aisthēseis) that are bundled in memories (mnēmai). 
Repeated memories, in turn, produce experience (empeiria), which, in the last step, 
depending on its object, yields scientific knowledge (epistēmē) or craft (technē), that is, 
concepts. 
In contrast with Aristotle and the Stoics, the Epicurean theory does not explicitly 
discuss the role of experience in his account of prolēpseis.399 But the first two or three 
stages of the Aristotelian and Stoic account seem to map very well onto the Epicurean 
account, especially since Epicurus makes clear elsewhere that perceptions themselves 
do not involve memory.400 In other words, Epicurean prolēpseis can be said either to 
unify multiple perceptions to constitute a single memory or to form what Aristotle calls 
experience by being the product of multiple memories.401 After all, a prolēpsis is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 The following discussion is heavily indebted to Dyson 2009: 115ff. ‘Empeiria’ is only used 
twice in the extant texts of Epicurus (fr. 24 Arrighetti 3.5 and 18.5). 
400 At least according to Diogenes Laertius’ report: “Indeed, he says, all perceptions are irrational 
and not capable of receiving any memory because they neither move by themselves nor having 
been moved by another, are they capable of adding or subtracting something [πᾶσα γάρ, φησίν, 
αἴσθησις ἄλογός ἐστι καὶ µνήµης οὐδεµιᾶς δεκτική· οὔτε γὰρ ὑφ' αὑτῆς κινεῖται οὔτε ὑφ' ἑτέρου 
κινηθεῖσα δύναταί τι προςθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν].” Lives X.31. 
401 De Witt (1964: 144f.) criticizes that Diogenes’ account that links prolēpseis and repeated 
memory as nonsensical. He claims that a child, for instance, can have a concept of a thing 
without seeing multiple instantiations of the thing in question; the child can recognize an elephant 
again, even if this was the first and only instance it has seen such an animal. There are two 
answers to this criticism. The first is that even when we see an elephant only once, we – 
according to Epicurus – have multiple images of it that impinge on our sensual apparatus. In 
other words, even if we see the elephant only once, we will have a prolēpsis of it because the one 
time it presented itself to us is already an aggregation of several images. Second, one could insist 
that the “many times” at Lives X.31 is meant to signal that a perceiver has to see an object 
enough times because commonly, it takes repeated sense impressions in order for us to form a 
‘concept’ that is robust enough to be used as a certain criterion in perception. For instance, a 
perceiver might be instantly able to form some concept of cilantro when she sees it only once, but 
having formed such a concept, it might be difficult for her to distinguish cilantro from flat leaf 
parsley, especially if she is only acquainted with curly leaf parsley. Here, more experience with 
these herbs is needed so that the perceiver will be able to reliably discriminate between the two. 
Furthermore, as an added complication, there might be differences in learning capabilities among 
human beings, and arguably, someone who cannot distinguish flat leaf parsley and cilantro, even 
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“memory of that which has frequently become evident externally.” Accordingly, an apt 
metaphor for this way of understanding Epicurean prolēpseis is that of a composite 
photograph, as some commentators have suggested.402 The idea here is that prolēpseis 
are to be understood as images that are themselves the result of series of superimposed 
images. This again is very much in line with the idea that presentations (phantasiai) 
come to be through the stream of images that each object emits by means of 
compression (puknōma) or residue (egkataleimma), as was shown above.403 
In the context of the discussion of how human beings come to have an 
understanding of justice, the important upshot of this analysis is that Epicurean 
prolēpseis do not yet constitute knowledge, but are rather a more basic form of 
cognition.404 In other words, prolēpseis are not ennoia or epinoiai (concepts) if one 
means by this the concepts that are acquired by science. As Aristotle explains in the 
Metaphysics, an agent with experience only knows how to handle a particular case and, 
unlike an agent who has knowledge, does not know the reason why (to dioti kai tēn 
aitian) something is the case and is unable to teach a third party.405 Accordingly, to 
elucidate the way prolēpseis function in Epicurean theory, Diogenes Laertius, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
if they have some idea of it, does not really have a prolēpsis of cilantro but rather a false 
supposition thereof.  
402 Bailey 1964 [1928]: 245; see also Taylor 1911: 47. For criticism of Bailey’s metaphor, see 
above all Glidden 1971: 171ff. For a discussion of Glidden’s criticism, see in turn Obi 1993: 98ff. 
as well as Asmis 1984: 65. 
403 On puknōma and egkataleimma, see the comments in Verde 2010: 135. 
404 See also Goldschmidt 2006 [1978] 46f. This raises the interesting question of whether animals 
are also able to have prolēpseis. In this context, see my discussion of animal minds in chapter 2. 
There, it was argued that Polystratus claims that animals do not have memory, which would 
mean they do not have prolēpseis, either.  
405 Aristotle, Metaphysics I.1.980a26ff. 
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passage quoted above, gives the example of identifying an unspecified object in the 
distance as either a horse or a cow. Arguably, this is not a case of a prolēpsis being 
employed as an initial concept in a scientific inquiry, but rather a case where a prolēpsis 
is used as an everyday conceptual device. Nevertheless, the passage describes the kind 
of understanding a perceiver has, when she has a prolēpsis: She can classify objects 
she has perceived and so has a functional understanding of the world rather than 
scientific knowledge thereof, which, presumably, would be the product of more elaborate 
reasoning.  
 That prolēpseis do not constitute knowledge also follows from the two further 
considerations. First, the examples of what a prolēpsis conjures up when it is evoked – 
both in the Diogenes passage quoted above and elsewhere – suggest that there is at 
least some visual component to prolēpseis. By this, I mean that ‘tupos’ and ‘morphē’ can 
at least be understood as visual metaphors and as a result, a prolēpsis of a horse can 
be thought of as a kind of blueprint of a horse that allows a perceiver to compare the 
presentation of a horse that enters her mind via the senses with a ‘picture’ that she has 
been imprinted on her mind. Of course, ‘tupos’ and ‘morphē’ could also be understood 
as referring to an intelligible form of the object, but this cannot be said of the articulation 
of the prolēpsis of a human being as ‘such and such a form with animateness’: this 
strongly suggests that there is at least something pictorial about prolēpseis. In other 
words, what is important in regard to prolēpseis, as for Epicurean definitions, is not that 
they capture the essence of the entity that they are describing, but rather that they help 
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agents identify the salient properties of an entity in order to engage with this object in a 
practical way.406   
Second, that prolēpsis does not yet constitute knowledge also emerges from a 
passage in Hermarchus that was already briefly discussed in chapter 3:407 
Some of the brightest people of that time, keeping in mind that they themselves 
abstained from killing because this is useful for security, reminded others what 
would result from their association with each other, so that abstaining from their 
kin they would safeguard the community which was working for the individual 
security of each. Separating themselves out, and doing nothing to injure those 
who had gathered in the same place, was useful not only for excluding animals of 
other kinds, but also for dealing with human beings who came to do harm. For a 
time, then, they held back from their kinsman inasmuch as he was entering the 
same community for providing necessities and was making some contribution to 
both the purposes mentioned [that is, repelling threats from animals as well as 
from other human beings]. But as time went on and reproduction greatly 
increased, and other kinds of animals (and their dragging away of victims) had 
been driven out, some people acquired a rational analysis [epilogismos] of what 
was beneficial on their sustenance of each other, not just an non-rational 
memory [alogos mnēmē].408 
 
 The context for the passage is the discussion of how human beings acquire the 
knowledge that it is advantageous not to kill their neighbors or – in short – that it is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 On definitions in Epicureanism in general, see Besnier 1994, Mansfeld 1994, and Giovacchini 
2003. On the idea of  outline accounts (hupographē), which in a certain way replace definitions, 
see Letter to Menoeceus 123 along with the comments in Manuwald 1972: 57ff., Asmis 1984: 
42ff., and Fine 2014: 237ff. The Epicurean rejection of definitions is found at Cicero, On Ends 
II.5f.  
407 On the significance of this passage, see also Müller 1987: 236ff.  
408 Διαµνηµονεύοντες δέ τινες τῶν τότε χαριεστάτων ὡς αὐτοί τε ἀπέσχοντο τοῦ κτείνειν διὰ τὸ 
χρήσιµον πρὸς τἠν σωτηρίαν, τοῖς τε λοιποῖς ἐνεποίουν µνήµην τοῦ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐν ταῖς µετ᾽ 
ἀλλήλων συντροφαῖς, ὅπως ἀπεχόµενοι τοῦ συγγενοῦς διαφυλάττωσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, ἥ συνήργει 
πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἑκάστου σωτηρίαν. Οὐ µόνον δὲ χρήσιµον ἦν τὸ χωρίζεσθαι µηδὲ λυµαντικὸν 
ποιεῖν µηδὲν τῶν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτον τόπον συνειλεγµένων πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀλλοφύλων ἐξόρισµα ζῴων. 
ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ παραγιγνοµένους. Μέχρι µὲν οὖν τινος διὰ ταύτην 
ἀπείχοντο τοῦ συγγενοῦς, ὅσον ἐβάδιζεν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρείας τινὰς 
παρείχετο πρὸς ἑκαστερον τῶν εἰρηµένων· ἐλθόντος δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῆς δι᾽ 
ἀλλήλων γενέσεως µακρὰν προηκούσης, ἐξεωσµένων δὲ τῶν ἀλλοφύλων ζῴων καὶ τῆς 
παρασπάρσεως, ἐπιλογισµὸν ἔλαβον τινες τοῦ συµφέροντος ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλων τροφαῖς, οὐ 
µόνον ἄλογον µνήµην. Hermarchus fr. 34 Longo Auricchio = Porphyry, On Abstinence I.10.2ff.; 
Trans. by Clark, modified. 
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just to do so. Hermarchus explicitly distinguishes between the brightest human beings 
who possess the capacity of ‘rational analysis’ (epilogismos) and those, the many, who 
merely have an ‘irrational memory’ (alogos mnēmē), that is, a prolēpsis. In other words, 
then, the passage seems to suggest that in the logismos-phase of cultural development, 
which, as I argue in chapter 3, is the second phase of development, some human beings 
begin to acquire concepts that go beyond prolēpseis. Others only operate at the level of 
prolēpseis, that is, have functional concepts that allow them to structure their experience 
without deeper understanding of the phenomena in question. Consequently, the 
difference between having a prolēpsis and having a scientific concept lies, just as in 
Aristotle, in the fact that those with logismos have reached a more thorough 
understanding of an entity than those who merely possess a prolēpsis. Indeed, in the 
latter case, it seems that the mind has only processed the presentation in a minimal way, 
if at all, while a presentation is processed in a more comprehensive way and the 
perceiver has a more comprehensive understanding in the case of scientific 
knowledge.409 
Some commentators have offered a different reading of this passage, though, 
and instead suggested that the difference between the preeminent individuals and the 
many in the passage lies in the fact that there are prolēpseis of higher and lower 
generality.410 Accordingly, the above passage is taken to show that human beings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 See also Tsouna 2016: 170 who seems to hold a similar view. Cole objects that at least some 
thoughts pertaining to justice require more complex reasoning than the Epicureans concede here: 
“Memory will tell a man to seek out his fellows when in need of help; but to say, ‘I will not kill this 
man; he might help me at some time in the future,’ requires forethought as well as hindsight and 
the art of connecting one piece of data with another which is the work of logismos (or, more 
accurately, synesis), not alogos mnēmē” (1990 [1967]: 73).  I take it though that even the process 
of acquiring a prolēpsis involves some process of abstraction.  
410 Jürss 1977: 221f., Goldschmidt 2006 [1978]: 46ff., and Müller 1987: 238. Philodemus, On 
Anger col. XLIV.41ff, Indelli suggests that the Epicureans allowed that prolēpseis are 
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acquire ‘inferential’ prolēpseis, besides ‘basic’ non-inferential prolēpseis, at a later stage 
in the process of cultural development. On this reading, the brightest human beings who 
possess epilogismos do not create a scientific concept, as on my reading, but rather a 
more general prolēpsis. This alternative way of understanding the passage is backed by 
a certain understanding of a further passage in Diogenes Laertius, according to which 
concepts (epinoiai) come to be in one of four ways, by direct experience (periptōsis), 
analogy (analogia), likeness (homoiotēs), and combination (sunthesis).411 Defenders of 
this reading argue that basic preconceptions come about via periptōsis, while more 
general prolēpseis come about in other ways mentioned. 
This reading, however, seems to have problems accounting for scientific 
concepts that are different from prolēpseis. After all, if more general prolēpseis come 
about by analogy, likeness, and combination, how can Epicureans appeal to scientific 
concepts, since nothing distinguishes these concepts in the process of formation from 
prolēpseis? Certainly, there may not be any scientific concepts on the Epicurean view, 
but then it seems odd and confusing that the Epicureans use other terms such as 
epinoia, ennoēma, ennoia, etc. If, by contrast, more general prolēpseis come about by 
only one or two of the three ways described in Diogenes Laertius, the Epicureans could 
distinguish scientific concepts and prolēpseis in terms of their processes of formation. 
However, the question of what distinguishes general prolēpseis and scientific concepts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
hierarchically structured; some prolēpseis are more general than others: “It also pleases the 
leading men [= Epicurus, Hermarchus, Meterodorus, and Polyaenus] that the Sage does not 
become angry according to this prolēpsis but according to a more general one [ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ 
τοῖς καθηγεµόσιν οὐ τὸ κατ[ὰ] τὴν πρόληψιν [τ]αύτην θυµωθησεσθαι τὸν σο[φ]όν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ 
τὴν κοι[ν]οτέραν].” Trans. mine. 
411 Lives X.32. Admittedly, the addition of “reason too contributing something [sumballomenou ti 
kai tou logismos]” (Trans. by Bailey) is rather mysterious. One would like to know what exactly 
reason contributes and if this is true of all four conjuncts.  
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in terms of their functional role within Epicureanism would still remain open. Finally, 
there is also a more general problem. The sentence immediately preceding the 
enumeration of the four ways epinoiai come about states that these epinoiai are about 
the non-evident (adēlon). The full passage reads: “Hence it is from the appearances 
[apo tōn phainomenōn] that we must draw inferences about the non-evident [peri tōn 
adēlōn]. For all notions [epinoiai] come to be by direct experience, analogy, likeness, 
and composition, with some slight aid from reasoning [tou logismou].”412  
By ‘non-evident,’ the Epicureans refer to an epistemological class of objects that 
is completely separate from the class of objects that are manifest, evident, or observable 
(enargēs or prosdēlon).413 The prime example of adēla are atoms and void, since both 
are so small that they cannot be observed by sense experience. While atoms and void 
cannot be observed by the senses, the Epicureans claim that human beings can have 
knowledge of the void, for instance, via inferences that comes about with the help of 
reason. This is what Epicurus calls non-counter-witnessing (ouk antimarturēsis): the 
process by which the compatibility of the existence of something adēlon with what is 
directly manifested and plainly observed (enargēs/ prosdēlon) is asserted. In the case of 
void, one can illustrate this by the following pattern of inference:414 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινοµένων χρή σηµειοῦσθαι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπίνοιαι πᾶσαι 
ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γεγόνασι κατὰ τε περίπτωσιν καὶ ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁµοιότητα καὶ σύνθεσιν, 
συµβαλλοµένου τι καὶ τοῦ λογισµοῦ. X.32; Trans. by Hicks, modified. 
413 According to Inwood and Gerson, prosdēlon is “something evident which does not depend on 
something else for its truth or knowability” (1997: 405) and enargeia (the noun corresponding to 
the adjective enargēs) is “an originally Epicurean term for a presentation obtained directly by the 
sense or the intellect without interpretative additions. Also, self-evidence” (ibid.: 400). On the 
meaning of enargēs, see also the discussion in Glidden 1971: 182ff. (who argues that the term 
should be translated as ‘clear,’ not as ‘evident’).  
414 Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.40. I am simplifying the argument and leaving aside the problem of 
the void as something, in which bodies come to be, which is also mentioned in the passage. 
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1. If there were no void, there would be no movement. 
2. There is movement. 
3. There is void.415 
Now, since prolēpseis, according to Diogenes Laertius’ account at Lives X.33, 
were said to become evident or appear outside (pollakis exōthen phanentos), but adēla 
cannot do so (they are not objects of direct sense experience), it follows that there are 
no prolēpseis of things that are adēla.416 Furthermore, this means for the Diogenes 
passage that we were discussing that it does not at all comment on how prolēpseis are 
being formed, but rather refer to a completely different process, namely, the process of 
how scientific concepts come about. Furthermore, this, of course, means for the 
Hermarchus passage that it probably does not describe how some people obtain 
prolēpseis of higher generality, but rather how they obtain concepts that are distinct from 
prolēpseis. 
 If this reading so far is correct and the intervention of the mind in the formation of 
prolēpseis is as minimal as I have argued, then prolēpseis can indeed be an alogos 
operation, where ‘alogos’ is also perhaps fittingly translated ‘unreflective.’417 In other 
words, the conclusion that on the Epicurean view, human beings have a non-inferential 
understanding of justice becomes more and more inevitable. Given that there is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 While the first claim is an assumption for the sake of the inference, the second one is a direct 
result of sense perception, which Epicurus also refers to as witnessing (epimaturēsis). The third 
claim follows deductively from 1 and 2. On epimaturēsis and antimaturēsis, see, for instance, the 
discussion in Asmis 1984 as well as the remarks in Dumont 1982. 
416 Accordingly, Sedley and Fine also argue that there will not be any prolēpseis of atoms, 
precisely because they defy direct observation (Sedley 2011: 42 and Fine 2014: 236 pace 
Tsouna 2016: 170). Similarly problematic is the question of whether there are prolēpseis of 
imaginary beings such as centaurs. Fine (2014: 235) argues that there are not, whereas Asmis 
(1984: 65) takes the contrary view. 
417 See also Müller 1987: 237.  
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prolēpsis of the just418 and given the way that prolēpseis come about, it follows that 
human beings receive presentations of the just via the senses in a non-inferential way 
and, consequently, that Epicurean perceivers must have presentations of what is just in 
the same way they have presentations of something being black or white. 
This brings us to the second objection against the claim that human beings come 
to have an understanding of what is just in a non-inferential way via sense experience, 
namely, that knowledge of the just is not obtained by the sense at all, but by the mind. 
To explain this objection, some comments on the Epicurean views on the gods are in 
order. Unfortunately, there is not much agreement among scholars on Epicurean 
theology.419 However, it seems that scholars do largely agree that Epicurean gods are 
an example of an object of which human beings acquire an understanding via the mind 
and not via sense perception.420 This is particularly interesting because it could suggest 
that agents do not come to understand what is just via the senses; the analogy between 
the non-moral and the moral, between the claims that an apple is red and that a person 
is just, does not hold. Yet there is some indication that the gods are indeed a special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418 KD 37 and 38. Manuwald is more skeptical about whether one can say anything about the 
creation of the prolēpsis of the just (1972: 84ff.), but, following Müller 1987: 237, fn. 15, I take this 
view to be refuted by the passage in Hermachus that was discussed above. 
419 A good overview of the relevant scholarship is found in Essler 2011: 18ff. Further important 
contributions are Sedley 2011 (who argues for the idealist view) and Konstan 2011 (who argues 
for the realist view).  
420 “Epicurus, however, who not merely discerns abstruse and recondite things with the mind, but 
handles them as tangible realities, teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such 
that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind [Epicurus autem, qui res 
occultas et penitus abditas non modo videat animo sed etiam sic tractet ut manu, docet eam esse 
vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur].” Cicero, On the Nature of the 
Gods I.49f. Trans. by Rackham, modified.  
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case in Epicureanism.421 Accordingly, they can either be said to actually exist in the 
interstices of the different worlds (metakosmoi/ intermundia), as on the so-called realist 
reading, or they can be said to be mere projections without a corresponding object, as 
on the so-called idealist reading. On both readings, though, the gods are quite unlike the 
just. Pace the realist reading that claims the gods are outside our world, the just actually 
exists in the phenomenal world around us and so would be directly accessible to human 
sense experience. And pace the idealist reading, the just actually exists in the world and 
has corresponding basic objects in our world and is not merely the product of an 
intellectual abstraction. In short, then, there is no reason to deny that, on the Epicurean 
view, human beings come to have a non-inferential understanding of what is just in the 
same way that they come to know that the cat is black, namely, via sense experience.422 
7.3. The Political Function of the prolēpsis of the Just 
Having laid out how agents come to have an understanding of justice above, I 
now turn to a different, but related feature of prolēpseis, namely, how agents specifically 
classify something as just and what significance the ability to classify something as just 
with the help of a prolēpsis has for the Epicurean theory of justice and law as a whole. In 
doing so, I will examine KD 37 and 38, which explicitly speak of a prolēpsis of the just: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 Obbink suggests a list of existents that may be perceived by thought. On his view, “[t]hese 
include not only the gods […], but ideas of humans and horses, imaginables such as satyrs, 
mathematicals, and certain aspects of bodies. […] (Void/location, since it lacks the power, 
characteristic of body, to act upon the senses, must also be discoverable by thought)” (1996: 
341).  
422 It seems that it is possible that insofar as the gods are just, one can have an understanding of 
what is just via the prolēpsis of the gods, but it does not follow that one can only have an 
understanding of what is just in this way. This would perhaps be a case where a prolēpsis of one 
thing (here: the gods) entails that of another (the just). Likewise, one may also argue that even in 
the case of things apprehended by the mind, the mind still relies on sense data in some way so 
that there is nothing that is purely perceptible by the mind. See Verde 2009: 90ff.  
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Among the things that are acknowledged to be just, whatever is attested to be 
beneficial in the requirements of mutual intercourse, has its existence in the 
domain of justice, whether or not it turns out to be the same for all. But if 
someone makes a law and it does not happen to accord to the beneficial of 
mutual intercourse, it no longer has the nature of justice. And even if what is 
beneficial in the sphere of justice changes but fits the prοlēpsis for some time, it 
was no less just throughout that time for those who do not confuse themselves 
with empty utterances but simply look at the facts.423 
 
Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, things that were 
acknowledged to be just have been shown not to accord with the prolēpsis in 
actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when the circumstances have 
changed, the things acknowledged to be just no longer lead to benefit, there they 
were just at the same time when they were of benefit for the dealings of fellow-
citizens with one another; but subsequently they are no longer just, when no 
longer of benefit.424 
 
 Following Manuwald, the texts can be summarized by five main claims, which are 
not mutually exclusive:425 
1. The things acknowledged to be just (ta nomisthenta dikaia) are really just 
whenever they are beneficial (sumphera) in the mutual intercourse among people 
(KD 37). 
2. If the things acknowledged to be just are not beneficial, then these things are no 
longer just (KD 37). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Τὸ µὲν ἐπιµαρτυρούµενον ὅτι συµφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν 
νοµισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων ἔχει τὸ ἐν τοῦ δικαίου χώραν εἶναι, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε 
µὴ τὸ αὐτό. ἐάν δὲ νόµον θῆταί τις, µὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συµφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους 
κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει. κἂν µεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συµφέρον 
χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρµόττῃ, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς µὴ 
φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς εἰς τὰ πράγµατα βλέπουσιν. KD 37 (= LS 
22B); translation by Long and Sedley, modified. 
424 Ἔνθα µὴ καινῶν γενοµένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγµάτων ἀνεφάνη µὴ ἐναρµόττοντα εἰς τὴν 
πρόληψιν τὰ νοµισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια· ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν 
γενοµένων τῶν πραγµάτων οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείµενα, ἐνταῦθα δὴ τότε µὲν ἦν 
δίκαια ὅτε συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συµπολιτευοµένων. ὕστερον δ' οὐκ 
ἦν ἔτι δίκαια, ὅτε µὴ συνέφερεν. KD 38; Trans. Bailey; translation modified. 
425 1972: 81. 
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3. What is beneficial can change. However, if things that have been acknowledged 
to be just agree with the prolēpsis of the just for some time, then these things are 
or were just for that time (KD 37). 
4. A change in circumstances aside, what is acknowledged to be just is just only if it 
accords with the prolēpsis of the just (KD 38).  
5.  In the event of a change in the circumstances, what was acknowledged to be 
just and formerly accorded with the prolēpsis of the just may no longer accord 
with the prolēpsis. In this case, what was acknowledged to be just is no longer 
just, even though it was just before the change (KD 38). 
Note that there is an ambiguity in the expression “things acknowledged to be just 
[ta nomisthenta dikaia].”426 ‘Nomizein’ can mean both to enact as law and to believe.  
Consequently, the expression could refer to the initial agreements in the original state 
(which are not yet law) or it could refer to the legal enactments that are characteristic of 
the second phase of cultural development. While KD 37 speaks of a law that is set 
down, which makes the latter meaning more likely, KD 38 leaves open whether which 
sense to give nomizein. It may thus be unduly restrictive to assume that what is true of 
the initial agreements in regard to the prolēpsis is not also true of the agreements that 
lead to the existence of law. 
Be this as it may, KD 37 and 38 explain how it is possible for the Epicureans to 
evaluate or classify an existing agreement as just and unjust. In doing so, the 
Epicureans emphasize that on their view, something is not merely just because of the 
act of the agreement that is formed among agents, that, for instance, it is not unjust to 
harm others merely because agents have agreed on such behavior. Rather, for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 Ibid.: 81, fn. 1. 
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Epicureans, it is ultimately just not to harm because of the content, that is, because not 
harming is more beneficial than the contrary. What is beneficial, in turn, is, as I argued in 
chapter 1, an objective fact about the world on the Epicurean view; and such a fact, I 
argued in the previous sections of this chapter, is directly perceived by perceivers. With 
this in mind, one can easily understand the distinction between things that are 
acknowledged to be just (ta nomisthenta dikaia) and those that are actually just (ta 
dikaia). At first, the reference to something ‘actually just’ may be a bit surprising. After 
all, I argued at length that what is just is an agreement in Epicureanism. However, in 
accordance with what I argued above, what is just is not merely an agreement, it is also 
based on facts about the world in some way, especially on what is beneficial. In 
asserting that what is acknowledged to be just and what is actually just can come apart, 
the Epicureans are able to account for the fact that some agreements are in fact unjust 
and that there is in fact more to an agreement than merely the act of agreeing. The 
success of the agreement, in other words, does not merely lie in the agreeing itself but 
also in the content of the agreement and its desirability given objective reality. In this 
vein, an agreement that would require human beings to do or not to do something that is 
in disagreement with what is beneficial for human nature (whatever this may be) can 
surely not become the content of a just agreement. 
In any case, Epicurean prolēpseis can be used to gage what is ‘actually just’ as 
opposed to what has been agreed upon as just. As I explained above, having a prolēpsis 
of a thing amounts to having a functional understanding of a thing. Accordingly, the 
prolēpsis of the just is a functional understanding that human beings have of the just, 
independently of the agreements to which they are subjected. Since this understanding 
may no longer be applicable as circumstances change, the prolēpsis of the just offers 
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agents the possibility to diagnose the change in circumstances. The prolēpsis of the just 
can thus serve as the standard (kanōn) against which something is checked. This allows 
for a more nuanced understanding of justice. Agreements or laws are not merely just 
and unjust without qualification, but are just and unjust in reference to a point and period 
in time, which are added as factors to be taken into account when considering whether 
an agreement or law is just. An agreement or law is just whenever it corresponds to the 
prolēpsis of the just but is not just when it does not correspond to it. For instance, a law 
that imposes a fine on the damage of another person’s property is just if it prevents this 
damage, being in accord with the prolēpsis of the just according to which what is 
beneficial in the mutual dealings among human beings is just. However, if the 
circumstances change in such a way that a fine is no longer considered an appropriate 
sanction mechanism, for instance, that it is too low and considered negligible and so 
even incentivizes damaging someone’s property in case of conflicts (as opposed to other 
forms of retribution), then such a law on the Epicurean view is certainly no longer just, 
even if it was just for the time that it achieved its purpose of being beneficial. 
Put again differently, in contradistinction to Thomas Hobbes, for whom there is 
no justice outside the law in the state of nature and hence in society, no meaningful way 
to criticize a law or ordinance that was issued by the sovereign as unjust,427 the 
Epicurean notion of prolēpsis is a tool to recognize that an agreement or law has 
become unjust. This is important because such a diagnosis is the prerequisite for a 
change so that a law may again be in accord with what is beneficial. Pace Reimar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 At Leviathan XIII.13, Hobbes writes: “To this war of every man against every man, this also is 
consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have 
there [that is, in the state of nature] no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; 
where no law, no injustice.” 
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Müller,428 one therefore has to agree with Antonina Alberti that prolēpseis are an 
objective criterion by the help of which things that are legislated as just can be 
criticized.429 The Epicureans neither think that the agreements of justice and the laws are 
merely just because they exist nor that justice and the laws are wholly relative. Instead, 
the agreements of justice and the laws are just because they are beneficial for the 
mutual relationships among human beings and correspond to prolēpsis of the just and 
this benefit is an objective fact about the world. The prolēpsis of the just is thus the 
outside criterion that allows agents to evaluate whether laws are just. 
Finally, note that although prolēpseis are a powerful tool of diagnosing the just, 
the Epicureans acknowledge that people can go wrong in regard to prolēpseis. As a 
passage in the Letter to Menoeceus shows, the many mistake false suppositions 
(hupolēpseis pseudes) for genuine prolēpseis.430 Furthermore, even reasonable people 
can disagree about how to articulate the content of a prolēpsis and it can be somewhat 
of a discursive exercise to find out what is entailed by a given prolēpsis.431 Recall in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 1972: 109. 
429 1995: 187ff. 
430 123; see also Philodemus, Rhetoric I.255, col. XXI.10ff. Sudhaus as well as Diogenes 
Laertius, Lives 34 and PHerc. 1251 col. IX Tsouna and Indelli. 
431 The main example of this is the prolēpsis of a good money-maker that is discussed in 
Philodemus’ On Property Management: “We must not, on the other hand, [violate] this [sc. the 
meaning of the expression the ‘good moneymaker’] through [the ordinary usage] of linguistic 
expressions, as sophists do, especially as we would be showing nothing about the acquisition 
and use [of wealth] pertaining to the wise man. Rather, we must refer to the preconception that 
we possess about a good moneymaker, ask in whom the content of that preconception is 
substantiated and in what manner that person makes money, and ascribe the predicate ‘good 
moneymaker’ [to whom it may be in whom] those features are attested. For just this reason, if we 
want to claim that, in the preconception, the good moneymaker is the one who acquires and 
takes care of wealth in accordance with what is advantageous, then we must proclaim the sage 
above all such a man. But if, on the other hand, in the preconception, we apply the quality of the 
good moneymaker rather to the man [who obtains for himself] many possessions with ability and 
experience, and also not in a dishonorable way but lawfully, however much it may be true [in this 
mode of acquisition] he encounters more sufferings than pleasures, then we must affirm that it is 
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context that the Epicureans also are not committed to the claim that all human beings 
have the same mental capacities: Not everyone is capable of being a Sage and human 
mental dispositions vary.432 Consequently, it will take skill and learning to grasp a 
prolēpsis and the danger that just anyone can appeal to a prolēpsis to proclaim his or 
her view on what is just is somewhat mitigated. Prolēpseis are only valuable criteria of 
diagnosis because they are infallible guides to truth from an Epicurean point of view, but 
this does not mean that everyone at all times will be able to make use of such a guide. 
7.4. Summary 
 In this chapter, I discussed Epicurean moral epistemology. I first argued that 
Epicurean agents come to have an understanding of justice in the same way that they 
have an understanding of everyday objects. I established this claim by appealing to the 
metaphysical status of the just as an accidental property that is ontologically in the same 
category as other non-moral accidental properties and to the Epicurean commitment to 
an atomistic theory of perception according to which all accidental properties, which 
includes the just, can become objects of perception. Second, I showed in this chapter 
that Epicurean agents not only come to have an understanding of the just via sense 
experience, but that this understanding is itself non-inferential, that is, that it does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
people other than sages who belong to that category [sc. of good moneymakers] [Οὐ µὴν 
[ἀπο]βιαστέον γε τοῦτ᾽ ἐστιν δ[ιὰ] τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἑρµηνείας συ[νηθ]ειῶν καὶ ταῦτα µηθὲν 
ἐνδεικνυµένους περὶ τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ [κ]τήσεώς τε καὶ χρήσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἀνάγοντας ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἡµῖν πρόληψι[ν] περὶ ἀγαθοῦ χρηµατ[ιστ]οῦ , σκεπτέον τε ἐν τίνι 
τὸ προειληµµένον καὶ τῶι πῶς χρηµατιζοµένωι, καὶ [ὧι] ἂν ἐκεῖν᾽ ἐπιµαρτυρῆται, κατηγογητέον 
τ[οῦ]το χρηµατιστὴν ἀγαθόν· διόπερ εἰ µὲν βουλόµεθα λέγειν ἐν προλήψει τοῦτον ἀγαθὸν 
χρηµατιστὴ[ν] τὸν κα[τὰ] τὸ συµφέρον κτώµενον [κα]ὶ ἐπιµελόµενον π[λο]ύτου, τὸν σοφὸν µάλιστα 
το[ι]οῦτον εἶναι ῥητέον· εἰ [δὲ] µᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὸν δυνατῶς καὶ ἐντέχνως πολλὰ πορι[ζ]ό[µεν]ον καὶ 
µήτε αἰσχρῶς ἐννόµ[ω]ς τε φέροµεν ἐν προλήψει τὸν ἀγαθον χρηµατιστήν, κἂν ὅτι µάλιστα 
πλεῖ[ον κα]κοπαθῇ κτώµενος [οὕτω]ς ἤπερ ἥδηται, µᾶλ[λο]ν ἄλλο[υ]ς τῶν σοφῶν φατέον.]” (col. 
XX.1ff. Tsouna; Trans. by Tsouna. See also Rhetoric, II.244 col. XLII.15 as well as II.266 col. 
XIa.6 Sudhaus as well as the comments in Asmis 1984: 44 and Tsouna-McKirahan 2007: 72. 
432 Fr. 226 Usener. 
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involve syllogistic reasoning in any way. To do so, I turned to the Epicurean prolēpseis, 
which amount to a functional understanding of an object, and argued that the prolēpsis 
of the just does not constitute a special case compared to other prolēpseis; that is, it 
does not come about by inferential reasoning or mental perception. Finally, I discussed 
some implications of the Epicurean theory of prolēpsis for practical politics and I 
identified the main function of prolēpsis to allow perceivers to diagnose when what has 
been agreed upon as just is no longer actually just. This, I demonstrated, is particularly 
interesting because it means that for the Epicureans what is just is more than the act of 
an agreement and that there is an independent standard for assessing what is just and 
what is unjust, although justice on the whole is relative on the Epicurean view.    
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